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-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c2252
1 files changed, 2252 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..6127cb7a4b48
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/ssl_ciph.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2252 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 1995-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
+ * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/comp.h>
+#include <openssl/engine.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/conf.h>
+#include <openssl/trace.h>
+#include "internal/nelem.h"
+#include "ssl_local.h"
+#include "internal/thread_once.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/comp.h"
+#include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h"
+
+/* NB: make sure indices in these tables match values above */
+
+typedef struct {
+ uint32_t mask;
+ int nid;
+} ssl_cipher_table;
+
+/* Table of NIDs for each cipher */
+static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_cipher[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX] = {
+ {SSL_DES, NID_des_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_DES_IDX 0 */
+ {SSL_3DES, NID_des_ede3_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX 1 */
+ {SSL_RC4, NID_rc4}, /* SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX 2 */
+ {SSL_RC2, NID_rc2_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX 3 */
+ {SSL_IDEA, NID_idea_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX 4 */
+ {SSL_eNULL, NID_undef}, /* SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX 5 */
+ {SSL_AES128, NID_aes_128_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX 6 */
+ {SSL_AES256, NID_aes_256_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX 7 */
+ {SSL_CAMELLIA128, NID_camellia_128_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX 8 */
+ {SSL_CAMELLIA256, NID_camellia_256_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX 9 */
+ {SSL_eGOST2814789CNT, NID_gost89_cnt}, /* SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX 10 */
+ {SSL_SEED, NID_seed_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX 11 */
+ {SSL_AES128GCM, NID_aes_128_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX 12 */
+ {SSL_AES256GCM, NID_aes_256_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX 13 */
+ {SSL_AES128CCM, NID_aes_128_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128CCM_IDX 14 */
+ {SSL_AES256CCM, NID_aes_256_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256CCM_IDX 15 */
+ {SSL_AES128CCM8, NID_aes_128_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128CCM8_IDX 16 */
+ {SSL_AES256CCM8, NID_aes_256_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256CCM8_IDX 17 */
+ {SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12, NID_gost89_cnt_12}, /* SSL_ENC_GOST8912_IDX 18 */
+ {SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, NID_chacha20_poly1305}, /* SSL_ENC_CHACHA_IDX 19 */
+ {SSL_ARIA128GCM, NID_aria_128_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_ARIA128GCM_IDX 20 */
+ {SSL_ARIA256GCM, NID_aria_256_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_ARIA256GCM_IDX 21 */
+ {SSL_MAGMA, NID_magma_ctr_acpkm}, /* SSL_ENC_MAGMA_IDX */
+ {SSL_KUZNYECHIK, NID_kuznyechik_ctr_acpkm}, /* SSL_ENC_KUZNYECHIK_IDX */
+};
+
+/* NB: make sure indices in this table matches values above */
+static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_mac[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = {
+ {SSL_MD5, NID_md5}, /* SSL_MD_MD5_IDX 0 */
+ {SSL_SHA1, NID_sha1}, /* SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX 1 */
+ {SSL_GOST94, NID_id_GostR3411_94}, /* SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2 */
+ {SSL_GOST89MAC, NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3 */
+ {SSL_SHA256, NID_sha256}, /* SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4 */
+ {SSL_SHA384, NID_sha384}, /* SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5 */
+ {SSL_GOST12_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX 6 */
+ {SSL_GOST89MAC12, NID_gost_mac_12}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX 7 */
+ {SSL_GOST12_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX 8 */
+ {0, NID_md5_sha1}, /* SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX 9 */
+ {0, NID_sha224}, /* SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX 10 */
+ {0, NID_sha512}, /* SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX 11 */
+ {SSL_MAGMAOMAC, NID_magma_mac}, /* sSL_MD_MAGMAOMAC_IDX */
+ {SSL_KUZNYECHIKOMAC, NID_kuznyechik_mac} /* SSL_MD_KUZNYECHIKOMAC_IDX */
+};
+
+/* *INDENT-OFF* */
+static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_kx[] = {
+ {SSL_kRSA, NID_kx_rsa},
+ {SSL_kECDHE, NID_kx_ecdhe},
+ {SSL_kDHE, NID_kx_dhe},
+ {SSL_kECDHEPSK, NID_kx_ecdhe_psk},
+ {SSL_kDHEPSK, NID_kx_dhe_psk},
+ {SSL_kRSAPSK, NID_kx_rsa_psk},
+ {SSL_kPSK, NID_kx_psk},
+ {SSL_kSRP, NID_kx_srp},
+ {SSL_kGOST, NID_kx_gost},
+ {SSL_kGOST18, NID_kx_gost18},
+ {SSL_kANY, NID_kx_any}
+};
+
+static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_auth[] = {
+ {SSL_aRSA, NID_auth_rsa},
+ {SSL_aECDSA, NID_auth_ecdsa},
+ {SSL_aPSK, NID_auth_psk},
+ {SSL_aDSS, NID_auth_dss},
+ {SSL_aGOST01, NID_auth_gost01},
+ {SSL_aGOST12, NID_auth_gost12},
+ {SSL_aSRP, NID_auth_srp},
+ {SSL_aNULL, NID_auth_null},
+ {SSL_aANY, NID_auth_any}
+};
+/* *INDENT-ON* */
+
+/* Utility function for table lookup */
+static int ssl_cipher_info_find(const ssl_cipher_table *table,
+ size_t table_cnt, uint32_t mask)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ for (i = 0; i < table_cnt; i++, table++) {
+ if (table->mask == mask)
+ return (int)i;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+#define ssl_cipher_info_lookup(table, x) \
+ ssl_cipher_info_find(table, OSSL_NELEM(table), x)
+
+/*
+ * PKEY_TYPE for GOST89MAC is known in advance, but, because implementation
+ * is engine-provided, we'll fill it only if corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD is
+ * found
+ */
+static const int default_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = {
+ /* MD5, SHA, GOST94, MAC89 */
+ EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef,
+ /* SHA256, SHA384, GOST2012_256, MAC89-12 */
+ EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef,
+ /* GOST2012_512 */
+ EVP_PKEY_HMAC,
+ /* MD5/SHA1, SHA224, SHA512, MAGMAOMAC, KUZNYECHIKOMAC */
+ NID_undef, NID_undef, NID_undef, NID_undef, NID_undef
+};
+
+#define CIPHER_ADD 1
+#define CIPHER_KILL 2
+#define CIPHER_DEL 3
+#define CIPHER_ORD 4
+#define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5
+/*
+ * Bump the ciphers to the top of the list.
+ * This rule isn't currently supported by the public cipherstring API.
+ */
+#define CIPHER_BUMP 6
+
+typedef struct cipher_order_st {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+ int active;
+ int dead;
+ struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev;
+} CIPHER_ORDER;
+
+static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = {
+ /* "ALL" doesn't include eNULL (must be specifically enabled) */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_ALL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL},
+ /* "COMPLEMENTOFALL" */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_CMPALL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL},
+
+ /*
+ * "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in
+ * ALL!)
