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-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c1362
1 files changed, 1362 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..1be6cd7dbc99
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_cert.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1362 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "internal/e_os.h"
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include "internal/nelem.h"
+#include "internal/o_dir.h"
+#include <openssl/bio.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <openssl/store.h>
+#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
+#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include "internal/refcount.h"
+#include "ssl_local.h"
+#include "ssl_cert_table.h"
+#include "internal/thread_once.h"
+#include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h"
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+# ifdef _WIN32
+# define stat _stat
+# endif
+# ifndef S_ISDIR
+# define S_ISDIR(a) (((a) & S_IFMT) == S_IFDIR)
+# endif
+#endif
+
+
+static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int op, int bits, int nid, void *other,
+ void *ex);
+
+static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_x509_store_ctx_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+static volatile int ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = -1;
+
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ssl_x509_store_ctx_init)
+{
+ ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx = X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_new_index(0,
+ "SSL for verify callback",
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx >= 0;
+}
+
+int SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(void)
+{
+
+ if (!RUN_ONCE(&ssl_x509_store_ctx_once, ssl_x509_store_ctx_init))
+ return -1;
+ return ssl_x509_store_ctx_idx;
+}
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_new(size_t ssl_pkey_num)
+{
+ CERT *ret = NULL;
+
+ /* Should never happen */
+ if (!ossl_assert(ssl_pkey_num >= SSL_PKEY_NUM))
+ return NULL;
+
+ ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ret->ssl_pkey_num = ssl_pkey_num;
+ ret->pkeys = OPENSSL_zalloc(ret->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(CERT_PKEY));
+ if (ret->pkeys == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret->key = &(ret->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA]);
+ ret->sec_cb = ssl_security_default_callback;
+ ret->sec_level = OPENSSL_TLS_SECURITY_LEVEL;
+ ret->sec_ex = NULL;
+ if (!CRYPTO_NEW_REF(&ret->references, 1)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ret->pkeys);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert)
+{
+ CERT *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret));
+ size_t i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+ int j;
+#endif
+
+ if (ret == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ ret->ssl_pkey_num = cert->ssl_pkey_num;
+ ret->pkeys = OPENSSL_zalloc(ret->ssl_pkey_num * sizeof(CERT_PKEY));
+ if (ret->pkeys == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ ret->key = &ret->pkeys[cert->key - cert->pkeys];
+ if (!CRYPTO_NEW_REF(&ret->references, 1)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(ret->pkeys);
+ OPENSSL_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ if (cert->dh_tmp != NULL) {
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cert->dh_tmp))
+ goto err;
+ ret->dh_tmp = cert->dh_tmp;
+ }
+
+ ret->dh_tmp_cb = cert->dh_tmp_cb;
+ ret->dh_tmp_auto = cert->dh_tmp_auto;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ret->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = cert->pkeys + i;
+ CERT_PKEY *rpk = ret->pkeys + i;
+
+ if (cpk->x509 != NULL) {
+ if (!X509_up_ref(cpk->x509))
+ goto err;
+ rpk->x509 = cpk->x509;
+ }
+
+ if (cpk->privatekey != NULL) {
+ if (!EVP_PKEY_up_ref(cpk->privatekey))
+ goto err;
+ rpk->privatekey = cpk->privatekey;
+ }
+
+ if (cpk->chain) {
+ rpk->chain = X509_chain_up_ref(cpk->chain);
+ if (!rpk->chain) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if (cpk->serverinfo != NULL) {
+ /* Just copy everything. */
+ rpk->serverinfo = OPENSSL_memdup(cpk->serverinfo, cpk->serverinfo_length);
+ if (rpk->serverinfo == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ rpk->serverinfo_length = cpk->serverinfo_length;
+ }
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+ for (j = TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; j < TLSEXT_comp_cert_limit; j++) {
+ if (cpk->comp_cert[j] != NULL) {
+ if (!OSSL_COMP_CERT_up_ref(cpk->comp_cert[j]))
+ goto err;
+ rpk->comp_cert[j] = cpk->comp_cert[j];
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+
+ /* Configured sigalgs copied across */
+ if (cert->conf_sigalgs) {
+ ret->conf_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->conf_sigalgslen
+ * sizeof(*cert->conf_sigalgs));
+ if (ret->conf_sigalgs == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(ret->conf_sigalgs, cert->conf_sigalgs,
+ cert->conf_sigalgslen * sizeof(*cert->conf_sigalgs));
+ ret->conf_sigalgslen = cert->conf_sigalgslen;
+ } else
+ ret->conf_sigalgs = NULL;
+
+ if (cert->client_sigalgs) {
+ ret->client_sigalgs = OPENSSL_malloc(cert->client_sigalgslen
+ * sizeof(*cert->client_sigalgs));
