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-rw-r--r--crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c2274
1 files changed, 2274 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d958373875a3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,2274 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2016-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include <openssl/ocsp.h>
+#include "../ssl_local.h"
+#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+#include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h"
+#include "statem_local.h"
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+ if (!s->renegotiate) {
+ /* If not renegotiating, send an empty RI extension to indicate support */
+
+#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION
+# error Internal DTLS version error
+#endif
+
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)
+ && (s->min_proto_version >= TLS1_3_VERSION
+ || (ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, TLS1_VERSION, NULL)
+ && s->min_proto_version <= TLS1_VERSION))) {
+ /*
+ * For TLS <= 1.0 SCSV is used instead, and for TLS 1.3 this
+ * extension isn't used at all.
+ */
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+ }
+
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+ }
+
+ /* Add a complete RI extension if renegotiating */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
+ s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+ if (s->ext.hostname == NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name)
+ /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname,
+ strlen(s->ext.hostname))
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+/* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+ if (s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ /* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */
+ /*-
+ * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length
+ * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value.
+ */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length)
+ /* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ /* Add SRP username if there is one */
+ if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp)
+ /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
+ /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */
+ || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)
+ || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login,
+ strlen(s->srp_ctx.login))
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int use_ecc(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int min_version, int max_version)
+{
+ int i, end, ret = 0;
+ unsigned long alg_k, alg_a;
+ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL;
+ const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
+ size_t num_groups, j;
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
+
+ /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */
+ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)
+ return 0;
+
+ cipher_stack = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(ssl);
+ end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack);
+ for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
+ const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i);
+
+ alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey;
+ alg_a = c->algorithm_auth;
+ if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK))
+ || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA)
+ || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ ret = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_stack);
+ if (!ret)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Check we have at least one EC supported group */
+ tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
+ for (j = 0; j < num_groups; j++) {
+ uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[j];
+
+ if (tls_valid_group(s, ctmp, min_version, max_version, 1, NULL)
+ && tls_group_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+ const unsigned char *pformats;
+ size_t num_formats;
+ int reason, min_version, max_version;
+
+ reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
+ if (reason != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, reason);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ if (!use_ecc(s, min_version, max_version))
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */
+ tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats);
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats)
+ /* Sub-packet for formats extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+ const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
+ size_t num_groups = 0, i, tls13added = 0, added = 0;
+ int min_version, max_version, reason;
+
+ reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
+ if (reason != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, reason);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We only support EC groups in TLSv1.2 or below, and in DTLS. Therefore
+ * if we don't have EC support then we don't send this extension.
+ */
+ if (!use_ecc(s, min_version, max_version)
+ && (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) || max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION))
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ /*
+ * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message
+ */
+ tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups)
+ /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ /* Copy group ID if supported */
+ for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
+ uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[i];
+ int okfortls13;
+
+ if (tls_valid_group(s, ctmp, min_version, max_version, 0, &okfortls13)
+ && tls_group_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ if (okfortls13 && max_version == TLS1_3_VERSION)
+ tls13added++;
+ added++;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ if (added == 0)
+ SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_GROUPS,
+ "No groups enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version");
+ else
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if (tls13added == 0 && max_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_GROUPS,
+ "No groups enabled for max supported SSL/TLS version");
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+ size_t ticklen;
+
+ if (!tls_use_ticket(s))
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL
+ && s->session->ext.tick != NULL
+ && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen;
+ } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL
+ && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) {
+ ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length;
+ s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen);
+ if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->session->ext.tick,
+ s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen);
+ s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen;
+ } else {
+ ticklen = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL &&
+ s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+ size_t salglen;
+ const uint16_t *salg;
+
+ /*
+ * This used both in the initial hello and as part of renegotiation,
+ * in the latter case, the client version may be already set and may
+ * be lower than that initially offered in `client_version`.