+ */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT},
+
+ /*
+ * key exchange aliases (some of those using only a single bit here
+ * combine multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs, e.g. kDHE
+ * combines DHE_DSS and DHE_RSA)
+ */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kRSA, NULL, 0, SSL_kRSA},
+
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kEDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kDHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_DH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE},
+
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kEECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_ECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE},
+
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kPSK},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kRSAPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kRSAPSK},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHEPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHEPSK},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kDHEPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHEPSK},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kSRP, NULL, 0, SSL_kSRP},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kGOST, NULL, 0, SSL_kGOST},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_kGOST18, NULL, 0, SSL_kGOST18},
+
+ /* server authentication aliases */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aRSA, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aRSA},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aDSS, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_DSS, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aNULL, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aECDSA, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_ECDSA, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aPSK, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aPSK},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST01, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST12, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST12},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_aSRP, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aSRP},
+
+ /* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_EDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, ~SSL_aNULL},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_DHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, ~SSL_aNULL},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_EECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE, ~SSL_aNULL},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_ECDHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE, ~SSL_aNULL},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_RSA, NULL, 0, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_ADH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_AECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_PSK, NULL, 0, SSL_PSK},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_SRP, NULL, 0, SSL_kSRP},
+
+ /* symmetric encryption aliases */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_3DES, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_3DES},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_RC4, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_RC2, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC2},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_IDEA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_IDEA},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_SEED, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SEED},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_eNULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_GOST, NULL, 0, 0, 0,
+ SSL_eGOST2814789CNT | SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12 | SSL_MAGMA | SSL_KUZNYECHIK},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_AES128, NULL, 0, 0, 0,
+ SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_AES256, NULL, 0, 0, 0,
+ SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES256CCM8},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_AES, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_AES_GCM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_AES_CCM, NULL, 0, 0, 0,
+ SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_AES_CCM_8, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA128},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA256},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_CHACHA20, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_GOST2012_GOST8912_GOST8912, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12},
+
+ {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA_GCM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA128GCM | SSL_ARIA256GCM},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA128, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA128GCM},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA256GCM},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_CBC, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CBC},
+
+ /* MAC aliases */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_MD5, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_SHA1, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_SHA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_GOST94, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST94},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST89MAC | SSL_GOST89MAC12},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_SHA256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA256},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_SHA384, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA384},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_GOST12, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST12_256},
+
+ /* protocol version aliases */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_SSLV3, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL3_VERSION},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_VERSION},
+ {0, "TLSv1.0", NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_VERSION},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_2_VERSION},
+
+ /* strength classes */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_LOW, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_LOW},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_MEDIUM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MEDIUM},
+ {0, SSL_TXT_HIGH, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH},
+ /* FIPS 140-2 approved ciphersuite */
+ {0, SSL_TXT_FIPS, NULL, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_FIPS},
+
+ /* "EDH-" aliases to "DHE-" labels (for backward compatibility) */
+ {0, SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, NULL, 0,
+ SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS},
+ {0, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, NULL, 0,
+ SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS},
+
+};
+
+/*
+ * Search for public key algorithm with given name and return its pkey_id if
+ * it is available. Otherwise return 0
+ */
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+
+static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name)
+{
+ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+ int pkey_id = 0;
+ ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pkey_name, -1);
+ if (ameth && EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ ameth) > 0)
+ return pkey_id;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#else
+
+static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name)
+{
+ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth;
+ ENGINE *tmpeng = NULL;
+ int pkey_id = 0;
+ ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, pkey_name, -1);
+ if (ameth) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
+ ameth) <= 0)
+ pkey_id = 0;
+ }
+ tls_engine_finish(tmpeng);
+ return pkey_id;
+}
+
+#endif
+
+int ssl_load_ciphers(SSL_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ size_t i;
+ const ssl_cipher_table *t;
+ EVP_KEYEXCH *kex = NULL;
+ EVP_SIGNATURE *sig = NULL;
+
+ ctx->disabled_enc_mask = 0;
+ for (i = 0, t = ssl_cipher_table_cipher; i < SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX; i++, t++) {
+ if (t->nid != NID_undef) {
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher
+ = ssl_evp_cipher_fetch(ctx->libctx, t->nid, ctx->propq);
+
+ ctx->ssl_cipher_methods[i] = cipher;
+ if (cipher == NULL)
+ ctx->disabled_enc_mask |= t->mask;
+ }
+ }
+ ctx->disabled_mac_mask = 0;
+ for (i = 0, t = ssl_cipher_table_mac; i < SSL_MD_NUM_IDX; i++, t++) {
+ const EVP_MD *md
+ = ssl_evp_md_fetch(ctx->libctx, t->nid, ctx->propq);
+
+ ctx->ssl_digest_methods[i] = md;
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ ctx->disabled_mac_mask |= t->mask;
+ } else {
+ int tmpsize = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
+
+ if (!ossl_assert(tmpsize > 0))
+ return 0;
+ ctx->ssl_mac_secret_size[i] = tmpsize;
+ }
+ }
+
+ ctx->disabled_mkey_mask = 0;
+ ctx->disabled_auth_mask = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * We ignore any errors from the fetches below. They are expected to fail
+ * if these algorithms are not available.
