diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c | 1488 |
1 files changed, 1488 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..889b12dd66d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c @@ -0,0 +1,1488 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include "internal/e_os.h" + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <limits.h> +#include <errno.h> +#include <assert.h> +#include "../ssl_local.h" +#include "../quic/quic_local.h" +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/buffer.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/core_names.h> +#include "record_local.h" +#include "internal/packet.h" +#include "internal/comp.h" +#include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h" + +void RECORD_LAYER_init(RECORD_LAYER *rl, SSL_CONNECTION *s) +{ + rl->s = s; +} + +int RECORD_LAYER_clear(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + int ret = 1; + + /* Clear any buffered records we no longer need */ + while (rl->curr_rec < rl->num_recs) + ret &= ssl_release_record(rl->s, + &(rl->tlsrecs[rl->curr_rec++]), + 0); + + + rl->wnum = 0; + memset(rl->handshake_fragment, 0, sizeof(rl->handshake_fragment)); + rl->handshake_fragment_len = 0; + rl->wpend_tot = 0; + rl->wpend_type = 0; + rl->wpend_buf = NULL; + rl->alert_count = 0; + rl->num_recs = 0; + rl->curr_rec = 0; + + BIO_free(rl->rrlnext); + rl->rrlnext = NULL; + + if (rl->rrlmethod != NULL) + rl->rrlmethod->free(rl->rrl); /* Ignore return value */ + if (rl->wrlmethod != NULL) + rl->wrlmethod->free(rl->wrl); /* Ignore return value */ + BIO_free(rl->rrlnext); + rl->rrlmethod = NULL; + rl->wrlmethod = NULL; + rl->rrlnext = NULL; + rl->rrl = NULL; + rl->wrl = NULL; + + if (rl->d) + DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); + + return ret; +} + +int RECORD_LAYER_reset(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + int ret; + + ret = RECORD_LAYER_clear(rl); + + /* We try and reset both record layers even if one fails */ + ret &= ssl_set_new_record_layer(rl->s, + SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl->s) + ? DTLS_ANY_VERSION : TLS_ANY_VERSION, + OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ, + OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NID_undef, NULL, NULL, NULL); + + ret &= ssl_set_new_record_layer(rl->s, + SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl->s) + ? DTLS_ANY_VERSION : TLS_ANY_VERSION, + OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE, + OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE, NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + NID_undef, NULL, NULL, NULL); + + /* SSLfatal already called in the event of failure */ + return ret; +} + +/* Checks if we have unprocessed read ahead data pending */ +int RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + return rl->rrlmethod->unprocessed_read_pending(rl->rrl); +} + +/* Checks if we have decrypted unread record data pending */ +int RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + return (rl->curr_rec < rl->num_recs) + || rl->rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(rl->rrl); +} + +int RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(const RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + return rl->wpend_tot > 0; +} + +static uint32_t ossl_get_max_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s) +{ + uint32_t max_early_data; + SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; + + /* + * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the + * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early + * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data. + */ + if (!s->server && sess->ext.max_early_data == 0) { + if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL + && s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + sess = s->psksession; + } + + if (!s->server) + max_early_data = sess->ext.max_early_data; + else if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) + max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data; + else + max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data < sess->ext.max_early_data + ? s->recv_max_early_data : sess->ext.max_early_data; + + return max_early_data; +} + +static int ossl_early_data_count_ok(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t length, + size_t overhead, int send) +{ + uint32_t max_early_data; + + max_early_data = ossl_get_max_early_data(s); + + if (max_early_data == 0) { + SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); + return 0; + } + + /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */ + max_early_data += overhead; + + if (s->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) { + SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); + return 0; + } + s->early_data_count += length; + + return 1; +} + +size_t ssl3_pending(const SSL *s) +{ + size_t i, num = 0; + const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); + + if (sc == NULL) + return 0; + + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc)) { + TLS_RECORD *rdata; + pitem *item, *iter; + + iter = pqueue_iterator(sc->rlayer.d->buffered_app_data); + while ((item = pqueue_next(&iter)) != NULL) { + rdata = item->data; + num += rdata->length; + } + } + + for (i = 0; i < sc->rlayer.num_recs; i++) { + if (sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[i].type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) + return num; + num += sc->rlayer.tlsrecs[i].length; + } + + num += sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->app_data_pending(sc->rlayer.rrl); + + return num; +} + +void SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t len) +{ + ctx->default_read_buf_len = len; +} + +void SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(SSL *s, size_t len) +{ + SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); + + if (sc == NULL || IS_QUIC(s)) + return; + sc->rlayer.default_read_buf_len = len; +} + +const char *SSL_rstate_string_long(const SSL *s) +{ + const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); + const char *lng; + + if (sc == NULL) + return NULL; + + if (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod == NULL || sc->rlayer.rrl == NULL) + return "unknown"; + + sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_state(sc->rlayer.rrl, NULL, &lng); + + return lng; +} + +const char *SSL_rstate_string(const SSL *s) +{ + const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s); + const char *shrt; + + if (sc == NULL) + return NULL; + + if (sc->rlayer.rrlmethod == NULL || sc->rlayer.rrl == NULL) + return "unknown"; + + sc->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_state(sc->rlayer.rrl, &shrt, NULL); + + return shrt; +} + +static int tls_write_check_pending(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint8_t type, + const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == 0) + return 0; + + /* We have pending data, so do some sanity checks */ + if ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot > len) + || (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER) + && (s->rlayer.wpend_buf != buf)) + || (s->rlayer.wpend_type != type)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); + return -1; + } + return 1; +} + +/* + * Call this to write data in records of type 'type' It will return <= 0 if + * not all data has been sent or non-blocking IO. + */ +int ssl3_write_bytes(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type, const void *buf_, size_t len, + size_t *written) +{ + const unsigned char *buf = buf_; + size_t tot; + size_t n, max_send_fragment, split_send_fragment, maxpipes; + int i; + SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl); + OSSL_RECORD_TEMPLATE tmpls[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; + unsigned int recversion; + + if (s == NULL) + return -1; + + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + tot = s->rlayer.wnum; + /* + * ensure that if we end up with a smaller value of data to write out + * than the original len from a write which didn't complete for + * non-blocking I/O and also somehow ended up avoiding the check for + * this in tls_write_check_pending/SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY as it must never be + * possible to end up with (len-tot) as a large number that will then + * promptly send beyond the end of the users buffer ... so we trap and + * report the error in a way the user will notice + */ + if ((len < s->rlayer.wnum) + || ((s->rlayer.wpend_tot != 0) + && (len < (s->rlayer.wnum + s->rlayer.wpend_tot)))) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + return -1; + } + + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING + && !ossl_early_data_count_ok(s, len, 0, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return -1; + } + + s->rlayer.wnum = 0; + + /* + * If we are supposed to be sending a KeyUpdate or NewSessionTicket then go + * into init unless we have writes pending - in which case we should finish + * doing that first. + */ + if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == 0 && (s->key_update != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE + || s->ext.extra_tickets_expected > 0)) + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + + /* + * When writing early data on the server side we could be "in_init" in + * between receiving the EoED and the CF - but we don't want to handle those + * messages yet. + */ + if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) + && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING) { + i = s->handshake_func(ssl); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + if (i < 0) + return i; + if (i == 0) { + return -1; + } + } + + i = tls_write_check_pending(s, type, buf, len); + if (i < 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return i; + } else if (i > 0) { + /* Retry needed */ + i = HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s, + s->rlayer.wrlmethod->retry_write_records(s->rlayer.wrl)); + if (i <= 0) { + s->rlayer.wnum = tot; + return i; + } + tot += s->rlayer.wpend_tot; + s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0; + } /* else no retry required */ + + if (tot == 0) { + /* + * We've not previously sent any data for this write so memorize + * arguments so that we can detect bad write retries later + */ + s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0; + s->rlayer.wpend_type = type; + s->rlayer.wpend_buf = buf; + } + + if (tot == len) { /* done? */ + *written = tot; + return 1; + } + + /* If we have an alert to send, lets send it */ + if (s->s3.alert_dispatch > 0) { + i = ssl->method->ssl_dispatch_alert(ssl); + if (i <= 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ + s->rlayer.wnum = tot; + return i; + } + /* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */ + } + + n = (len - tot); + + max_send_fragment = ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s); + split_send_fragment = ssl_get_split_send_fragment(s); + + if (max_send_fragment == 0 + || split_send_fragment == 0 + || split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) { + /* + * We should have prevented this when we set/get the split and max send + * fragments so we shouldn't get here + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + /* + * Some servers hang if initial client hello is larger than 256 bytes + * and record version number > TLS 1.0 + */ + recversion = (s->version == TLS1_3_VERSION) ? TLS1_2_VERSION : s->version; + if (SSL_get_state(ssl) == TLS_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO + && !s->renegotiate + && TLS1_get_version(ssl) > TLS1_VERSION + && s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_NONE) + recversion = TLS1_VERSION; + + for (;;) { + size_t tmppipelen, remain; + size_t j, lensofar = 0; + + /* + * Ask the record layer how it would like to split the amount of data + * that we have, and how many of those records it would like in one go. + */ + maxpipes = s->rlayer.wrlmethod->get_max_records(s->rlayer.wrl, type, n, + max_send_fragment, + &split_send_fragment); + /* + * If max_pipelines is 0 then this means "undefined" and we default to + * whatever the record layer wants to do. Otherwise we use the smallest + * value from the number requested by the record layer, and max number + * configured by the user. + */ + if (s->max_pipelines > 0 && maxpipes > s->max_pipelines) + maxpipes = s->max_pipelines; + + if (maxpipes > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) + maxpipes = SSL_MAX_PIPELINES; + + if (split_send_fragment > max_send_fragment) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + if (n / maxpipes >= split_send_fragment) { + /* + * We have enough data to completely fill all available + * pipelines + */ + for (j = 0; j < maxpipes; j++) { + tmpls[j].type = type; + tmpls[j].version = recversion; + tmpls[j].buf = &(buf[tot]) + (j * split_send_fragment); + tmpls[j].buflen = split_send_fragment; + } + /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */ + s->rlayer.wpend_tot = maxpipes * split_send_fragment; + } else { + /* We can partially fill all available pipelines */ + tmppipelen = n / maxpipes; + remain = n % maxpipes; + /* + * If there is a remainder we add an extra byte to the first few + * pipelines + */ + if (remain > 0) + tmppipelen++; + for (j = 0; j < maxpipes; j++) { + tmpls[j].type = type; + tmpls[j].version = recversion; + tmpls[j].buf = &(buf[tot]) + lensofar; + tmpls[j].buflen = tmppipelen; + lensofar += tmppipelen; + if (j + 1 == remain) + tmppipelen--; + } + /* Remember how much data we are going to be sending */ + s->rlayer.wpend_tot = n; + } + + i = HANDLE_RLAYER_WRITE_RETURN(s, + s->rlayer.wrlmethod->write_records(s->rlayer.wrl, tmpls, maxpipes)); + if (i <= 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ + s->rlayer.wnum = tot; + return i; + } + + if (s->rlayer.wpend_tot == n + || (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA + && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE) != 0)) { + *written = tot + s->rlayer.wpend_tot; + s->rlayer.wpend_tot = 0; + return 1; + } + + n -= s->rlayer.wpend_tot; + tot += s->rlayer.wpend_tot; + } +} + +int ossl_tls_handle_rlayer_return(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int writing, int ret, + char *file, int line) +{ + SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); + + if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_RETRY) { + s->rwstate = writing ? SSL_WRITING : SSL_READING; + ret = -1; + } else { + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF) { + if (writing) { + /* + * This shouldn't happen with a writing operation. We treat it + * as fatal. + */ + ERR_new(); + ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0); + ossl_statem_fatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR, NULL); + ret = OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL; + } else if ((s->options & SSL_OP_IGNORE_UNEXPECTED_EOF) != 0) { + SSL_set_shutdown(ssl, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN); + s->s3.warn_alert = SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY; + } else { + ERR_new(); + ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0); + /* + * This reason code is part of the API and may be used by + * applications for control flow decisions. + */ + ossl_statem_fatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, + SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_EOF_WHILE_READING, NULL); + } + } else if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL) { + int al = s->rlayer.rrlmethod->get_alert_code(s->rlayer.rrl); + + if (al != SSL_AD_NO_ALERT) { + ERR_new(); + ERR_set_debug(file, line, 0); + ossl_statem_fatal(s, al, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE, NULL); + } + /* + * else some failure but there is no alert code. We don't log an + * error for this. The record layer should have logged an error + * already or, if not, its due to some sys call error which will be + * reported via SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL and errno. + */ + } + /* + * The record layer distinguishes the cases of EOF, non-fatal + * err and retry. Upper layers do not. + * If we got a retry or success then *ret is already correct, + * otherwise we need to convert the return value. + */ + if (ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR || ret == OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_EOF) + ret = 0; + else if (ret < OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR) + ret = -1; + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Release data from a record. + * If length == 0 then we will release the entire record. + */ +int ssl_release_record(SSL_CONNECTION *s, TLS_RECORD *rr, size_t length) +{ + assert(rr->length >= length); + if (rr->rechandle != NULL) { + if (length == 0) + length = rr->length; + /* The record layer allocated the buffers for this record */ + if (HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s, + s->rlayer.rrlmethod->release_record(s->rlayer.rrl, + rr->rechandle, + length)) <= 0) { + /* RLAYER_fatal already called */ + return 0; + } + + if (length == rr->length) + s->rlayer.curr_rec++; + } else if (length == 0 || length == rr->length) { + /* We allocated the buffers for this record (only happens with DTLS) */ + OPENSSL_free(rr->allocdata); + rr->allocdata = NULL; + s->rlayer.curr_rec++; + } + rr->length -= length; + if (rr->length > 0) + rr->off += length; + else + rr->off = 0; + + return 1; +} + +/*- + * Return up to 'len' payload bytes received in 'type' records. + * 'type' is one of the following: + * + * - SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE (when tls_get_message_header and tls_get_message_body + * call us) + * - SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA (when ssl3_read calls us) + * - 0 (during a shutdown, no data has to be returned) + * + * If we don't have stored data to work from, read an SSL/TLS record first + * (possibly multiple records if we still