+ if (ret->client_sigalgs == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ memcpy(ret->client_sigalgs, cert->client_sigalgs,
+ cert->client_sigalgslen * sizeof(*cert->client_sigalgs));
+ ret->client_sigalgslen = cert->client_sigalgslen;
+ } else
+ ret->client_sigalgs = NULL;
+ /* Copy any custom client certificate types */
+ if (cert->ctype) {
+ ret->ctype = OPENSSL_memdup(cert->ctype, cert->ctype_len);
+ if (ret->ctype == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ret->ctype_len = cert->ctype_len;
+ }
+
+ ret->cert_flags = cert->cert_flags;
+
+ ret->cert_cb = cert->cert_cb;
+ ret->cert_cb_arg = cert->cert_cb_arg;
+
+ if (cert->verify_store) {
+ if (!X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->verify_store))
+ goto err;
+ ret->verify_store = cert->verify_store;
+ }
+
+ if (cert->chain_store) {
+ if (!X509_STORE_up_ref(cert->chain_store))
+ goto err;
+ ret->chain_store = cert->chain_store;
+ }
+
+ ret->sec_cb = cert->sec_cb;
+ ret->sec_level = cert->sec_level;
+ ret->sec_ex = cert->sec_ex;
+
+ if (!custom_exts_copy(&ret->custext, &cert->custext))
+ goto err;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (cert->psk_identity_hint) {
+ ret->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(cert->psk_identity_hint);
+ if (ret->psk_identity_hint == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ }
+#endif
+ return ret;
+
+ err:
+ ssl_cert_free(ret);
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/* Free up and clear all certificates and chains */
+
+void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c)
+{
+ size_t i;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+ int j;
+#endif
+
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < c->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+ X509_free(cpk->x509);
+ cpk->x509 = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(cpk->privatekey);
+ cpk->privatekey = NULL;
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(cpk->chain);
+ cpk->chain = NULL;
+ OPENSSL_free(cpk->serverinfo);
+ cpk->serverinfo = NULL;
+ cpk->serverinfo_length = 0;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG
+ for (j = 0; j < TLSEXT_comp_cert_limit; j++) {
+ OSSL_COMP_CERT_free(cpk->comp_cert[j]);
+ cpk->comp_cert[j] = NULL;
+ cpk->cert_comp_used = 0;
+ }
+#endif
+ }
+}
+
+void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return;
+ CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&c->references, &i);
+ REF_PRINT_COUNT("CERT", i, c);
+ if (i > 0)
+ return;
+ REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0);
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(c->dh_tmp);
+
+ ssl_cert_clear_certs(c);
+ OPENSSL_free(c->conf_sigalgs);
+ OPENSSL_free(c->client_sigalgs);
+ OPENSSL_free(c->ctype);
+ X509_STORE_free(c->verify_store);
+ X509_STORE_free(c->chain_store);
+ custom_exts_free(&c->custext);
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ OPENSSL_free(c->psk_identity_hint);
+#endif
+ OPENSSL_free(c->pkeys);
+ CRYPTO_FREE_REF(&c->references);
+ OPENSSL_free(c);
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+ int i, r;
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = s != NULL ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key;
+
+ if (!cpk)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ X509 *x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+
+ r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0);
+ if (r != 1) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, r);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(cpk->chain);
+ cpk->chain = chain;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set1_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain)
+{
+ STACK_OF(X509) *dchain;
+
+ if (!chain)
+ return ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, NULL);
+ dchain = X509_chain_up_ref(chain);
+ if (!dchain)
+ return 0;
+ if (!ssl_cert_set0_chain(s, ctx, dchain)) {
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(dchain);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ int r;
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = s ? s->cert->key : ctx->cert->key;
+
+ if (!cpk)
+ return 0;
+ r = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0);
+ if (r != 1) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, r);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!cpk->chain)
+ cpk->chain = sk_X509_new_null();
+ if (!cpk->chain || !sk_X509_push(cpk->chain, x))
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ if (!X509_up_ref(x))
+ return 0;
+ if (!ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(s, ctx, x)) {
+ X509_free(x);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < c->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+ if (cpk->x509 == x && cpk->privatekey) {
+ c->key = cpk;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0; i < c->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+ if (cpk->privatekey && cpk->x509 && !X509_cmp(cpk->x509, x)) {
+ c->key = cpk;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set_current(CERT *c, long op)
+{
+ size_t i, idx;
+
+ if (!c)
+ return 0;
+ if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_FIRST)
+ idx = 0;
+ else if (op == SSL_CERT_SET_NEXT) {
+ idx = (size_t)(c->key - c->pkeys + 1);
+ if (idx >= c->ssl_pkey_num)
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ return 0;
+ for (i = idx; i < c->ssl_pkey_num; i++) {