+ */
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) {
+ if (s->client_version < TLS1_2_VERSION
+ || (s->ssl.method->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION
+ && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION))
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+ } else {
+ if (DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, DTLS1_2_VERSION)
+ || (s->ssl.method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION
+ && DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, DTLS1_2_VERSION)))
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+ }
+
+ salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg);
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms)
+ /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ /* Sub-packet for the actual list */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */
+ if (x != NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request)
+ /* Sub-packet for status request extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)
+ /* Sub-packet for the ids */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) {
+ unsigned char *idbytes;
+ OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i);
+ int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL);
+
+ if (idlen <= 0
+ /* Sub-packet for an individual id */
+ || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes)
+ || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) {
+ unsigned char *extbytes;
+ int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL);
+
+ if (extlen < 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes)
+ || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes)
+ != extlen) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL
+ || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ /*
+ * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support
+ * for Next Protocol Negotiation
+ */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+#endif
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ s->s3.alpn_sent = 0;
+
+ if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt,
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation)
+ /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ s->s3.alpn_sent = 1;
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s);
+ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(ssl);
+ int i, end;
+
+ if (clnt == NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp)
+ /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt);
+ for (i = 0; i < end; i++) {
+ const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof =
+ sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
+
+ if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ /* Add an empty use_mki value */
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+#endif
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ /* Not defined for client Certificates */
+ if (x != NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+#endif
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+ int currv, min_version, max_version, reason;
+
+ reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
+ if (reason != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, reason);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight
+ * comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS.
+ */
+ if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension.
+ */
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE)
+ || (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE))
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE;
+ if (nodhe)
+ s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE;
+#endif
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+static int add_key_share(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int group_id, size_t loop_num)
+{
+ unsigned char *encoded_pubkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL;
+ size_t encodedlen;
+
+ if (loop_num < s->s3.tmp.num_ks_pkey) {
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
+ || !ossl_assert(s->s3.tmp.ks_pkey[loop_num] != NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share
+ */
+ key_share_key = s->s3.tmp.ks_pkey[loop_num];
+ } else {
+ key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, group_id);
+ if (key_share_key == NULL) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Encode the public key. */
+ encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(key_share_key,
+ &encoded_pubkey);
+ if (encodedlen == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* Create KeyShareEntry */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, group_id)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_pubkey, encodedlen)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ /* For backward compatibility, we use the first valid group to add a key share */
+ if (loop_num == 0) {
+ s->s3.tmp.pkey = key_share_key;
+ s->s3.group_id = group_id;
+ }
+ /* We ensure in t1_lib.c that the loop number does not exceed OPENSSL_CLIENT_MAX_KEY_SHARES */
+ s->s3.tmp.ks_pkey[loop_num] = key_share_key;
+ s->s3.tmp.ks_group_id[loop_num] = group_id;
+ if (loop_num >= s->s3.tmp.num_ks_pkey)
+ s->s3.tmp.num_ks_pkey++;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(encoded_pubkey);
+
+ return 1;
+ err:
+ if (key_share_key != s->s3.tmp.ks_pkey[loop_num])
+ EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key);
+ OPENSSL_free(encoded_pubkey);
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ size_t i, num_groups = 0;
+ const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
+ uint16_t group_id = 0;
+ int add_only_one = 0;
+ size_t valid_keyshare = 0;
+
+ /* key_share extension */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share)
+ /* Extension data sub-packet */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ /* KeyShare list sub-packet */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ tls1_get_requested_keyshare_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
+ if (num_groups == 1 && pgroups[0] == 0) { /* Indication that no * prefix was used */
+ tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
+ add_only_one = 1;
+ }
+
+ /* If neither the default nor the keyshares have any entry --> fatal */
+ if (num_groups == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ /* Add key shares */
+
+ if (s->s3.group_id != 0 && s->s3.tmp.pkey == NULL) {
+ /* new, single key share */
+ group_id = s->s3.group_id;
+ s->s3.tmp.num_ks_pkey = 0;
+ if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, group_id, 0)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ valid_keyshare++;
+ } else {
+ if (s->ext.supportedgroups == NULL) /* use default */
+ add_only_one = 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
+ if (!tls_group_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED))
+ continue;
+ if (!tls_valid_group(s, pgroups[i], TLS1_3_VERSION, TLS1_3_VERSION,
+ 0, NULL))
+ continue;
+
+ group_id = pgroups[i];
+
+ if (group_id == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, group_id, valid_keyshare)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ valid_keyshare++;
+ if (add_only_one)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (valid_keyshare == 0) {
