diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c | 704 |
1 files changed, 704 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..111fbaf7d3a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/rec_layer_d1.c @@ -0,0 +1,704 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2005-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include "../ssl_local.h" +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/buffer.h> +#include "record_local.h" +#include "internal/packet.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h" + +int DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_new(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d; + + if ((d = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d))) == NULL) + return 0; + + rl->d = d; + + d->buffered_app_data = pqueue_new(); + + if (d->buffered_app_data == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(d); + rl->d = NULL; + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_free(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + if (rl->d == NULL) + return; + + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); + pqueue_free(rl->d->buffered_app_data); + OPENSSL_free(rl->d); + rl->d = NULL; +} + +void DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER *d; + pitem *item = NULL; + TLS_RECORD *rec; + pqueue *buffered_app_data; + + d = rl->d; + + while ((item = pqueue_pop(d->buffered_app_data)) != NULL) { + rec = (TLS_RECORD *)item->data; + + if (rl->s->options & SSL_OP_CLEANSE_PLAINTEXT) + OPENSSL_cleanse(rec->allocdata, rec->length); + OPENSSL_free(rec->allocdata); + OPENSSL_free(item->data); + pitem_free(item); + } + + buffered_app_data = d->buffered_app_data; + memset(d, 0, sizeof(*d)); + d->buffered_app_data = buffered_app_data; +} + +static int dtls_buffer_record(SSL_CONNECTION *s, TLS_RECORD *rec) +{ + TLS_RECORD *rdata; + pitem *item; + struct pqueue_st *queue = s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data; + + /* Limit the size of the queue to prevent DOS attacks */ + if (pqueue_size(queue) >= 100) + return 0; + + /* We don't buffer partially read records */ + if (!ossl_assert(rec->off == 0)) + return -1; + + rdata = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*rdata)); + item = pitem_new(rec->seq_num, rdata); + if (rdata == NULL || item == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(rdata); + pitem_free(item); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + *rdata = *rec; + /* + * We will release the record from the record layer soon, so we take a copy + * now. Copying data isn't good - but this should be infrequent so we + * accept it here. + */ + rdata->data = rdata->allocdata = OPENSSL_memdup(rec->data, rec->length); + if (rdata->data == NULL) { + OPENSSL_free(rdata); + pitem_free(item); + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); + return -1; + } + /* + * We use a NULL rechandle to indicate that the data field has been + * allocated by us. + */ + rdata->rechandle = NULL; + + item->data = rdata; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + /* Store bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ + if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(s->rbio) && + (ossl_statem_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED + || ossl_statem_get_state(s) == TLS_ST_CR_FINISHED)) { + BIO_ctrl(s->rbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO, + sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); + } +#endif + + if (pqueue_insert(queue, item) == NULL) { + /* Must be a duplicate so ignore it */ + OPENSSL_free(rdata->allocdata); + OPENSSL_free(rdata); + pitem_free(item); + } + + return 1; +} + +/* Unbuffer a previously buffered TLS_RECORD structure if any */ +static void dtls_unbuffer_record(SSL_CONNECTION *s) +{ + TLS_RECORD *rdata; + pitem *item; + + /* If we already have records to handle then do nothing */ + if (s->rlayer.curr_rec < s->rlayer.num_recs) + return; + + item = pqueue_pop(s->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data); + if (item != NULL) { + rdata = (TLS_RECORD *)item->data; + + s->rlayer.tlsrecs[0] = *rdata; + s->rlayer.num_recs = 1; + s->rlayer.curr_rec = 0; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + /* Restore bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo struct */ + if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(s->rbio)) { + BIO_ctrl(s->rbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO, + sizeof(rdata->recordinfo), &rdata->recordinfo); + } +#endif + + OPENSSL_free(item->data); + pitem_free(item); + } +} + +/*- + * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. + * 'type' is one of the following: + * + * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE + * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) + * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) + * + * If we don't have stored data to work from, read an SSL/TLS record first + * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). + * + * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as + * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec + * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recd_type| + * argument is non NULL. + * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store + * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol + * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): + * Change cipher spec protocol + * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored + * Alert protocol + * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) + * Handshake protocol + * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have + * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages + * here, anything else is handled by higher layers + * Application data protocol + * none of our business + */ +int dtls1_read_bytes(SSL *s, uint8_t type, uint8_t *recvd_type, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, + int peek, size_t *readbytes) +{ + int i, j, ret; + size_t n; + TLS_RECORD *rr; + void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; + SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); + + if (sc == NULL) + return -1; + + if ((type && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) && + (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) || + (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(sc) && SSL_in_init(s)) { + /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ + i = sc->handshake_func(s); + /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ + if (i < 0) + return i; + if (i == 0) + return -1; + } + + start: + sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + + /* + * We are not handshaking and have no data yet, so process data buffered + * during the last handshake in advance, if any. + */ + if (SSL_is_init_finished(s)) + dtls_unbuffer_record(sc); + + /* Check for timeout */ + if (dtls1_handle_timeout(sc) > 0) { + goto start; + } else