+ */
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ sig = EVP_SIGNATURE_fetch(ctx->libctx, "DSA", ctx->propq);
+ if (sig == NULL)
+ ctx->disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aDSS;
+ else
+ EVP_SIGNATURE_free(sig);
+ kex = EVP_KEYEXCH_fetch(ctx->libctx, "DH", ctx->propq);
+ if (kex == NULL)
+ ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK;
+ else
+ EVP_KEYEXCH_free(kex);
+ kex = EVP_KEYEXCH_fetch(ctx->libctx, "ECDH", ctx->propq);
+ if (kex == NULL)
+ ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK;
+ else
+ EVP_KEYEXCH_free(kex);
+ sig = EVP_SIGNATURE_fetch(ctx->libctx, "ECDSA", ctx->propq);
+ if (sig == NULL)
+ ctx->disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aECDSA;
+ else
+ EVP_SIGNATURE_free(sig);
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_PSK;
+ ctx->disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aPSK;
+#endif
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+ ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kSRP;
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Check for presence of GOST 34.10 algorithms, and if they are not
+ * present, disable appropriate auth and key exchange
+ */
+ memcpy(ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id, default_mac_pkey_id,
+ sizeof(ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id));
+
+ ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] =
+ get_optional_pkey_id(SN_id_Gost28147_89_MAC);
+ if (ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX])
+ ctx->ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = 32;
+ else
+ ctx->disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_GOST89MAC;
+
+ ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] =
+ get_optional_pkey_id(SN_gost_mac_12);
+ if (ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX])
+ ctx->ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] = 32;
+ else
+ ctx->disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_GOST89MAC12;
+
+ ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_MAGMAOMAC_IDX] =
+ get_optional_pkey_id(SN_magma_mac);
+ if (ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_MAGMAOMAC_IDX])
+ ctx->ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_MAGMAOMAC_IDX] = 32;
+ else
+ ctx->disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_MAGMAOMAC;
+
+ ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_KUZNYECHIKOMAC_IDX] =
+ get_optional_pkey_id(SN_kuznyechik_mac);
+ if (ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_KUZNYECHIKOMAC_IDX])
+ ctx->ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_KUZNYECHIKOMAC_IDX] = 32;
+ else
+ ctx->disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_KUZNYECHIKOMAC;
+
+ if (!get_optional_pkey_id(SN_id_GostR3410_2001))
+ ctx->disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12;
+ if (!get_optional_pkey_id(SN_id_GostR3410_2012_256))
+ ctx->disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST12;
+ if (!get_optional_pkey_id(SN_id_GostR3410_2012_512))
+ ctx->disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST12;
+ /*
+ * Disable GOST key exchange if no GOST signature algs are available *
+ */
+ if ((ctx->disabled_auth_mask & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) ==
+ (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12))
+ ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kGOST;
+
+ if ((ctx->disabled_auth_mask & SSL_aGOST12) == SSL_aGOST12)
+ ctx->disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kGOST18;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_CIPHER *sslc,
+ const EVP_CIPHER **enc)
+{
+ int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_cipher,
+ sslc->algorithm_enc);
+
+ if (i == -1) {
+ *enc = NULL;
+ } else {
+ if (i == SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX) {
+ /*
+ * We assume we don't care about this coming from an ENGINE so
+ * just do a normal EVP_CIPHER_fetch instead of
+ * ssl_evp_cipher_fetch()
+ */
+ *enc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(ctx->libctx, "NULL", ctx->propq);
+ if (*enc == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = ctx->ssl_cipher_methods[i];
+
+ if (cipher == NULL
+ || !ssl_evp_cipher_up_ref(cipher))
+ return 0;
+ *enc = ctx->ssl_cipher_methods[i];
+ }
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_get_evp_md_mac(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_CIPHER *sslc,
+ const EVP_MD **md,
+ int *mac_pkey_type, size_t *mac_secret_size)
+{
+ int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_mac, sslc->algorithm_mac);
+
+ if (i == -1) {
+ *md = NULL;
+ if (mac_pkey_type != NULL)
+ *mac_pkey_type = NID_undef;
+ if (mac_secret_size != NULL)
+ *mac_secret_size = 0;
+ } else {
+ const EVP_MD *digest = ctx->ssl_digest_methods[i];
+
+ if (digest == NULL || !ssl_evp_md_up_ref(digest))
+ return 0;
+
+ *md = digest;
+ if (mac_pkey_type != NULL)
+ *mac_pkey_type = ctx->ssl_mac_pkey_id[i];
+ if (mac_secret_size != NULL)
+ *mac_secret_size = ctx->ssl_mac_secret_size[i];
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_get_evp(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_SESSION *s,
+ const EVP_CIPHER **enc, const EVP_MD **md,
+ int *mac_pkey_type, size_t *mac_secret_size,
+ SSL_COMP **comp, int use_etm)
+{
+ int i;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+
+ c = s->cipher;
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (comp != NULL) {
+ SSL_COMP ctmp;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *comp_methods;
+
+ *comp = NULL;
+ ctmp.id = s->compress_meth;
+ comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+ if (comp_methods != NULL) {
+ i = sk_SSL_COMP_find(comp_methods, &ctmp);
+ if (i >= 0)
+ *comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(comp_methods, i);
+ }
+ /* If were only interested in comp then return success */
+ if ((enc == NULL) && (md == NULL))
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if ((enc == NULL) || (md == NULL))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(ctx, c, enc))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_md_mac(ctx, c, md, mac_pkey_type,
+ mac_secret_size)) {
+ ssl_evp_cipher_free(*enc);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((*enc != NULL)
+ && (*md != NULL
+ || (EVP_CIPHER_get_flags(*enc) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER))
+ && (c->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD
+ || mac_pkey_type == NULL || *mac_pkey_type != NID_undef)) {
+ const EVP_CIPHER *evp = NULL;
+
+ if (use_etm
+ || s->ssl_version >> 8 != TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR
+ || s->ssl_version < TLS1_VERSION)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4
+ && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_MD5)
+ evp = ssl_evp_cipher_fetch(ctx->libctx, NID_rc4_hmac_md5,
+ ctx->propq);
+ else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128
+ && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1)
+ evp = ssl_evp_cipher_fetch(ctx->libctx,
+ NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1,
+ ctx->propq);
+ else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256
+ && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1)
+ evp = ssl_evp_cipher_fetch(ctx->libctx,
+ NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha1,
+ ctx->propq);
+ else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128
+ && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256)
+ evp = ssl_evp_cipher_fetch(ctx->libctx,
+ NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha256,
+ ctx->propq);
+ else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256
+ && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256)
+ evp = ssl_evp_cipher_fetch(ctx->libctx,
+ NID_aes_256_cbc_hmac_sha256,
+ ctx->propq);
+
+ if (evp != NULL) {
+ ssl_evp_cipher_free(*enc);
+ ssl_evp_md_free(*md);
+ *enc = evp;
+ *md = NULL;
+ }
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *ssl_md(SSL_CTX *ctx, int idx)
+{
+ idx &= SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK;
+ if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX)
+ return NULL;
+ return ctx->ssl_digest_methods[idx];
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *ssl_handshake_md(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ return ssl_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), ssl_get_algorithm2(s));
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *ssl_prf_md(SSL_CONNECTION *s)
+{
+ return ssl_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
+ ssl_get_algorithm2(s) >> TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT);
+}
+
+
+#define ITEM_SEP(a) \
+ (((a) == ':') || ((a) == ' ') || ((a) == ';') || ((a) == ','))
+
+static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail)
+{
+ if (curr == *tail)
+ return;
+ if (curr == *head)
+ *head = curr->next;
+ if (curr->prev != NULL)
+ curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+ if (curr->next != NULL)
+ curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+ (*tail)->next = curr;
+ curr->prev = *tail;
+ curr->next = NULL;
+ *tail = curr;
+}
+
+static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail)
+{
+ if (curr == *head)
+ return;
+ if (curr == *tail)
+ *tail = curr->prev;
+ if (curr->next != NULL)
+ curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+ if (curr->prev != NULL)
+ curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+ (*head)->prev = curr;
+ curr->next = *head;
+ curr->prev = NULL;
+ *head = curr;
+}
+
+static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
+ int num_of_ciphers,
+ uint32_t disabled_mkey,
+ uint32_t disabled_auth,
+ uint32_t disabled_enc,
+ uint32_t disabled_mac,
+ CIPHER_ORDER *co_list,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
+{
+ int i, co_list_num;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+
+ /*
+ * We have num_of_ciphers descriptions compiled in, depending on the
+ * method selected (SSLv3, TLSv1 etc).
+ * These will later be sorted in a linked list with at most num
+ * entries.