don't have anything to return). + * + * This function must handle any surprises the peer may have for us, such as + * Alert records (e.g. close_notify) or renegotiation requests. ChangeCipherSpec + * messages are treated as if they were handshake messages *if* the |recvd_type| + * argument is non NULL. + * Also if record payloads contain fragments too small to process, we store + * them until there is enough for the respective protocol (the record protocol + * may use arbitrary fragmentation and even interleaving): + * Change cipher spec protocol + * just 1 byte needed, no need for keeping anything stored + * Alert protocol + * 2 bytes needed (AlertLevel, AlertDescription) + * Handshake protocol + * 4 bytes needed (HandshakeType, uint24 length) -- we just have + * to detect unexpected Client Hello and Hello Request messages + * here, anything else is handled by higher layers + * Application data protocol + * none of our business + */ +int ssl3_read_bytes(SSL *ssl, uint8_t type, uint8_t *recvd_type, + unsigned char *buf, size_t len, + int peek, size_t *readbytes) +{ + int i, j, ret; + size_t n, curr_rec, totalbytes; + TLS_RECORD *rr; + void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type2, int val) = NULL; + int is_tls13; + SSL_CONNECTION *s = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL_ONLY(ssl); + + is_tls13 = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s); + + if ((type != 0 + && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) + && (type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) + || (peek && (type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA))) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + if ((type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) + /* (partially) satisfy request from storage */ + { + unsigned char *src = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; + unsigned char *dst = buf; + unsigned int k; + + /* peek == 0 */ + n = 0; + while ((len > 0) && (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0)) { + *dst++ = *src++; + len--; + s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len--; + n++; + } + /* move any remaining fragment bytes: */ + for (k = 0; k < s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; k++) + s->rlayer.handshake_fragment[k] = *src++; + + if (recvd_type != NULL) + *recvd_type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; + + *readbytes = n; + return 1; + } + + /* + * Now s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 0 if type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE. + */ + + if (!ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) && SSL_in_init(ssl)) { + /* type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ + i = s->handshake_func(ssl); + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + if (i < 0) + return i; + if (i == 0) + return -1; + } + start: + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + + /*- + * For each record 'i' up to |num_recs] + * rr[i].type - is the type of record + * rr[i].data, - data + * rr[i].off, - offset into 'data' for next read + * rr[i].length, - number of bytes. + */ + /* get new records if necessary */ + if (s->rlayer.curr_rec >= s->rlayer.num_recs) { + s->rlayer.curr_rec = s->rlayer.num_recs = 0; + do { + rr = &s->rlayer.tlsrecs[s->rlayer.num_recs]; + + ret = HANDLE_RLAYER_READ_RETURN(s, + s->rlayer.rrlmethod->read_record(s->rlayer.rrl, + &rr->rechandle, + &rr->version, &rr->type, + &rr->data, &rr->length, + NULL, NULL)); + if (ret <= 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ + return ret; + } + rr->off = 0; + s->rlayer.num_recs++; + } while (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->processed_read_pending(s->rlayer.rrl) + && s->rlayer.num_recs < SSL_MAX_PIPELINES); + } + rr = &s->rlayer.tlsrecs[s->rlayer.curr_rec]; + + if (s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0 + && rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE + && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_R_MIXED_HANDSHAKE_AND_NON_HANDSHAKE_DATA); + return -1; + } + + /* + * Reset the count of consecutive warning alerts if we've got a non-empty + * record that isn't an alert. + */ + if (rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && rr->length != 0) + s->rlayer.alert_count = 0; + + /* we now have a packet which can be read and processed */ + + if (s->s3.change_cipher_spec /* set when we receive ChangeCipherSpec, + * reset by ssl3_get_finished */ + && (rr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_R_DATA_BETWEEN_CCS_AND_FINISHED); + return -1; + } + + /* + * If the other end has shut down, throw anything we read away (even in + * 'peek' mode) + */ + if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { + s->rlayer.curr_rec++; + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + return 0; + } + + if (type == rr->type + || (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC + && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE && recvd_type != NULL + && !is_tls13)) { + /* + * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA or + * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or + * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC + */ + /* + * make sure that we are not getting application data when we are + * doing a handshake for the first time + */ + if (SSL_in_init(ssl) && type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA + && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_APP_DATA_IN_HANDSHAKE); + return -1; + } + + if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE + && rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC + && s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len > 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + return -1; + } + + if (recvd_type != NULL) + *recvd_type = rr->type; + + if (len == 0) { + /* + * Skip a zero length record. This ensures multiple calls to + * SSL_read() with a zero length buffer will eventually cause + * SSL_pending() to report data as being available. + */ + if (rr->length == 0 && !ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0)) + return -1; + + return 0; + } + + totalbytes = 0; + curr_rec = s->rlayer.curr_rec; + do { + if (len - totalbytes > rr->length) + n = rr->length; + else + n = len - totalbytes; + + memcpy(buf, &(rr->data[rr->off]), n); + buf += n; + if (peek) { + /* Mark any zero length record as consumed CVE-2016-6305 */ + if (rr->length == 0 && !ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0)) + return -1; + } else { + if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, n)) + return -1; + } + if (rr->length == 0 + || (peek && n == rr->length)) { + rr++; + curr_rec++; + } + totalbytes += n; + } while (type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA + && curr_rec < s->rlayer.num_recs + && totalbytes < len); + if (totalbytes == 0) { + /* We must have read empty records. Get more data */ + goto start; + } + *readbytes = totalbytes; + return 1; + } + + /* + * If we get here, then type != rr->type; if we have a handshake message, + * then it was unexpected (Hello Request or Client Hello) or invalid (we + * were actually expecting a CCS). + */ + + /* + * Lets just double check that we've not got an SSLv2 record + */ + if (rr->version == SSL2_VERSION) { + /* + * Should never happen. ssl3_get_record() should only give us an SSLv2 + * record back if this is the first packet and we are looking for an + * initial ClientHello. Therefore |type| should always be equal to + * |rr->type|. If not then something has gone horribly wrong + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + } + + if (ssl->method->version == TLS_ANY_VERSION + && (s->server || rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT)) { + /* + * If we've got this far and still haven't decided on what version + * we're using then this must be a client side alert we're dealing + * with. We shouldn't be receiving anything other than a ClientHello + * if we are a server. + */ + s->version = rr->version; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); + return -1; + } + + /*- + * s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len == 4 iff rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; + * (Possibly rr is 'empty' now, i.e. rr->length may be 0.) + */ + + if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { + unsigned int alert_level, alert_descr; + const unsigned char *alert_bytes = rr->data + rr->off; + PACKET alert; + + if (!PACKET_buf_init(&alert, alert_bytes, rr->length) + || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_level) + || !PACKET_get_1(&alert, &alert_descr) + || PACKET_remaining(&alert) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_INVALID_ALERT); + return -1; + } + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_ALERT, alert_bytes, 2, ssl, + s->msg_callback_arg); + + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->info_callback; + else if (ssl->ctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb = ssl->ctx->info_callback; + + if (cb != NULL) { + j = (alert_level << 8) | alert_descr; + cb(ssl, SSL_CB_READ_ALERT, j); + } + + if ((!is_tls13 && alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) + || (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED)) { + s->s3.warn_alert = alert_descr; + if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0)) + return -1; + + s->rlayer.alert_count++; + if (s->rlayer.alert_count == MAX_WARN_ALERT_COUNT) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_R_TOO_MANY_WARN_ALERTS); + return -1; + } + } + + /* + * Apart from close_notify the only other warning alert in TLSv1.3 + * is user_cancelled - which we just ignore. + */ + if (is_tls13 && alert_descr == SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED) { + goto start; + } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY + && (is_tls13 || alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING)) { + s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + return 0; + } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_FATAL || is_tls13) { + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; + s->s3.fatal_alert = alert_descr; + SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, + SSL_AD_REASON_OFFSET + alert_descr, + "SSL alert number %d", alert_descr); + s->shutdown |= SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN; + if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0)) + return -1; + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); + return 0; + } else if (alert_descr == SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION) { + /* + * This is a warning but we receive it if we requested + * renegotiation and the peer denied it. Terminate with a fatal + * alert because if the application tried to renegotiate it + * presumably had a good reason and expects it to succeed. In + * the future we might have a renegotiation where we don't care + * if the peer refused it where we carry on. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + return -1; + } else if (alert_level == SSL3_AL_WARNING) { + /* We ignore any other warning alert in TLSv1.2 and below */ + goto start; + } + + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_ALERT_TYPE); + return -1; + } + + if ((s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) != 0) { + if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { + BIO *rbio; + + /* + * We ignore any handshake messages sent to us unless they are + * TLSv1.3 in which case we want to process them. For all other + * handshake messages we can't do anything reasonable with them + * because we are unable to write any response due to having already + * sent close_notify. + */ + if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0)) + return -1; + + if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY) != 0) + goto start; + + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + rbio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl); + BIO_clear_retry_flags(rbio); + BIO_set_retry_read(rbio); + return -1; + } + } else { + /* + * The peer is continuing to send application data, but we have + * already sent close_notify. If this was expected we should have + * been called via SSL_read() and this would have been handled + * above. + * No alert sent because we already sent close_notify + */ + if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0)) + return -1; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, + SSL_R_APPLICATION_DATA_AFTER_CLOSE_NOTIFY); + return -1; + } + } + + /* + * For handshake data we have 'fragment' storage, so fill that so that we + * can process the header at a fixed place. This is done after the + * "SHUTDOWN" code above to avoid filling the fragment storage with data + * that we're just going to discard. + */ + if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { + size_t dest_maxlen = sizeof(s->rlayer.handshake_fragment); + unsigned char *dest = s->rlayer.handshake_fragment; + size_t *dest_len = &s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len; + + n = dest_maxlen - *dest_len; /* available space in 'dest' */ + if (rr->length < n) + n = rr->length; /* available bytes */ + + /* now move 'n' bytes: */ + if (n > 0) { + memcpy(dest + *dest_len, rr->data + rr->off, n); + *dest_len += n; + } + /* + * We release the number of bytes consumed, or the whole record if it + * is zero length + */ + if ((n > 0 || rr->length == 0) && !ssl_release_record(s, rr, n)) + return -1; + + if (*dest_len < dest_maxlen) + goto start; /* fragment was too small */ + } + + if (rr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + return -1; + } + + /* + * Unexpected handshake message (ClientHello, NewSessionTicket (TLS1.3) or + * protocol violation) + */ + if ((s->rlayer.handshake_fragment_len >= 4) + && !ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) { + int ined = (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING); + + /* We found handshake data, so we're going back into init */ + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + + i = s->handshake_func(ssl); + /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ + if (i < 0) + return i; + if (i == 0) { + return -1; + } + + /* + * If we were actually trying to read early data and we found a + * handshake message, then we don't want to continue to try and read + * the application data any more. It won't be "early" now. + */ + if (ined) + return -1; + + if (!(s->mode & SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY)) { + if (!RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { + BIO *bio; + /* + * In the case where we try to read application data, but we + * trigger an SSL handshake, we return -1 with the retry + * option set. Otherwise renegotiation may cause nasty + * problems in the blocking world + */ + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl); + BIO_clear_retry_flags(bio); + BIO_set_retry_read(bio); + return -1; + } + } + goto start; + } + + switch (rr->type) { + default: + /* + * TLS 1.0 and 1.1 say you SHOULD ignore unrecognised record types, but + * TLS 1.2 says you MUST send an unexpected message alert. We use the + * TLS 1.2 behaviour for all protocol versions to prevent issues where + * no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised + * record types, using up resources processing them. + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); + return -1; + case SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC: + case SSL3_RT_ALERT: + case SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE: + /* + * we already handled all of these, with the possible exception of + * SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE when ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s) is true, but + * that should not happen when type != rr->type + */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return -1; + case SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA: + /* + * At this point, we were expecting handshake data, but have + * application data. If the library was running inside ssl3_read() + * (i.e. in_read_app_data is set) and it makes sense to read + * application data at this point (session renegotiation not yet + * started), we will indulge it. + */ + if (ossl_statem_app_data_allowed(s)) { + s->s3.in_read_app_data = 2; + return -1; + } else if (ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { + /* + * This can happen after a client sends a CH followed by early_data, + * but the server responds with a HelloRetryRequest. The server + * reads the next record from the client expecting to find a + * plaintext ClientHello but gets a record which appears to be + * application data. The trial decrypt "works" because null + * decryption was applied. We just skip it and move on to the next + * record. + */ + if (!ossl_early_data_count_ok(s, rr->length, + EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return -1; + } + if (!ssl_release_record(s, rr, 0)) + return -1; + goto start; + } else { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_RECORD); + return -1; + } + } +} + +/* + * Returns true if the current rrec was sent in SSLv2 backwards compatible + * format and false otherwise. + */ +int RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(RECORD_LAYER *rl) +{ + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(rl->s)) + return 0; + return rl->tlsrecs[0].version == SSL2_VERSION; +} + +static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_msg_callback_fn rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper; +static void rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper(int write_p, int version, + int content_type, const void *buf, + size_t len, void *cbarg) +{ + SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg; + SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s); + + if (s->msg_callback != NULL) + s->msg_callback(write_p, version, content_type, buf, len, ssl, + s->msg_callback_arg); +} + +static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_security_fn