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->pkeys + i;
+ if (cpk->x509 && cpk->privatekey) {
+ c->key = cpk;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg)
+{
+ c->cert_cb = cb;
+ c->cert_cb_arg = arg;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify a certificate chain/raw public key
+ * Return codes:
+ * 1: Verify success
+ * 0: Verify failure or error
+ * -1: Retry required
+ */
+static int ssl_verify_internal(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, EVP_PKEY *rpk)
+{
+ X509 *x;
+ int i = 0;
+ X509_STORE *verify_store;
+ X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx;
+
+ /* Something must be passed in */
+ if ((sk == NULL || sk_X509_num(sk) == 0) && rpk == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Only one can be set */
+ if (sk != NULL && rpk != NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+ if (s->cert->verify_store)
+ verify_store = s->cert->verify_store;
+ else
+ verify_store = sctx->cert_store;
+
+ ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq);
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (sk != NULL) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(sk, 0);
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(ctx, verify_store, x, sk)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init_rpk(ctx, verify_store, rpk)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto end;
+ }
+ }
+ param = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(ctx);
+ /*
+ * XXX: Separate @AUTHSECLEVEL and @TLSSECLEVEL would be useful at some
+ * point, for now a single @SECLEVEL sets the same policy for TLS crypto
+ * and PKI authentication.
+ */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level(param,
+ SSL_get_security_level(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)));
+
+ /* Set suite B flags if needed */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(ctx, tls1_suiteb(s));
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(ctx,
+ SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx(),
+ SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s)))
+ goto end;
+
+ /* Verify via DANE if enabled */
+ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(&s->dane))
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(ctx, &s->dane);
+
+ /*
+ * We need to inherit the verify parameters. These can be determined by
+ * the context: if its a server it will verify SSL client certificates or
+ * vice versa.
+ */
+
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(ctx, s->server ? "ssl_client" : "ssl_server");
+ /*
+ * Anything non-default in "s->param" should overwrite anything in the ctx.
+ */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(param, s->param);
+
+ if (s->verify_callback)
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(ctx, s->verify_callback);
+
+ if (sctx->app_verify_callback != NULL) {
+ i = sctx->app_verify_callback(ctx, sctx->app_verify_arg);
+ } else {
+ i = X509_verify_cert(ctx);
+ /* We treat an error in the same way as a failure to verify */
+ if (i < 0)
+ i = 0;
+ }
+
+ s->verify_result = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx);
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(s->verified_chain);
+ s->verified_chain = NULL;
+
+ if (sk != NULL && X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(ctx) != NULL) {
+ s->verified_chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(ctx);
+ if (s->verified_chain == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ i = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Move peername from the store context params to the SSL handle's */
+ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, param);
+
+ end:
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return i;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify a raw public key
+ * Return codes:
+ * 1: Verify success
+ * 0: Verify failure or error
+ * -1: Retry required
+ */
+int ssl_verify_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, EVP_PKEY *rpk)
+{
+ return ssl_verify_internal(s, NULL, rpk);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Verify a certificate chain
+ * Return codes:
+ * 1: Verify success
+ * 0: Verify failure or error
+ * -1: Retry required
+ */
+int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk)
+{
+ return ssl_verify_internal(s, sk, NULL);
+}
+
+static void set0_CA_list(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **ca_list,
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(*ca_list, X509_NAME_free);
+ *ca_list = name_list;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_dup_CA_list(const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk)
+{
+ int i;
+ const int num = sk_X509_NAME_num(sk);
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret;
+ X509_NAME *name;
+
+ ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_reserve(NULL, num);
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
+ name = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i));
+ if (name == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, name); /* Cannot fail after reserve call */
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void SSL_set0_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+ SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ set0_CA_list(&sc->ca_names, name_list);