+ /* No key shares were allowed */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+#else
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+#endif
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+
+ /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */
+ if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie)
+ /* Extension data sub-packet */
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie,
+ s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ goto end;
+ }
+
+ ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+ end:
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie);
+ s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL;
+ s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1];
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+ const unsigned char *id = NULL;
+ size_t idlen = 0;
+ SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL;
+ SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL;
+ SSL *ussl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s);
+
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
+ handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+
+ if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL
+ && (!s->psk_use_session_cb(ussl, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess)
+ || (psksess != NULL
+ && psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) {
+ SSL_SESSION_free(psksess);
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
+ if (psksess == NULL && s->psk_client_callback != NULL) {
+ unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN];
+ size_t psklen = 0;
+
+ memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity));
+ psklen = s->psk_client_callback(ussl, NULL,
+ identity, sizeof(identity) - 1,
+ psk, sizeof(psk));
+
+ if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ } else if (psklen > 0) {
+ const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 };
+ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher;
+
+ idlen = strlen(identity);
+ if (idlen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ id = (unsigned char *)identity;
+
+ /*
+ * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know
+ * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec
+ */
+ cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s),
+ tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id);
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ psksess = SSL_SESSION_new();
+ if (psksess == NULL
+ || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psksess, psk, psklen)
+ || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psksess, cipher)
+ || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psksess, TLS1_3_VERSION)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen);
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
+ s->psksession = psksess;
+ if (psksess != NULL) {
+ OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id);
+ s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen);
+ if (s->psksession_id == NULL) {
+ s->psksession_id_len = 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ s->psksession_id_len = idlen;
+ }
+
+ if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING
+ || (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0
+ && (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) {
+ s->max_early_data = 0;
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+ }
+ edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess;
+ s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data;
+
+ if (edsess->ext.hostname != NULL) {
+ if (s->ext.hostname == NULL
+ || (s->ext.hostname != NULL
+ && strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early
+ * data.
+ */
+ if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) {
+ PACKET prots, alpnpkt;
+ int found = 0;
+
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) {
+ if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected,
+ edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (!found) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+ SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the
+ * extension, we set it to accepted.
+ */
+ s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED;
+ s->ext.early_data_ok = 1;
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+#define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff
+#define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200
+
+/*
+ * PSK pre binder overhead =
+ * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk
+ * 2 bytes for extension length
+ * 2 bytes for identities list length
+ * 2 bytes for identity length
+ * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age
+ * 2 bytes for binder list length
+ * 1 byte for binder length
+ * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the
+ * subsequent binder bytes
+ */
+#define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1)
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+ unsigned char *padbytes;
+ size_t hlen;
+
+ if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ /*
+ * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685.
+ * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but
+ * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore
+ * this extension MUST always appear second to last.
+ */
+ if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this
+ * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be.
+ */
+ if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION
+ && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0
+ && s->session->cipher != NULL) {
+ const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
+ s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
+
+ if (md != NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder
+ * length.
+ */
+ int md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
+
+ if (md_size <= 0)
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen
+ + md_size;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) {
+ /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */
+ hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen;
+
+ /*
+ * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and
+ * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least
+ * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x,
+ * 8.x are intolerant of that condition)
+ */
+ if (hlen > 4)
+ hlen -= 4;
+ else
+ hlen = 1;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ memset(padbytes, 0, hlen);
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Construct the pre_shared_key extension
+ */
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ uint32_t agesec, agems = 0;
+ size_t binderoffset, msglen;
+ int reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0;
+ unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL;
+ const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL;
+ int dores = 0;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+ OSSL_TIME t;
+
+ s->ext.tick_identity = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single
+ * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length
+ * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume
+ * so don't add this extension.