rlayer_security_wrapper; +static int rlayer_security_wrapper(void *cbarg, int op, int bits, int nid, + void *other) +{ + SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg; + + return ssl_security(s, op, bits, nid, other); +} + +static OSSL_FUNC_rlayer_padding_fn rlayer_padding_wrapper; +static size_t rlayer_padding_wrapper(void *cbarg, int type, size_t len) +{ + SSL_CONNECTION *s = cbarg; + SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s); + + return s->rlayer.record_padding_cb(ssl, type, len, + s->rlayer.record_padding_arg); +} + +static const OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch[] = { + { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SKIP_EARLY_DATA, (void (*)(void))ossl_statem_skip_early_data }, + { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))rlayer_msg_callback_wrapper }, + { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_SECURITY, (void (*)(void))rlayer_security_wrapper }, + { OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING, (void (*)(void))rlayer_padding_wrapper }, + OSSL_DISPATCH_END +}; + +void ossl_ssl_set_custom_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s, + const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *meth, + void *rlarg) +{ + s->rlayer.custom_rlmethod = meth; + s->rlayer.rlarg = rlarg; +} + +static const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *ssl_select_next_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s, + int direction, + int level) +{ + if (s->rlayer.custom_rlmethod != NULL) + return s->rlayer.custom_rlmethod; + + if (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE) { + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) + return &ossl_dtls_record_method; + + return &ossl_tls_record_method; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS + /* KTLS does not support renegotiation */ + if (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION + && (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_KTLS) != 0 + && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))) + return &ossl_ktls_record_method; +#endif + + /* Default to the current OSSL_RECORD_METHOD */ + return direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ ? s->rlayer.rrlmethod + : s->rlayer.wrlmethod; +} + +static int ssl_post_record_layer_select(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int direction) +{ + const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *thismethod; + OSSL_RECORD_LAYER *thisrl; + + if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) { + thismethod = s->rlayer.rrlmethod; + thisrl = s->rlayer.rrl; + } else { + thismethod = s->rlayer.wrlmethod; + thisrl = s->rlayer.wrl; + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS + { + SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); + + if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod == &ossl_ktls_record_method) { + /* KTLS does not support renegotiation so disallow it */ + SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION); + } + } +#endif + if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) && thismethod->set_first_handshake != NULL) + thismethod->set_first_handshake(thisrl, 1); + + if (s->max_pipelines != 0 && thismethod->set_max_pipelines != NULL) + thismethod->set_max_pipelines(thisrl, s->max_pipelines); + + return 1; +} + +int ssl_set_new_record_layer(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version, + int direction, int level, + unsigned char *secret, size_t secretlen, + unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, + unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen, + unsigned char *mackey, size_t mackeylen, + const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, size_t taglen, + int mactype, const EVP_MD *md, + const SSL_COMP *comp, const EVP_MD *kdfdigest) +{ + OSSL_PARAM options[5], *opts = options; + OSSL_PARAM settings[6], *set = settings; + const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD **thismethod; + OSSL_RECORD_LAYER **thisrl, *newrl = NULL; + BIO *thisbio; + SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); + const OSSL_RECORD_METHOD *meth; + int use_etm, stream_mac = 0, tlstree = 0; + unsigned int maxfrag = (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE) + ? ssl_get_max_send_fragment(s) + : SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; + int use_early_data = 0; + uint32_t max_early_data; + COMP_METHOD *compm = (comp == NULL) ? NULL : comp->method; + + meth = ssl_select_next_record_layer(s, direction, level); + + if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) { + thismethod = &s->rlayer.rrlmethod; + thisrl = &s->rlayer.rrl; + thisbio = s->rbio; + } else { + thismethod = &s->rlayer.wrlmethod; + thisrl = &s->rlayer.wrl; + thisbio = s->wbio; + } + + if (meth == NULL) + meth = *thismethod; + + if (!ossl_assert(meth != NULL)) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + /* Parameters that *may* be supported by a record layer if passed */ + *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint64(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_OPTIONS, + &s->options); + *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MODE, + &s->mode); + if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) { + *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_READ_BUFFER_LEN, + &s->rlayer.default_read_buf_len); + *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_READ_AHEAD, + &s->rlayer.read_ahead); + } else { + *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_BLOCK_PADDING, + &s->rlayer.block_padding); + *opts++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_HS_PADDING, + &s->rlayer.hs_padding); + } + *opts = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + /* Parameters that *must* be supported by a record layer if passed */ + if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) { + use_etm = SSL_READ_ETM(s) ? 