+ */
+
+ /* Get the initial list of ciphers */
+ co_list_num = 0; /* actual count of ciphers */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_of_ciphers; i++) {
+ c = ssl_method->get_cipher(i);
+ /* drop those that use any of that is not available */
+ if (c == NULL || !c->valid)
+ continue;
+ if ((c->algorithm_mkey & disabled_mkey) ||
+ (c->algorithm_auth & disabled_auth) ||
+ (c->algorithm_enc & disabled_enc) ||
+ (c->algorithm_mac & disabled_mac))
+ continue;
+ if (((ssl_method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) == 0) &&
+ c->min_tls == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (((ssl_method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) != 0) &&
+ c->min_dtls == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ co_list[co_list_num].cipher = c;
+ co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL;
+ co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL;
+ co_list[co_list_num].active = 0;
+ co_list_num++;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Prepare linked list from list entries
+ */
+ if (co_list_num > 0) {
+ co_list[0].prev = NULL;
+
+ if (co_list_num > 1) {
+ co_list[0].next = &co_list[1];
+
+ for (i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++) {
+ co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1];
+ co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1];
+ }
+
+ co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2];
+ }
+
+ co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL;
+
+ *head_p = &co_list[0];
+ *tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1];
+ }
+}
+
+static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list,
+ int num_of_group_aliases,
+ uint32_t disabled_mkey,
+ uint32_t disabled_auth,
+ uint32_t disabled_enc,
+ uint32_t disabled_mac,
+ CIPHER_ORDER *head)
+{
+ CIPHER_ORDER *ciph_curr;
+ const SSL_CIPHER **ca_curr;
+ int i;
+ uint32_t mask_mkey = ~disabled_mkey;
+ uint32_t mask_auth = ~disabled_auth;
+ uint32_t mask_enc = ~disabled_enc;
+ uint32_t mask_mac = ~disabled_mac;
+
+ /*
+ * First, add the real ciphers as already collected
+ */
+ ciph_curr = head;
+ ca_curr = ca_list;
+ while (ciph_curr != NULL) {
+ *ca_curr = ciph_curr->cipher;
+ ca_curr++;
+ ciph_curr = ciph_curr->next;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now we add the available ones from the cipher_aliases[] table.
+ * They represent either one or more algorithms, some of which
+ * in any affected category must be supported (set in enabled_mask),
+ * or represent a cipher strength value (will be added in any case because algorithms=0).
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_of_group_aliases; i++) {
+ uint32_t algorithm_mkey = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mkey;
+ uint32_t algorithm_auth = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_auth;
+ uint32_t algorithm_enc = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_enc;
+ uint32_t algorithm_mac = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mac;
+
+ if (algorithm_mkey)
+ if ((algorithm_mkey & mask_mkey) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (algorithm_auth)
+ if ((algorithm_auth & mask_auth) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (algorithm_enc)
+ if ((algorithm_enc & mask_enc) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ if (algorithm_mac)
+ if ((algorithm_mac & mask_mac) == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ *ca_curr = (SSL_CIPHER *)(cipher_aliases + i);
+ ca_curr++;
+ }
+
+ *ca_curr = NULL; /* end of list */
+}
+
+static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(uint32_t cipher_id, uint32_t alg_mkey,
+ uint32_t alg_auth, uint32_t alg_enc,
+ uint32_t alg_mac, int min_tls,
+ uint32_t algo_strength, int rule,
+ int32_t strength_bits, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
+{
+ CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cp;
+ int reverse = 0;
+
+ OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
+ BIO_printf(trc_out,
+ "Applying rule %d with %08x/%08x/%08x/%08x/%08x %08x (%d)\n",
+ rule, (unsigned int)alg_mkey, (unsigned int)alg_auth,
+ (unsigned int)alg_enc, (unsigned int)alg_mac, min_tls,
+ (unsigned int)algo_strength, (int)strength_bits);
+ }
+
+ if (rule == CIPHER_DEL || rule == CIPHER_BUMP)
+ reverse = 1; /* needed to maintain sorting between currently
+ * deleted ciphers */
+
+ head = *head_p;
+ tail = *tail_p;
+
+ if (reverse) {
+ next = tail;
+ last = head;
+ } else {
+ next = head;
+ last = tail;
+ }
+
+ curr = NULL;
+ for (;;) {
+ if (curr == last)
+ break;
+
+ curr = next;
+
+ if (curr == NULL)
+ break;
+
+ next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next;
+
+ cp = curr->cipher;
+
+ /*
+ * Selection criteria is either the value of strength_bits
+ * or the algorithms used.
+ */
+ if (strength_bits >= 0) {
+ if (strength_bits != cp->strength_bits)
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ if (trc_out != NULL) {
+ BIO_printf(trc_out,
+ "\nName: %s:"
+ "\nAlgo = %08x/%08x/%08x/%08x/%08x Algo_strength = %08x\n",
+ cp->name,
+ (unsigned int)cp->algorithm_mkey,
+ (unsigned int)cp->algorithm_auth,
+ (unsigned int)cp->algorithm_enc,
+ (unsigned int)cp->algorithm_mac,
+ cp->min_tls,
+ (unsigned int)cp->algo_strength);
+ }
+ if (cipher_id != 0 && (cipher_id != cp->id))
+ continue;
+ if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey))
+ continue;
+ if (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth))
+ continue;
+ if (alg_enc && !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc))
+ continue;
+ if (alg_mac && !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac))
+ continue;
+ if (min_tls && (min_tls != cp->min_tls))
+ continue;
+ if ((algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)
+ && !(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK & cp->algo_strength))
+ continue;
+ if ((algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK)
+ && !(algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK & cp->algo_strength))
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (trc_out != NULL)
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "Action = %d\n", rule);
+
+ /* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */
+ if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) {
+ /* reverse == 0 */
+ if (!curr->active) {
+ ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
+ curr->active = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Move the added cipher to this location */
+ else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) {
+ /* reverse == 0 */
+ if (curr->active) {
+ ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail);
+ }
+ } else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) {
+ /* reverse == 1 */
+ if (curr->active) {
+ /*
+ * most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions for
+ * any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop works
+ * in reverse to maintain the order)
+ */
+ ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail);
+ curr->active = 0;
+ }
+ } else if (rule == CIPHER_BUMP) {
+ if (curr->active)
+ ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail);
+ } else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) {
+ /* reverse == 0 */
+ if (head == curr)
+ head = curr->next;
+ else
+ curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+ if (tail == curr)
+ tail = curr->prev;
+ curr->active = 0;
+ if (curr->next != NULL)
+ curr->next->prev = curr->prev;
+ if (curr->prev != NULL)
+ curr->prev->next = curr->next;
+ curr->next = NULL;
+ curr->prev = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *head_p = head;
+ *tail_p = tail;
+
+ OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
+}
+
+static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p)
+{
+ int32_t max_strength_bits;
+ int i, *number_uses;
+ CIPHER_ORDER *curr;
+
+ /*
+ * This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting
+ * must keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting
+ * routine as '+' movement to the end of the list.