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+ set0_CA_list(&ctx->ca_names, name_list);
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get0_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->ca_names;
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get0_CA_list(const SSL *s)
+{
+ const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return sc->ca_names != NULL ? sc->ca_names : s->ctx->ca_names;
+}
+
+void SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+ set0_CA_list(&ctx->client_ca_names, name_list);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_CTX_get_client_CA_list(const SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ return ctx->client_ca_names;
+}
+
+void SSL_set_client_CA_list(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *name_list)
+{
+ SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ set0_CA_list(&sc->client_ca_names, name_list);
+}
+
+const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get0_peer_CA_list(const SSL *s)
+{
+ const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return sc->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_get_client_CA_list(const SSL *s)
+{
+ const SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!sc->server)
+ return sc->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names;
+ return sc->client_ca_names != NULL ? sc->client_ca_names
+ : s->ctx->client_ca_names;
+}
+
+static int add_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **sk, const X509 *x)
+{
+ X509_NAME *name;
+
+ if (x == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (*sk == NULL && ((*sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(X509_get_subject_name(x))) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(*sk, name)) {
+ X509_NAME_free(name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_add1_to_CA_list(SSL *ssl, const X509 *x)
+{
+ SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return add_ca_name(&sc->ca_names, x);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add1_to_CA_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const X509 *x)
+{
+ return add_ca_name(&ctx->ca_names, x);
+}
+
+/*
+ * The following two are older names are to be replaced with
+ * SSL(_CTX)_add1_to_CA_list
+ */
+int SSL_add_client_CA(SSL *ssl, X509 *x)
+{
+ SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(ssl);
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ return add_ca_name(&sc->client_ca_names, x);
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_add_client_CA(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x)
+{
+ return add_ca_name(&ctx->client_ca_names, x);
+}
+
+static int xname_cmp(const X509_NAME *a, const X509_NAME *b)
+{
+ unsigned char *abuf = NULL, *bbuf = NULL;
+ int alen, blen, ret;
+
+ /* X509_NAME_cmp() itself casts away constness in this way, so
+ * assume it's safe:
+ */
+ alen = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)a, &abuf);
+ blen = i2d_X509_NAME((X509_NAME *)b, &bbuf);
+
+ if (alen < 0 || blen < 0)
+ ret = -2;
+ else if (alen != blen)
+ ret = alen - blen;
+ else /* alen == blen */
+ ret = memcmp(abuf, bbuf, alen);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(abuf);
+ OPENSSL_free(bbuf);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int xname_sk_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
+{
+ return xname_cmp(*a, *b);
+}
+
+static unsigned long xname_hash(const X509_NAME *a)
+{
+ /* This returns 0 also if SHA1 is not available */
+ return X509_NAME_hash_ex((X509_NAME *)a, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file_ex(const char *file,
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
+ const char *propq)
+{
+ BIO *in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ret = NULL;
+ LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash = lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp);
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX *prev_libctx = NULL;
+
+ if (file == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (name_hash == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (in == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ x = X509_new_ex(libctx, propq);
+ if (x == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Internally lh_X509_NAME_retrieve() needs the libctx to retrieve SHA1 */
+ prev_libctx = OSSL_LIB_CTX_set0_default(libctx);
+ for (;;) {
+ if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+ break;
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ ret = sk_X509_NAME_new_null();
+ if (ret == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ /* check for duplicates */
+ xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+ if (xn == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (lh_X509_NAME_retrieve(name_hash, xn) != NULL) {
+ /* Duplicate. */
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ xn = NULL;
+ } else {
+ lh_X509_NAME_insert(name_hash, xn);
+ if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ret, xn))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ret, X509_NAME_free);
+ ret = NULL;
+ done:
+ /* restore the old libctx */
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX_set0_default(prev_libctx);
+ BIO_free(in);
+ X509_free(x);
+ lh_X509_NAME_free(name_hash);
+ if (ret != NULL)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ return ret;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *SSL_load_client_CA_file(const char *file)