1 : 0; + if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM) != 0) + stream_mac = 1; + + if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE) != 0) + tlstree = 1; + } else { + use_etm = SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) ? 1 : 0; + if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) != 0) + stream_mac = 1; + + if ((s->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE) != 0) + tlstree = 1; + } + + if (use_etm) + *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_USE_ETM, + &use_etm); + + if (stream_mac) + *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_STREAM_MAC, + &stream_mac); + + if (tlstree) + *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_TLSTREE, + &tlstree); + + /* + * We only need to do this for the read side. The write side should already + * have the correct value due to the ssl_get_max_send_fragment() call above + */ + if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ + && s->session != NULL + && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)) + maxfrag = GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session); + + + if (maxfrag != SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) + *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_FRAG_LEN, + &maxfrag); + + /* + * The record layer must check the amount of early data sent or received + * using the early keys. A server also needs to worry about rejected early + * data that might arrive when the handshake keys are in force. + */ + if (s->server && direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) { + use_early_data = (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY + || level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE); + } else if (!s->server && direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE) { + use_early_data = (level == OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY); + } + if (use_early_data) { + max_early_data = ossl_get_max_early_data(s); + + if (max_early_data != 0) + *set++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_uint32(OSSL_LIBSSL_RECORD_LAYER_PARAM_MAX_EARLY_DATA, + &max_early_data); + } + + *set = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + for (;;) { + int rlret; + BIO *prev = NULL; + BIO *next = NULL; + unsigned int epoch = 0; + OSSL_DISPATCH rlayer_dispatch_tmp[OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch)]; + size_t i, j; + + if (direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ) { + prev = s->rlayer.rrlnext; + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) + && level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE) + epoch = dtls1_get_epoch(s, SSL3_CC_READ); /* new epoch */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) + next = BIO_new(BIO_s_dgram_mem()); + else +#endif + next = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); + + if (next == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + s->rlayer.rrlnext = next; + } else { + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) + && level != OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_NONE) + epoch = dtls1_get_epoch(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); /* new epoch */ + } + + /* + * Create a copy of the dispatch array, missing out wrappers for + * callbacks that we don't need. + */ + for (i = 0, j = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(rlayer_dispatch); i++) { + switch (rlayer_dispatch[i].function_id) { + case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_MSG_CALLBACK: + if (s->msg_callback == NULL) + continue; + break; + case OSSL_FUNC_RLAYER_PADDING: + if (s->rlayer.record_padding_cb == NULL) + continue; + break; + default: + break; + } + rlayer_dispatch_tmp[j++] = rlayer_dispatch[i]; + } + + rlret = meth->new_record_layer(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, version, + s->server, direction, level, epoch, + secret, secretlen, key, keylen, iv, + ivlen, mackey, mackeylen, ciph, taglen, + mactype, md, compm, kdfdigest, prev, + thisbio, next, NULL, NULL, settings, + options, rlayer_dispatch_tmp, s, + s->rlayer.rlarg, &newrl); + BIO_free(prev); + switch (rlret) { + case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_FATAL: + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_RECORD_LAYER_FAILURE); + return 0; + + case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_NON_FATAL_ERR: + if (*thismethod != meth && *thismethod != NULL) { + /* + * We tried a new record layer method, but it didn't work out, + * so we fallback to the original method and try again + */ + meth = *thismethod; + continue; + } + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_RECORD_LAYER); + return 0; + + case OSSL_RECORD_RETURN_SUCCESS: + break; + + default: + /* Should not happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + break; + } + + /* + * Free the old record layer if we have one except in the case of DTLS when + * writing and there are still buffered sent messages in our queue. In that + * case the record layer is still referenced by those buffered messages for + * potential retransmit. Only when those buffered messages get freed do we + * free the record layer object (see dtls1_hm_fragment_free) + */ + if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) + || direction == OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ + || pqueue_peek(s->d1->sent_messages) == NULL) { + if (*thismethod != NULL && !(*thismethod)->free(*thisrl)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + + *thisrl = newrl; + *thismethod = meth; + + return ssl_post_record_layer_select(s, direction); +} + +int ssl_set_record_protocol_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int vers) +{ + if (!ossl_assert(s->rlayer.rrlmethod != NULL) + || !ossl_assert(s->rlayer.wrlmethod != NULL)) + return 0; + s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.rrl, s->version); + s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_protocol_version(s->rlayer.wrl, s->version); + + return 1; +} |