+ */
+ max_strength_bits = 0;
+ curr = *head_p;
+ while (curr != NULL) {
+ if (curr->active && (curr->cipher->strength_bits > max_strength_bits))
+ max_strength_bits = curr->cipher->strength_bits;
+ curr = curr->next;
+ }
+
+ number_uses = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(int) * (max_strength_bits + 1));
+ if (number_uses == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Now find the strength_bits values actually used
+ */
+ curr = *head_p;
+ while (curr != NULL) {
+ if (curr->active)
+ number_uses[curr->cipher->strength_bits]++;
+ curr = curr->next;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending
+ * order.
+ */
+ for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--)
+ if (number_uses[i] > 0)
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, head_p,
+ tail_p);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(number_uses);
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **head_p,
+ CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p,
+ const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list, CERT *c)
+{
+ uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, algo_strength;
+ int min_tls;
+ const char *l, *buf;
+ int j, multi, found, rule, retval, ok, buflen;
+ uint32_t cipher_id = 0;
+ char ch;
+
+ retval = 1;
+ l = rule_str;
+ for (;;) {
+ ch = *l;
+
+ if (ch == '\0')
+ break; /* done */
+ if (ch == '-') {
+ rule = CIPHER_DEL;
+ l++;
+ } else if (ch == '+') {
+ rule = CIPHER_ORD;
+ l++;
+ } else if (ch == '!') {
+ rule = CIPHER_KILL;
+ l++;
+ } else if (ch == '@') {
+ rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL;
+ l++;
+ } else {
+ rule = CIPHER_ADD;
+ }
+
+ if (ITEM_SEP(ch)) {
+ l++;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ alg_mkey = 0;
+ alg_auth = 0;
+ alg_enc = 0;
+ alg_mac = 0;
+ min_tls = 0;
+ algo_strength = 0;
+
+ for (;;) {
+ ch = *l;
+ buf = l;
+ buflen = 0;
+#ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC
+ while (((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) ||
+ ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) ||
+ ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) ||
+ (ch == '-') || (ch == '_') || (ch == '.') || (ch == '='))
+#else
+ while (isalnum((unsigned char)ch) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '_') || (ch == '.')
+ || (ch == '='))
+#endif
+ {
+ ch = *(++l);
+ buflen++;
+ }
+
+ if (buflen == 0) {
+ /*
+ * We hit something we cannot deal with,
+ * it is no command or separator nor
+ * alphanumeric, so we call this an error.
+ */
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) {
+ found = 0; /* unused -- avoid compiler warning */
+ break; /* special treatment */
+ }
+
+ /* check for multi-part specification */
+ if (ch == '+') {
+ multi = 1;
+ l++;
+ } else {
+ multi = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now search for the cipher alias in the ca_list. Be careful
+ * with the strncmp, because the "buflen" limitation
+ * will make the rule "ADH:SOME" and the cipher
+ * "ADH-MY-CIPHER" look like a match for buflen=3.
+ * So additionally check whether the cipher name found
+ * has the correct length. We can save a strlen() call:
+ * just checking for the '\0' at the right place is
+ * sufficient, we have to strncmp() anyway. (We cannot
+ * use strcmp(), because buf is not '\0' terminated.)
+ */
+ j = found = 0;
+ cipher_id = 0;
+ while (ca_list[j]) {
+ if (strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->name, buflen) == 0
+ && (ca_list[j]->name[buflen] == '\0')) {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ } else if (ca_list[j]->stdname != NULL
+ && strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->stdname, buflen) == 0
+ && ca_list[j]->stdname[buflen] == '\0') {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ } else
+ j++;
+ }
+
+ if (!found)
+ break; /* ignore this entry */
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey) {
+ if (alg_mkey) {
+ alg_mkey &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey;
+ if (!alg_mkey) {
+ found = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ alg_mkey = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth) {
+ if (alg_auth) {
+ alg_auth &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth;
+ if (!alg_auth) {
+ found = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ alg_auth = ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc) {
+ if (alg_enc) {
+ alg_enc &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc;
+ if (!alg_enc) {
+ found = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ alg_enc = ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac) {
+ if (alg_mac) {
+ alg_mac &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac;
+ if (!alg_mac) {
+ found = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ alg_mac = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) {
+ if (algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) {
+ algo_strength &=
+ (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) |
+ ~SSL_STRONG_MASK;
+ if (!(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)) {
+ found = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ algo_strength = ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) {
+ if (algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) {
+ algo_strength &=
+ (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) |
+ ~SSL_DEFAULT_MASK;
+ if (!(algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK)) {
+ found = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ } else {
+ algo_strength |=
+ ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->valid) {
+ /*
+ * explicit ciphersuite found; its protocol version does not
+ * become part of the search pattern!
+ */
+
+ cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * not an explicit ciphersuite; only in this case, the
+ * protocol version is considered part of the search pattern
+ */
+
+ if (ca_list[j]->min_tls) {
+ if (min_tls != 0 && min_tls != ca_list[j]->min_tls) {
+ found = 0;
+ break;
+ } else {
+ min_tls = ca_list[j]->min_tls;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!multi)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Ok, we have the rule, now apply it
+ */
+ if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { /* special command */
+ ok = 0;
+ if ((buflen == 8) && HAS_PREFIX(buf, "STRENGTH")) {
+ ok = ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p);
+ } else if (buflen == 10 && CHECK_AND_SKIP_PREFIX(buf, "SECLEVEL=")) {
+ int level = *buf - '0';
+ if (level < 0 || level > 5) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+ } else {
+ c->sec_level = level;
+ ok = 1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND);
+ }
+ if (ok == 0)
+ retval = 0;
+ /*
+ * We do not support any "multi" options
+ * together with "@", so throw away the
+ * rest of the command, if any left, until
+ * end or ':' is found.