+{
+ return SSL_load_client_CA_file_ex(file, NULL, NULL);
+}
+
+static int add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+ const char *file,
+ LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash)
+{
+ BIO *in;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+ int ret = 1;
+
+ in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file());
+
+ if (in == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_BIO_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (BIO_read_filename(in, file) <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (PEM_read_bio_X509(in, &x, NULL, NULL) == NULL)
+ break;
+ if ((xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn);
+ if (xn == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (lh_X509_NAME_retrieve(name_hash, xn) != NULL) {
+ /* Duplicate. */
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ } else if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn)) {
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ /* Successful insert, add to hash table */
+ lh_X509_NAME_insert(name_hash, xn);
+ }
+ }
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ ret = 0;
+ done:
+ BIO_free(in);
+ X509_free(x);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+ const char *file)
+{
+ X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+ int ret = 1;
+ int idx = 0;
+ int num = 0;
+ LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash = lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp);
+
+ if (file == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (name_hash == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Pre-populate the lhash with the existing entries of the stack, since
+ * using the LHASH_OF is much faster for duplicate checking. That's because
+ * xname_cmp converts the X509_NAMEs to DER involving a memory allocation
+ * for every single invocation of the comparison function.
+ */
+ num = sk_X509_NAME_num(stack);
+ for (idx = 0; idx < num; idx++) {
+ xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(stack, idx);
+ lh_X509_NAME_insert(name_hash, xn);
+ }
+
+ ret = add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack, file, name_hash);
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ ret = 0;
+ done:
+ lh_X509_NAME_free(name_hash);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+ const char *dir)
+{
+ OPENSSL_DIR_CTX *d = NULL;
+ const char *filename;
+ int ret = 0;
+ X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+ int idx = 0;
+ int num = 0;
+ LHASH_OF(X509_NAME) *name_hash = lh_X509_NAME_new(xname_hash, xname_cmp);
+
+ if (name_hash == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Pre-populate the lhash with the existing entries of the stack, since
+ * using the LHASH_OF is much faster for duplicate checking. That's because
+ * xname_cmp converts the X509_NAMEs to DER involving a memory allocation
+ * for every single invocation of the comparison function.
+ */
+ num = sk_X509_NAME_num(stack);
+ for (idx = 0; idx < num; idx++) {
+ xn = sk_X509_NAME_value(stack, idx);
+ lh_X509_NAME_insert(name_hash, xn);
+ }
+
+ while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(&d, dir))) {
+ char buf[1024];
+ int r;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+ struct stat st;
+
+#else
+ /* Cannot use stat so just skip current and parent directories */
+ if (strcmp(filename, ".") == 0 || strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
+ continue;
+#endif
+ if (strlen(dir) + strlen(filename) + 2 > sizeof(buf)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_PATH_TOO_LONG);
+ goto err;
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
+ r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s%s", dir, filename);
+#else
+ r = BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", dir, filename);
+#endif
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
+ /* Skip subdirectories */
+ if (!stat(buf, &st) && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
+ continue;
+#endif
+ if (r <= 0 || r >= (int)sizeof(buf))
+ goto err;
+ if (!add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(stack, buf, name_hash))
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (errno) {
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SYS, get_last_sys_error(),
+ "calling OPENSSL_dir_read(%s)", dir);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_SYS_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ret = 1;
+
+ err:
+ if (d)
+ OPENSSL_DIR_end(&d);
+ lh_X509_NAME_free(name_hash);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int add_uris_recursive(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+ const char *uri, int depth)
+{
+ int ok = 1;
+ OSSL_STORE_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ X509 *x = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *xn = NULL;
+ OSSL_STORE_INFO *info = NULL;
+
+ if ((ctx = OSSL_STORE_open(uri, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+
+ while (!OSSL_STORE_eof(ctx) && !OSSL_STORE_error(ctx)) {
+ int infotype;
+
+ if ((info = OSSL_STORE_load(ctx)) == NULL)
+ continue;
+ infotype = OSSL_STORE_INFO_get_type(info);
+
+ if (infotype == OSSL_STORE_INFO_NAME) {
+ /*
+ * This is an entry in the "directory" represented by the current
+ * uri. if |depth| allows, dive into it.