+ */
+ if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION
+ || (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL))
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)
+ handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s);
+
+ if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) {
+ /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */
+ if (s->session->cipher == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ mdres = ssl_md(sctx, s->session->cipher->algorithm2);
+ if (mdres == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
+ * Ignore it
+ */
+ goto dopsksess;
+ }
+
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdres != handmd) {
+ /*
+ * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session
+ * so we can't use it.
+ */
+ goto dopsksess;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says
+ * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most
+ * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in
+ * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do
+ * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an
+ * issue.
+ */
+ t = ossl_time_subtract(ossl_time_now(), s->session->time);
+ agesec = (uint32_t)ossl_time2seconds(t);
+ /*
+ * We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to
+ * rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is
+ * better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when
+ * the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be
+ * bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never
+ * happen.
+ */
+ if (agesec > 0)
+ agesec--;
+
+ if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) {
+ /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */
+ goto dopsksess;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be
+ * good enough.
+ */
+ agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000;
+
+ if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) {
+ /*
+ * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session.
+ * If so we just ignore it.
+ */
+ goto dopsksess;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed
+ * to be mod 2^32.
+ */
+ agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add;
+
+ reshashsize = EVP_MD_get_size(mdres);
+ if (reshashsize <= 0)
+ goto dopsksess;
+ s->ext.tick_identity++;
+ dores = 1;
+ }
+
+ dopsksess:
+ if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (s->psksession != NULL) {
+ mdpsk = ssl_md(sctx, s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2);
+ if (mdpsk == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session.
+ * If this happens it's an application bug.
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdpsk != handmd) {
+ /*
+ * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK
+ * session. This is an application bug.
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ pskhashsize = EVP_MD_get_size(mdpsk);
+ if (pskhashsize <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if (dores) {
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick,
+ s->session->ext.ticklen)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (s->psksession != NULL) {
+ if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id,
+ s->psksession_id_len)
+ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ s->ext.tick_identity++;
+ }
+
+ if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || (dores
+ && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder))
+ || (s->psksession != NULL
+ && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder))
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen)
+ /*
+ * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can
+ * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders
+ */
+ || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen;
+
+ if (dores
+ && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
+ resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if (s->psksession != NULL
+ && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL,
+ pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+#else
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+#endif
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt,
+ ossl_unused unsigned int context,
+ ossl_unused X509 *x,
+ ossl_unused size_t chainidx)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ if (!s->pha_enabled)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT;
+
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+#else
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+#endif
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right
+ */
+int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ size_t expected_len = s->s3.previous_client_finished_len
+ + s->s3.previous_server_finished_len;
+ size_t ilen;
+ const unsigned char *data;
+
+ /* Check for logic errors */
+ if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
+ || s->s3.previous_client_finished_len != 0)
+ || !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0
+ || s->s3.previous_server_finished_len != 0)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Parse the length byte */
+ if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Consistency check */
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Check that the extension matches */
+ if (ilen != expected_len) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3.previous_client_finished_len)
+ || memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_client_finished,
+ s->s3.previous_client_finished_len) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3.previous_server_finished_len)
+ || memcmp(data, s->s3.previous_server_finished,
+ s->s3.previous_server_finished_len) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->s3.send_connection_binding = 1;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */
+int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ unsigned int value;
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */
+ if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */
+ /*-
+ * RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation
+ * response that differs from the length it requested, ...
+ * It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert
+ */
+ if (value != s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded.
+ * The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now.
+ */
+ s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname);
+ if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ size_t ecpointformats_len;
+ PACKET ecptformatlist;
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist);
+ if (ecpointformats_len == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats);
+ s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len);
+ if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL) {
+ s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len;
+
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist,
+ s->ext.peer_ecpointformats,
+ ecpointformats_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s);
+
+ if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL &&
+ !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(ssl, PACKET_data(pkt),
+ PACKET_remaining(pkt),
+ s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP
+int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
+ /* We ignore this if the server sends a CertificateRequest */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status
+ * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty.
+ */
+ if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) {
+ /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in
+ * the chain. We ignore any other responses.