+ */
+ while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l))
+ l++;
+ } else if (found) {
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id,
+ alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac,
+ min_tls, algo_strength, rule, -1, head_p,
+ tail_p);
+ } else {
+ while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l))
+ l++;
+ }
+ if (*l == '\0')
+ break; /* done */
+ }
+
+ return retval;
+}
+
+static int check_suiteb_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, CERT *c,
+ const char **prule_str)
+{
+ unsigned int suiteb_flags = 0, suiteb_comb2 = 0;
+ if (HAS_PREFIX(*prule_str, "SUITEB128ONLY")) {
+ suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY;
+ } else if (HAS_PREFIX(*prule_str, "SUITEB128C2")) {
+ suiteb_comb2 = 1;
+ suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
+ } else if (HAS_PREFIX(*prule_str, "SUITEB128")) {
+ suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
+ } else if (HAS_PREFIX(*prule_str, "SUITEB192")) {
+ suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS;
+ }
+
+ if (suiteb_flags) {
+ c->cert_flags &= ~SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
+ c->cert_flags |= suiteb_flags;
+ } else {
+ suiteb_flags = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS;
+ }
+
+ if (!suiteb_flags)
+ return 1;
+ /* Check version: if TLS 1.2 ciphers allowed we can use Suite B */
+
+ if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ switch (suiteb_flags) {
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS:
+ if (suiteb_comb2)
+ *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+ else
+ *prule_str =
+ "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+ break;
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY:
+ *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256";
+ break;
+ case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS:
+ *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384";
+ break;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int ciphersuite_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphersuites = (STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *)arg;
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+ /* Arbitrary sized temp buffer for the cipher name. Should be big enough */
+ char name[80];
+
+ if (len > (int)(sizeof(name) - 1))
+ /* Anyway return 1 so we can parse rest of the list */
+ return 1;
+
+ memcpy(name, elem, len);
+ name[len] = '\0';
+
+ cipher = ssl3_get_cipher_by_std_name(name);
+ if (cipher == NULL)
+ /* Ciphersuite not found but return 1 to parse rest of the list */
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphersuites, cipher)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static __owur int set_ciphersuites(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **currciphers, const char *str)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *newciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
+
+ if (newciphers == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Parse the list. We explicitly allow an empty list */
+ if (*str != '\0'
+ && (CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, ciphersuite_cb, newciphers) <= 0
+ || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(newciphers) == 0)) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(newciphers);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*currciphers);
+ *currciphers = newciphers;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int update_cipher_list_by_id(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipherstack);
+
+ if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list_by_id);
+ *cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list;
+
+ (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*cipher_list_by_id, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(*cipher_list_by_id);
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int update_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites)
+{
+ int i;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(*cipher_list);
+
+ if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Delete any existing TLSv1.3 ciphersuites. These are always first in the
+ * list.
+ */
+ while (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tmp_cipher_list) > 0
+ && sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tmp_cipher_list, 0)->min_tls
+ == TLS1_3_VERSION)
+ (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(tmp_cipher_list, 0);
+
+ /* Insert the new TLSv1.3 ciphersuites */
+ for (i = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tls13_ciphersuites) - 1; i >= 0; i--) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *sslc = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tls13_ciphersuites, i);
+
+ /* Don't include any TLSv1.3 ciphersuites that are disabled */
+ if ((sslc->algorithm_enc & ctx->disabled_enc_mask) == 0
+ && (ssl_cipher_table_mac[sslc->algorithm2
+ & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK].mask
+ & ctx->disabled_mac_mask) == 0) {
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_unshift(tmp_cipher_list, sslc);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!update_cipher_list_by_id(cipher_list_by_id, tmp_cipher_list)) {
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(tmp_cipher_list);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list);
+ *cipher_list = tmp_cipher_list;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str)
+{
+ int ret = set_ciphersuites(&(ctx->tls13_ciphersuites), str);
+
+ if (ret && ctx->cipher_list != NULL)
+ return update_cipher_list(ctx, &ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id,
+ ctx->tls13_ciphersuites);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int SSL_set_ciphersuites(SSL *s, const char *str)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list;
+ SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s);
+ int ret;
+
+ if (sc == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ ret = set_ciphersuites(&(sc->tls13_ciphersuites), str);
+
+ if (sc->cipher_list == NULL) {
+ if ((cipher_list = SSL_get_ciphers(s)) != NULL)
+ sc->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipher_list);
+ }
+ if (ret && sc->cipher_list != NULL)
+ return update_cipher_list(s->ctx, &sc->cipher_list,
+ &sc->cipher_list_by_id,
+ sc->tls13_ciphersuites);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list,
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id,
+ const char *rule_str,
+ CERT *c)
+{
+ int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases, i;
+ uint32_t disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack;
+ const char *rule_p;
+ CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr;
+ const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list = NULL;
+ const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method = ctx->method;
+
+ /*
+ * Return with error if nothing to do.
+ */
+ if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ if (!check_suiteb_cipher_list(ssl_method, c, &rule_str))
+ return NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled
+ * in algorithms, so we first get the mask of disabled ciphers.
+ */
+
+ disabled_mkey = ctx->disabled_mkey_mask;
+ disabled_auth = ctx->disabled_auth_mask;
+ disabled_enc = ctx->disabled_enc_mask;
+ disabled_mac = ctx->disabled_mac_mask;
+
+ /*
+ * Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled
+ * in ciphers. We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so
+ * it is used for allocation.
+ */
+ num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers();
+
+ if (num_of_ciphers > 0) {
+ co_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*co_list) * num_of_ciphers);
+ if (co_list == NULL)
+ return NULL; /* Failure */
+ }
+
+ ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers,
+ disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc,
+ disabled_mac, co_list, &head, &tail);
+
+ /* Now arrange all ciphers by preference. */
+
+ /*
+ * Everything else being equal, prefer ephemeral ECDH over other key
+ * exchange mechanisms.
+ * For consistency, prefer ECDSA over RSA (though this only matters if the
+ * server has both certificates, and is using the DEFAULT, or a client
+ * preference).
+ */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD,
+ -1, &head, &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head,
+ &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head,
+ &tail);
+
+ /* Within each strength group, we prefer GCM over CHACHA... */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
+ &head, &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1,
+ &head, &tail);
+
+ /*
+ * ...and generally, our preferred cipher is AES.
+ * Note that AEADs will be bumped to take preference after sorting by
+ * strength.
+ */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES ^ SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD,
+ -1, &head, &tail);
+
+ /* Temporarily enable everything else for sorting */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+ /* Low priority for MD5 */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
+ &tail);
+
+ /*
+ * Move anonymous ciphers to the end. Usually, these will remain
+ * disabled. (For applications that allow them, they aren't too bad, but
+ * we prefer authenticated ciphers.)
+ */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
+ &tail);
+
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
+ &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
+ &tail);
+
+ /* RC4 is sort-of broken -- move to the end */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head,
+ &tail);
+
+ /*
+ * Now sort by symmetric encryption strength. The above ordering remains
+ * in force within each class
+ */
+ if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(&head, &tail)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Partially overrule strength sort to prefer TLS 1.2 ciphers/PRFs.
+ */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1,
+ &head, &tail);
+
+ /*
+ * Irrespective of strength, enforce the following order:
+ * (EC)DHE + AEAD > (EC)DHE > rest of AEAD > rest.
+ * Within each group, ciphers remain sorted by strength and previous
+ * preference, i.e.,
+ * 1) ECDHE > DHE
+ * 2) GCM > CHACHA
+ * 3) AES > rest
+ * 4) TLS 1.2 > legacy
+ *
+ * Because we now bump ciphers to the top of the list, we proceed in
+ * reverse order of preference.
+ */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1,
+ &head, &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+ CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail);
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0,
+ CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+ /* Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!) */
+ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail);
+
+ /*
+ * We also need cipher aliases for selecting based on the rule_str.
+ * There might be two types of entries in the rule_str: 1) names
+ * of ciphers themselves 2) aliases for groups of ciphers.
+ * For 1) we need the available ciphers and for 2) the cipher
+ * groups of cipher_aliases added together in one list (otherwise
+ * we would be happy with just the cipher_aliases table).