+ */
+ if (depth > 0)
+ ok = add_uris_recursive(stack, OSSL_STORE_INFO_get0_NAME(info),
+ depth - 1);
+ } else if (infotype == OSSL_STORE_INFO_CERT) {
+ if ((x = OSSL_STORE_INFO_get0_CERT(info)) == NULL
+ || (xn = X509_get_subject_name(x)) == NULL
+ || (xn = X509_NAME_dup(xn)) == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ if (sk_X509_NAME_find(stack, xn) >= 0) {
+ /* Duplicate. */
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ } else if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(stack, xn)) {
+ X509_NAME_free(xn);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(info);
+ info = NULL;
+ }
+
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ goto done;
+
+ err:
+ ok = 0;
+ OSSL_STORE_INFO_free(info);
+ done:
+ OSSL_STORE_close(ctx);
+
+ return ok;
+}
+
+int SSL_add_store_cert_subjects_to_stack(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *stack,
+ const char *store)
+{
+ int (*oldcmp) (const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b)
+ = sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, xname_sk_cmp);
+ int ret = add_uris_recursive(stack, store, 1);
+
+ (void)sk_X509_NAME_set_cmp_func(stack, oldcmp);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Build a certificate chain for current certificate */
+int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags)
+{
+ CERT *c = s != NULL ? s->cert : ctx->cert;
+ CERT_PKEY *cpk = c->key;
+ X509_STORE *chain_store = NULL;
+ X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = NULL;
+ STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL, *untrusted = NULL;
+ X509 *x;
+ SSL_CTX *real_ctx = (s == NULL) ? ctx : SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+ int i, rv = 0;
+
+ if (cpk->x509 == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Rearranging and check the chain: add everything to a store */
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK) {
+ chain_store = X509_STORE_new();
+ if (chain_store == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(cpk->chain); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(cpk->chain, i);
+ if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, x))
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Add EE cert too: it might be self signed */
+ if (!X509_STORE_add_cert(chain_store, cpk->x509))
+ goto err;
+ } else {
+ if (c->chain_store != NULL)
+ chain_store = c->chain_store;
+ else
+ chain_store = real_ctx->cert_store;
+
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_UNTRUSTED)
+ untrusted = cpk->chain;
+ }
+
+ xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(real_ctx->libctx, real_ctx->propq);
+ if (xs_ctx == NULL) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, cpk->x509, untrusted)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_X509_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Set suite B flags if needed */
+ X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(xs_ctx,
+ c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS);
+
+ i = X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx);
+ if (i <= 0 && flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_IGNORE_ERROR) {
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CLEAR_ERROR)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+ i = 1;
+ rv = 2;
+ }
+ if (i > 0)
+ chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(xs_ctx);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ i = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(xs_ctx);
+ ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED,
+ "Verify error:%s", X509_verify_cert_error_string(i));
+
+ goto err;
+ }
+ /* Remove EE certificate from chain */
+ x = sk_X509_shift(chain);
+ X509_free(x);
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_NO_ROOT) {
+ if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) {
+ /* See if last cert is self signed */
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, sk_X509_num(chain) - 1);
+ if (X509_get_extension_flags(x) & EXFLAG_SS) {
+ x = sk_X509_pop(chain);
+ X509_free(x);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /*
+ * Check security level of all CA certificates: EE will have been checked
+ * already.