+ */
+ if (chainidx != 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt);
+ }
+
+ /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */
+ s->ext.status_expected = 1;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT
+int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) {
+ /* We ignore this if the server sends it in a CertificateRequest */
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation
+ * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we
+ * need to let control continue to flow to that.
+ */
+ if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) {
+ size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt);
+
+ /* Simply copy it off for later processing */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts);
+ s->ext.scts = NULL;
+
+ s->ext.scts_len = (uint16_t)size;
+ if (size > 0) {
+ s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
+ if (s->ext.scts == NULL) {
+ s->ext.scts_len = 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0
+ ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH;
+
+ /*
+ * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension,
+ * otherwise this is unsolicited.
+ */
+ if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role,
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
+ NULL) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!custom_ext_parse(s, context,
+ TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp,
+ PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
+ x, chainidx)) {
+ /* SSLfatal already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG
+/*
+ * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No
+ * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly
+ * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure.
+ */
+static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt)
+{
+ PACKET tmp_protocol;
+
+ while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) {
+ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ unsigned char *selected;
+ unsigned char selected_len;
+ PACKET tmppkt;
+ SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s);
+
+ /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */
+ if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
+ return 1;
+
+ /* We must have requested it. */
+ if (sctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* The data must be valid */
+ tmppkt = *pkt;
+ if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s, &tmppkt)) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (sctx->ext.npn_select_cb(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s),
+ &selected, &selected_len,
+ PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt),
+ sctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK
+ || selected_len == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in
+ * a single Serverhello
+ */
+ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn);
+ s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len);
+ if (s->ext.npn == NULL) {
+ s->ext.npn_len = 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len);
+ s->ext.npn_len = selected_len;
+ s->s3.npn_seen = 1;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
+
+int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ size_t len;
+ PACKET confpkt, protpkt;
+ int valid = 0;
+
+ /* We must have requested it. */
+ if (!s->s3.alpn_sent) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*-
+ * The extension data consists of:
+ * uint16 list_length
+ * uint8 proto_length;
+ * uint8 proto[proto_length];
+ */
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* It must be a protocol that we sent */
+ if (!PACKET_buf_init(&confpkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&confpkt, &protpkt)) {
+ if (PACKET_remaining(&protpkt) != len)
+ continue;
+ if (memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_data(&protpkt), len) == 0) {
+ /* Valid protocol found */
+ valid = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!valid) {
+ /* The protocol sent from the server does not match one we advertised */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(s->s3.alpn_selected);
+ s->s3.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len);
+ if (s->s3.alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ s->s3.alpn_selected_len = 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3.alpn_selected, len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->s3.alpn_selected_len = len;
+
+ if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL
+ || s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len
+ || memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected, len)
+ != 0) {
+ /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */
+ s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
+ }
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ /*
+ * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have been
+ * initialised to NULL. We should update it with the selected ALPN.
+ */
+ if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected =
+ OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3.alpn_selected, s->s3.alpn_selected_len);
+ if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) {
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3.alpn_selected_len;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP
+int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ unsigned int id, ct, mki;
+ int i;
+ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt;
+ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2
+ || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id)
+ || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (mki != 0) {
+ /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */
+ clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s));
+ if (clnt == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and
+ * presumably offered)
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) {
+ prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i);
+
+ if (prof->id == id) {
+ s->srtp_profile = prof;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,
+ SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST);
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif
+
+int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */
+ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC)
+ && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD
+ && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4
+ && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_eGOST2814789CNT
+ && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12
+ && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_MAGMA
+ && s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_KUZNYECHIK)
+ s->ext.use_etm = 1;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET)
+ return 1;
+ s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS;
+ if (!s->hit)
+ s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ unsigned int version;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in
+ * a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else.