+ */
+ num_of_group_aliases = OSSL_NELEM(cipher_aliases);
+ num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1;
+ ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ca_list) * num_of_alias_max);
+ if (ca_list == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+ return NULL; /* Failure */
+ }
+ ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(ca_list, num_of_group_aliases,
+ disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc,
+ disabled_mac, head);
+
+ /*
+ * If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule
+ * before using the (possibly available) additional rules.
+ */
+ ok = 1;
+ rule_p = rule_str;
+ if (HAS_PREFIX(rule_str, "DEFAULT")) {
+ ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(OSSL_default_cipher_list(),
+ &head, &tail, ca_list, c);
+ rule_p += 7;
+ if (*rule_p == ':')
+ rule_p++;
+ }
+
+ if (ok && (rule_p[0] != '\0'))
+ ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, ca_list, c);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(ca_list); /* Not needed anymore */
+
+ if (!ok) { /* Rule processing failure */
+ OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error
+ * if we cannot get one.
+ */
+ if ((cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null()) == NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Add TLSv1.3 ciphers first - we always prefer those if possible */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tls13_ciphersuites); i++) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *sslc = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tls13_ciphersuites, i);
+
+ /* Don't include any TLSv1.3 ciphers that are disabled */
+ if ((sslc->algorithm_enc & disabled_enc) != 0
+ || (ssl_cipher_table_mac[sslc->algorithm2
+ & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK].mask
+ & ctx->disabled_mac_mask) != 0) {
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(tls13_ciphersuites, i);
+ i--;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, sslc)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS_CIPHER) {
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "cipher selection:\n");
+ }
+ /*
+ * The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added
+ * to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER).
+ */
+ for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next) {
+ if (curr->active) {
+ if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(co_list);
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack);
+ OSSL_TRACE_CANCEL(TLS_CIPHER);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (trc_out != NULL)
+ BIO_printf(trc_out, "<%s>\n", curr->cipher->name);
+ }
+ }
+ OPENSSL_free(co_list); /* Not needed any longer */
+ OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS_CIPHER);
+
+ if (!update_cipher_list_by_id(cipher_list_by_id, cipherstack)) {
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list);
+ *cipher_list = cipherstack;
+
+ return cipherstack;
+}
+
+char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len)
+{
+ const char *ver;
+ const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac;
+ uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac;
+ static const char *const format = "%-30s %-7s Kx=%-8s Au=%-5s Enc=%-22s Mac=%-4s\n";
+
+ if (buf == NULL) {
+ len = 128;
+ if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+ } else if (len < 128) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth;
+ alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc;
+ alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac;
+
+ ver = ssl_protocol_to_string(cipher->min_tls);
+
+ switch (alg_mkey) {
+ case SSL_kRSA:
+ kx = "RSA";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kDHE:
+ kx = "DH";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kECDHE:
+ kx = "ECDH";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kPSK:
+ kx = "PSK";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kRSAPSK:
+ kx = "RSAPSK";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kECDHEPSK:
+ kx = "ECDHEPSK";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kDHEPSK:
+ kx = "DHEPSK";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kSRP:
+ kx = "SRP";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kGOST:
+ kx = "GOST";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kGOST18:
+ kx = "GOST18";
+ break;
+ case SSL_kANY:
+ kx = "any";
+ break;
+ default:
+ kx = "unknown";
+ }
+
+ switch (alg_auth) {
+ case SSL_aRSA:
+ au = "RSA";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aDSS:
+ au = "DSS";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aNULL:
+ au = "None";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aECDSA:
+ au = "ECDSA";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aPSK:
+ au = "PSK";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aSRP:
+ au = "SRP";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aGOST01:
+ au = "GOST01";
+ break;
+ /* New GOST ciphersuites have both SSL_aGOST12 and SSL_aGOST01 bits */
+ case (SSL_aGOST12 | SSL_aGOST01):
+ au = "GOST12";
+ break;
+ case SSL_aANY:
+ au = "any";
+ break;
+ default:
+ au = "unknown";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (alg_enc) {
+ case SSL_DES:
+ enc = "DES(56)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_3DES:
+ enc = "3DES(168)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_RC4:
+ enc = "RC4(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_RC2:
+ enc = "RC2(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_IDEA:
+ enc = "IDEA(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_eNULL:
+ enc = "None";
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES128:
+ enc = "AES(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES256:
+ enc = "AES(256)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES128GCM:
+ enc = "AESGCM(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES256GCM:
+ enc = "AESGCM(256)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES128CCM:
+ enc = "AESCCM(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES256CCM:
+ enc = "AESCCM(256)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES128CCM8:
+ enc = "AESCCM8(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_AES256CCM8:
+ enc = "AESCCM8(256)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_CAMELLIA128:
+ enc = "Camellia(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_CAMELLIA256:
+ enc = "Camellia(256)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_ARIA128GCM:
+ enc = "ARIAGCM(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_ARIA256GCM:
+ enc = "ARIAGCM(256)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_SEED:
+ enc = "SEED(128)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT:
+ case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12:
+ enc = "GOST89(256)";
+ break;
+ case SSL_MAGMA:
+ enc = "MAGMA";
+ break;
+ case SSL_KUZNYECHIK:
+ enc = "KUZNYECHIK";
+ break;
+ case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305:
+ enc = "CHACHA20/POLY1305(256)";
+ break;
+ default:
+ enc = "unknown";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ switch (alg_mac) {
+ case SSL_MD5:
+ mac = "MD5";
+ break;
+ case SSL_SHA1:
+ mac = "SHA1";
+ break;
+ case SSL_SHA256:
+ mac = "SHA256";
+ break;
+ case SSL_SHA384:
+ mac = "SHA384";
+ break;
+ case SSL_AEAD:
+ mac = "AEAD";
+ break;
+ case SSL_GOST89MAC:
+ case SSL_GOST89MAC12:
+ mac = "GOST89";
+ break;
+ case SSL_GOST94:
+ mac = "GOST94";
+ break;
+ case SSL_GOST12_256:
+ case SSL_GOST12_512:
+ mac = "GOST2012";
+ break;
+ default:
+ mac = "unknown";
+ break;
+ }
+
+ BIO_snprintf(buf, len, format, cipher->name, ver, kx, au, enc, mac);
+
+ return buf;
+}
+
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return "(NONE)";
+
+ /*
+ * Backwards-compatibility crutch. In almost all contexts we report TLS
+ * 1.0 as "TLSv1", but for ciphers we report "TLSv1.0".