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) {
+ x = sk_X509_value(chain, i);
+ rv = ssl_security_cert(s, ctx, x, 0, 0);
+ if (rv != 1) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, rv);
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(chain);
+ rv = 0;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ }
+ OSSL_STACK_OF_X509_free(cpk->chain);
+ cpk->chain = chain;
+ if (rv == 0)
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ if (flags & SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK)
+ X509_STORE_free(chain_store);
+ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx);
+
+ return rv;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref)
+{
+ X509_STORE **pstore;
+
+ if (ref && store && !X509_STORE_up_ref(store))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (chain)
+ pstore = &c->chain_store;
+ else
+ pstore = &c->verify_store;
+ X509_STORE_free(*pstore);
+ *pstore = store;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_get_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE **pstore, int chain)
+{
+ *pstore = (chain ? c->chain_store : c->verify_store);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_get_security_level_bits(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int *levelp)
+{
+ int level;
+ /*
+ * note that there's a corresponding minbits_table
+ * in crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c that's used for checking the security level
+ * of RSA and DSA keys
+ */
+ static const int minbits_table[5 + 1] = { 0, 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 };
+
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ level = SSL_CTX_get_security_level(ctx);
+ else
+ level = SSL_get_security_level(s);
+
+ if (level > 5)
+ level = 5;
+ else if (level < 0)
+ level = 0;
+
+ if (levelp != NULL)
+ *levelp = level;
+
+ return minbits_table[level];
+}
+
+static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ int op, int bits, int nid, void *other,
+ void *ex)
+{
+ int level, minbits, pfs_mask;
+ const SSL_CONNECTION *sc;
+
+ minbits = ssl_get_security_level_bits(s, ctx, &level);
+
+ if (level == 0) {
+ /*
+ * No EDH keys weaker than 1024-bits even at level 0, otherwise,
+ * anything goes.
+ */
+ if (op == SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH && bits < 80)
+ return 0;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ switch (op) {
+ case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED:
+ case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED:
+ case SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK:
+ {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c = other;
+ /* No ciphers below security level */
+ if (bits < minbits)
+ return 0;
+ /* No unauthenticated ciphersuites */
+ if (c->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL)
+ return 0;
+ /* No MD5 mac ciphersuites */
+ if (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_MD5)
+ return 0;
+ /* SHA1 HMAC is 160 bits of security */
+ if (minbits > 160 && c->algorithm_mac & SSL_SHA1)
+ return 0;
+ /* Level 3: forward secure ciphersuites only */
+ pfs_mask = SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK;
+ if (level >= 3 && c->min_tls != TLS1_3_VERSION &&
+ !(c->algorithm_mkey & pfs_mask))
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ case SSL_SECOP_VERSION:
+ if ((sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_CONST_SSL(s)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(sc)) {
+ /* SSLv3, TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 only allowed at level 0 */
+ if (nid <= TLS1_1_VERSION && level > 0)
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ /* DTLS v1.0 only allowed at level 0 */
+ if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(nid, DTLS1_2_VERSION) && level > 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ break;
+
+ case SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION:
+ if (level >= 2)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ case SSL_SECOP_TICKET:
+ if (level >= 3)
+ return 0;
+ break;
+ default:
+ if (bits < minbits)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_security(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
+{
+ return s->cert->sec_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s), NULL, op, bits, nid,
+ other, s->cert->sec_ex);
+}
+
+int ssl_ctx_security(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other)
+{
+ return ctx->cert->sec_cb(NULL, ctx, op, bits, nid, other,
+ ctx->cert->sec_ex);
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(int nid, size_t *pidx, SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(ssl_cert_info); i++) {
+ if (ssl_cert_info[i].nid == nid) {
+ *pidx = i;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->sigalg_list_len; i++) {
+ if (ctx->ssl_cert_info[i].nid == nid) {
+ *pidx = SSL_PKEY_NUM + i;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(const EVP_PKEY *pk, size_t *pidx, SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* check classic pk types */
+ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(ssl_cert_info); i++) {
+ const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *tmp_lu = &ssl_cert_info[i];
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, OBJ_nid2sn(tmp_lu->nid))
+ || EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, OBJ_nid2ln(tmp_lu->nid))) {
+ if (pidx != NULL)
+ *pidx = i;
+ return tmp_lu;
+ }
+ }
+ /* check provider-loaded pk types */
+ for (i = 0; i < ctx->sigalg_list_len; i++) {
+ SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *tmp_lu = &(ctx->ssl_cert_info[i]);
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, OBJ_nid2sn(tmp_lu->nid))
+ || EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, OBJ_nid2ln(tmp_lu->nid))) {
+ if (pidx != NULL)
+ *pidx = SSL_PKEY_NUM + i;
+ return &ctx->ssl_cert_info[i];
+ }
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(size_t idx, SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ if (idx >= (OSSL_NELEM(ssl_cert_info) + ctx->sigalg_list_len))
+ return NULL;
+ else if (idx >= (OSSL_NELEM(ssl_cert_info)))
+ return &(ctx->ssl_cert_info[idx - SSL_PKEY_NUM]);
+ return &ssl_cert_info[idx];
+}