if (ossl_statem_in_error(sc)) { + /* dtls1_handle_timeout() has failed with a fatal error */ + return -1; + } + + /* get new packet if necessary */ + if (sc->rlayer.curr_rec >= sc->rlayer.num_recs) { + sc->rlayer.curr_rec = sc->rlayer.num_recs = 0; + do { + rr = &sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[sc->rlayer.num_recs]; + + ret = HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(sc, + sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->read_record(sc->rlayer.rrl, + &rr->rechandle, + &rr->version, &rr->type, + &rr->data, &rr->length, + &rr->epoch, rr->seq_num)); + if (ret <= 0) { + ret = dtls1_read_failed(sc, ret); + /* + * Anything other than a timeout is an error. SSLfatal() already + * called if appropriate. + */ + if (ret <= 0) + return ret; + else + goto start; + } + rr->off = 0; + sc->rlayer.num_recs++; + } while (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl) + && sc->rlayer.num_recs < SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); + } + rr = &sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[sc->rlayer.curr_rec]; + + /* + * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty + * record that isn't an alert. + */ + if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0) + sc->rlayer.alert_count = 0; + + /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ + + if (sc->s3.change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, + * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ + && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { + /* + * We now have application data between CCS and Finished. Most likely + * the packets were reordered on their way, so buffer the application + * data for later processing rather than dropping the connection. + */ + if (dtls_buffer_record(sc, rr) < 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return -1; + } + if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) + return -1; + goto start; + } + + /* + * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in + * 'peek' mode) + */ + if (sc->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { + if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) + return -1; + sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + return 0; + } + + if (type == rr->type + || (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC + && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL)) { + /* + * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or + * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or + * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC + */ + /* + * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are + * doing a handshake for the first time + */ + if (SSL_in_init(s) && (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) + && (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(sc))) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); + return -1; + } + + if (recvd_type != NULL) + *recvd_type = rr->type; + + if (len == 0) { + /* + * Release a zero length record. This ensures multiple calls to + * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause + * SSL_pending() to report data as being available. + */ + if (rr->length == 0 && !ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) + return -1; + return 0; + } + + if (len > rr->length) + n = rr->length; + else + n = len; + + memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); + if (peek) { + if (rr->length == 0 && !ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) + return -1; + } else { + if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, n)) + return -1; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + /* + * We might had to delay a close_notify alert because of reordered + * app data. If there was an alert and there is no message to read + * anymore, finally set shutdown. + */ + if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && + sc->d1->shutdown_received + && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)) <= 0) { + sc->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + return 0; + } +#endif + *readbytes = n; + return 1; + } + + /* + * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, + * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello). + */ + + if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { + unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr; + const unsigned char *alert_bytes = rr->data + rr->off; + PACKET alert; + + if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, rr->length) + || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level) + || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr) + || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT); + return -1; + } + + if (sc->msg_callback) + sc->msg_callback(0, sc->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, s, + sc->msg_callback_arg); + + if (sc->info_callback != NULL) + cb = sc->info_callback; + else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->ctx->info_callback; + + if (cb != NULL) { + j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; + cb(s, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); + } + + if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { + sc->s3.warn_alert = alert_descr; + if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) + return -1; + + sc->rlayer.alert_count++; + if (sc->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); + return -1; + } + + if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY) { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + /* + * With SCTP and streams the socket may deliver app data + * after a close_notify alert. We have to check this first so + * that nothing gets discarded. + */ + if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s)) && + BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s)) > 0) { + sc->d1->shutdown_received = 1; + sc->rwstate = SSL_READING; + BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); + BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); + return -1; + } +#endif + sc->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + return 0; + } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { + /* + * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested + * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal + * alert because if the application tried to renegotiate it + * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In + * the future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care + * if the peer refused it where we carry on. + */ + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + return -1; + } + } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL) { + sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + sc->s3.fatal_alert = alert_descr; + SSLfatal_data(sc, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, + SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr, + "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr); + sc->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) + return -1; + SSL_CTX_remove_session(sc->session_ctx, sc->session); + return 0; + } else { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); + return -1; + } + + goto start; + } + + if (sc->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { /* but we have not received a + * shutdown */ + sc->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) + return -1; + return 0; + } + + if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + /* + * We can't process a CCS now, because previous handshake messages + * are still missing, so just drop it. + */ + if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) + return -1; + goto start; + } + + /* + * Unexpected handshake message (Client Hello, or protocol violation) + */ + if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(sc)) { + struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; + + /* + * This may just be a stale retransmit. Also sanity check that we have + * at least enough record bytes for a message header + */ + if (rr->epoch != sc->rlayer.d->r_epoch + || rr->length < DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { + if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) + return -1; + goto start; + } + + dtls1_get_message_header(rr->data, &msg_hdr); + + /* + * If we are server, we may have a repeated FINISHED of the client + * here, then retransmit our CCS and FINISHED. + */ + if (msg_hdr.type == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { + if (dtls1_check_timeout_num(sc) < 0) { + /* SSLfatal) already called */ + return -1; + } + + if (dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(sc) <= 0) { + /* Fail if we encountered a fatal error */ + if (ossl_statem_in_error(sc)) + return -1; + } + if (!ssl_release_record(sc, rr, 0)) + return -1; + if (!(sc->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { + if (!sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->unprocessed_read_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl)) { + /* no read-ahead left? */ + BIO *bio; + + sc->rwstate = SSL_READING; + bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); + BIO_set_retry_read(bio); + return -1; + } + } + goto start; + } + + /* + * To get here we must be trying to read app data but found handshake + * data. But if we're trying to read app data, and we're not in init + * (which is tested for at the top of this function) then init must be + * finished + */ + if (!ossl_assert(SSL_is_init_finished(s))) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */ + ossl_statem_set_in_init(sc, 1); + + i = sc->handshake_func(s); + /* SSLfatal() called if appropriate */ + if (i < 0) + return i; + if (i == 0) + return -1; + + if (!(sc->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { + if (!sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->unprocessed_read_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl)) { + /* no read-ahead left? */ + BIO *bio; + /* + * In the case where we try to read application data, but we + * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry + * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty + * problems in the blocking world + */ + sc->rwstate = SSL_READING; + bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); + BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); + BIO_set_retry_read(bio); + return -1; + } + } + goto start; + } + + switch (rr->type) { + default: + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); + return -1; + case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + case SSL3_RT_ALERT: + case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: + /* + * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of + * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but + * that should not happen when type != rr->type + */ + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: + /* + * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have + * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() + * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read + * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet + * started), we will indulge it. + */ + if (sc->s3.in_read_app_data && + (sc->s3.total_renegotiations != 0) && + ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(sc)) { + sc->s3.in_read_app_data = 2; + return -1; + } else { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); + return -1; + } + } + /* not reached */ +} + +/* + * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if + * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. + */ +int dtls1_write_bytes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint8_t type, const void *buf, + size_t len, size_t *written) +{ + int i; + + if (!ossl_assert(len <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + i = do_dtls1_write(s, type, buf, len, written); + return i; +} + +int do_dtls1_write(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, uint8_t type, const unsigned char *buf, + size_t len, size_t *written) +{ + int i; + OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE tmpl; + SSL *s = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(sc); + int ret; + + /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ + if (sc->s3.alert_dispatch > 0) { + i = s->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(s); + if (i <= 0) + return i; + /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ + } + + if (len == 0) + return 0; + + if (len > ssl_get_max_send_fragment(sc)) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_EXCEEDS_MAX_FRAGMENT_SIZE); + return 0; + } + + tmpl.type = type; + /* + * Special case: for hello verify request, client version 1.0 and we + * haven't decided which version to use yet send back using version 1.0 + * header: otherwise some clients will ignore it. + */ + if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION + && sc->max_proto_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) + tmpl.version = DTLS1_VERSION; + else + tmpl.version = sc->version; + tmpl.buf = buf; + tmpl.buflen = len; + + ret = HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(sc, + sc->rlayer.wrlmethod->write_records(sc->rlayer.wrl, &tmpl, 1)); + + if (ret > 0) + *written = (int)len; + + return ret; +} + +void dtls1_increment_epoch(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int rw) +{ + if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) { + s->rlayer.d->r_epoch++; + + /* + * We must not use any buffered messages received from the previous + * epoch + */ + dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); + } else { + s->rlayer.d->w_epoch++; + } +} + +uint16_t dtls1_get_epoch(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int rw) { + uint16_t epoch; + + if (rw & SSL3_CC_READ) + epoch = s->rlayer.d->r_epoch; + else + epoch = s->rlayer.d->w_epoch; + + return epoch; +} |