+ */
+ if (c->min_tls == TLS1_VERSION)
+ return "TLSv1.0";
+ return ssl_protocol_to_string(c->min_tls);
+}
+
+/* return the actual cipher being used */
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+ if (c != NULL)
+ return c->name;
+ return "(NONE)";
+}
+
+/* return the actual cipher being used in RFC standard name */
+const char *SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+ if (c != NULL)
+ return c->stdname;
+ return "(NONE)";
+}
+
+/* return the OpenSSL name based on given RFC standard name */
+const char *OPENSSL_cipher_name(const char *stdname)
+{
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c;
+
+ if (stdname == NULL)
+ return "(NONE)";
+ c = ssl3_get_cipher_by_std_name(stdname);
+ return SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c);
+}
+
+/* number of bits for symmetric cipher */
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (c != NULL) {
+ if (alg_bits != NULL)
+ *alg_bits = (int)c->alg_bits;
+ ret = (int)c->strength_bits;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+uint32_t SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+ return c->id;
+}
+
+uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+ return c->id & 0xFFFF;
+}
+
+SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n)
+{
+ SSL_COMP *ctmp;
+ SSL_COMP srch_key;
+ int i;
+
+ if ((n == 0) || (sk == NULL))
+ return NULL;
+ srch_key.id = n;
+ i = sk_SSL_COMP_find(sk, &srch_key);
+ if (i >= 0)
+ ctmp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sk, i);
+ else
+ ctmp = NULL;
+
+ return ctmp;
+}
+
+#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void)
+{
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
+ *meths)
+{
+ return meths;
+}
+
+int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm)
+{
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#else
+STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) **rv;
+
+ rv = (STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) **)OSSL_LIB_CTX_get_data(NULL,
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX_COMP_METHODS);
+ if (rv != NULL)
+ return *rv;
+ else
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP)
+ *meths)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) **comp_methods;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *old_meths;
+
+ comp_methods = (STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) **)OSSL_LIB_CTX_get_data(NULL,
+ OSSL_LIB_CTX_COMP_METHODS);
+ if (comp_methods == NULL) {
+ old_meths = meths;
+ } else {
+ old_meths = *comp_methods;
+ *comp_methods = meths;
+ }
+
+ return old_meths;
+}
+
+int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm)
+{
+ STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *comp_methods;
+ SSL_COMP *comp;
+
+ comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods();
+
+ if (comp_methods == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ if (cm == NULL || COMP_get_type(cm) == NID_undef)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*-
+ * According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the
+ * compression number ranges should be the following:
+ *
+ * 0 to 63: methods defined by the IETF
+ * 64 to 192: external party methods assigned by IANA
+ * 193 to 255: reserved for private use
+ */
+ if (id < 193 || id > 255) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*comp));
+ if (comp == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ comp->id = id;
+ if (sk_SSL_COMP_find(comp_methods, comp) >= 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(comp);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID);
+ return 1;
+ }
+ if (!sk_SSL_COMP_push(comp_methods, comp)) {
+ OPENSSL_free(comp);
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ return comp ? COMP_get_name(comp) : NULL;
+#else
+ return NULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+const char *SSL_COMP_get0_name(const SSL_COMP *comp)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ return comp->name;
+#else
+ return NULL;
+#endif
+}
+
+int SSL_COMP_get_id(const SSL_COMP *comp)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP
+ return comp->id;
+#else
+ return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_get_cipher_by_char(SSL_CONNECTION *s,
+ const unsigned char *ptr,
+ int all)
+{
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr);
+
+ if (c == NULL || (!all && c->valid == 0))
+ return NULL;
+ return c;
+}
+
+const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr)
+{
+ return ssl->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr);
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+ int i;
+ if (c == NULL)
+ return NID_undef;
+ i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_cipher, c->algorithm_enc);
+ if (i == -1)
+ return NID_undef;
+ return ssl_cipher_table_cipher[i].nid;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+ int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_mac, c->algorithm_mac);
+
+ if (i == -1)
+ return NID_undef;
+ return ssl_cipher_table_mac[i].nid;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+ int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_kx, c->algorithm_mkey);
+
+ if (i == -1)
+ return NID_undef;
+ return ssl_cipher_table_kx[i].nid;
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+ int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_auth, c->algorithm_auth);
+
+ if (i == -1)
+ return NID_undef;
+ return ssl_cipher_table_auth[i].nid;
+}
+
+int ssl_get_md_idx(int md_nid) {
+ int i;
+
+ for(i = 0; i < SSL_MD_NUM_IDX; i++) {
+ if (md_nid == ssl_cipher_table_mac[i].nid)
+ return i;
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
+const EVP_MD *SSL_CIPHER_get_handshake_digest(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+ int idx = c->algorithm2 & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK;
+
+ if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX)
+ return NULL;
+ return EVP_get_digestbynid(ssl_cipher_table_mac[idx].nid);
+}
+
+int SSL_CIPHER_is_aead(const SSL_CIPHER *c)
+{
+ return (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) ? 1 : 0;
+}
+
+int ssl_cipher_get_overhead(const SSL_CIPHER *c, size_t *mac_overhead,
+ size_t *int_overhead, size_t *blocksize,
+ size_t *ext_overhead)
+{
+ int mac = 0, in = 0, blk = 0, out = 0;
+
+ /* Some hard-coded numbers for the CCM/Poly1305 MAC overhead
+ * because there are no handy #defines for those. */
+ if (c->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AESGCM | SSL_ARIAGCM)) {
+ out = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
+ } else if (c->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES256CCM)) {
+ out = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + 16;
+ } else if (c->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) {
+ out = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + 8;
+ } else if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) {
+ out = 16;
+ } else if (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) {
+ /* We're supposed to have handled all the AEAD modes above */
+ return 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Non-AEAD modes. Calculate MAC/cipher overhead separately */
+ int digest_nid = SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(c);
+ const EVP_MD *e_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest_nid);
+
+ if (e_md == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ mac = EVP_MD_get_size(e_md);
+ if (mac <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ if (c->algorithm_enc != SSL_eNULL) {
+ int cipher_nid = SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(c);
+ const EVP_CIPHER *e_ciph = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher_nid);
+
+ /* If it wasn't AEAD or SSL_eNULL, we expect it to be a
+ known CBC cipher. */
+ if (e_ciph == NULL ||
+ EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(e_ciph) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE)
+ return 0;
+
+ in = 1; /* padding length byte */
+ out = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(e_ciph);
+ if (out < 0)
+ return 0;
+ blk = EVP_CIPHER_get_block_size(e_ciph);
+ if (blk <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ *mac_overhead = (size_t)mac;
+ *int_overhead = (size_t)in;
+ *blocksize = (size_t)blk;
+ *ext_overhead = (size_t)out;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int ssl_cert_is_disabled(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t idx)
+{
+ const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *cl;
+
+ /* A provider-loaded key type is always enabled */
+ if (idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM)
+ return 0;
+
+ cl = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(idx, ctx);
+ if (cl == NULL || (cl->amask & ctx->disabled_auth_mask) != 0)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Default list of TLSv1.2 (and earlier) ciphers
+ * SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST deprecated in 3.0.0
+ * Update both macro and function simultaneously
+ */
+const char *OSSL_default_cipher_list(void)
+{
+ return "ALL:!COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT:!eNULL";
+}
+
+/*
+ * Default list of TLSv1.3 (and later) ciphers
+ * TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES deprecated in 3.0.0
+ * Update both macro and function simultaneously
+ */
+const char *OSSL_default_ciphersuites(void)
+{
+ return "TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:"
+ "TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256:"
+ "TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256";
+}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-10-24 03:23:25 +0000