+ */
+ if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
+ SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */
+ if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST)
+ return 1;
+
+ /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */
+ s->version = version;
+ if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, version)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ unsigned int group_id;
+ PACKET encoded_pt;
+ EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3.tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL;
+ const TLS_GROUP_INFO *ginf = NULL;
+ uint16_t valid_ks_id = 0;
+ size_t i;
+
+ /* Sanity check */
+ if (ckey == NULL || s->s3.peer_tmp != NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Which group ID does the server want -> group_id */
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) {
+ const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL;
+ size_t num_groups;
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we
+ * already sent in the first ClientHello
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.num_ks_pkey; i++) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.ks_group_id[i] == group_id) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Validate the selected group is one we support */
+ tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups);
+ for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) {
+ if (group_id == pgroups[i])
+ break;
+ }
+ if (i >= num_groups
+ || !tls_group_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)
+ || !tls_valid_group(s, group_id, TLS1_3_VERSION, TLS1_3_VERSION,
+ 0, NULL)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Memorize which groupID the server wants */
+ s->s3.group_id = group_id;
+
+ /* The initial keyshares are obsolete now, hence free memory */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.num_ks_pkey; i++) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.ks_pkey[i] != NULL) {
+ EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3.tmp.ks_pkey[i]);
+ s->s3.tmp.ks_pkey[i] = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ s->s3.tmp.num_ks_pkey = 0;
+ s->s3.tmp.pkey = NULL;
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * check that the group requested by the server is one we've
+ * sent a key share for, and if so: memorize which one
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < s->s3.tmp.num_ks_pkey; i++) {
+ if (s->s3.tmp.ks_group_id[i] == group_id) {
+ valid_ks_id = group_id;
+ ckey = s->s3.tmp.ks_pkey[i];
+ s->s3.group_id = group_id;
+ s->s3.tmp.pkey = ckey;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (valid_ks_id == 0) {
+ /*
+ * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original
+ * key_share!
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Retain this group in the SSL_SESSION */
+ if (!s->hit) {
+ s->session->kex_group = group_id;
+ } else if (group_id != s->session->kex_group) {
+ /*
+ * If this is a resumption but changed what group was used, we need
+ * to record the new group in the session, but the session is not
+ * a new session and could be in use by other threads. So, make
+ * a copy of the session to record the new information so that it's
+ * useful for any sessions resumed from tickets issued on this
+ * connection.
+ */
+ SSL_SESSION *new_sess;
+
+ if ((new_sess = ssl_session_dup(s->session, 0)) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_SSL_LIB);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = new_sess;
+ s->session->kex_group = group_id;
+ }
+
+ if ((ginf = tls1_group_id_lookup(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s),
+ group_id)) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt)
+ || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!ginf->is_kem) {
+ /* Regular KEX */
+ skey = EVP_PKEY_new();
+ if (skey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(skey, ckey) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_COPY_PARAMETERS_FAILED);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (tls13_set_encoded_pub_key(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt),
+ PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt)) <= 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ EVP_PKEY_free(skey);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ s->s3.peer_tmp = skey;
+ } else {
+ /* KEM Mode */
+ const unsigned char *ct = PACKET_data(&encoded_pt);
+ size_t ctlen = PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt);
+
+ if (ssl_decapsulate(s, ckey, ct, ctlen, 1) == 0) {
+ /* SSLfatal() already called */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ s->s3.did_kex = 1;
+#endif
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ PACKET cookie;
+
+ if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie)
+ || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie,
+ &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) {
+ unsigned long max_early_data;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data)
+ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data;
+
+ if (SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s) && max_early_data != 0xffffffff) {
+ /*
+ * QUIC allows missing max_early_data, or a max_early_data value
+ * of 0xffffffff. Missing max_early_data is stored in the session
+ * as 0. This is indistinguishable in OpenSSL from a present
+ * max_early_data value that was 0. In order that later checks for
+ * invalid max_early_data correctly treat as an error the case where
+ * max_early_data is present and it is 0, we store any invalid
+ * value in the same (non-zero) way. Otherwise we would have to
+ * introduce a new flag just for this.
+ */
+ s->session->ext.max_early_data = 1;
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!s->ext.early_data_ok
+ || !s->hit) {
+ /*
+ * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume
+ * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the
+ * server should not be accepting it.
+ */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED;
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context, X509 *x,
+ size_t chainidx)
+{
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
+ unsigned int identity;
+
+ if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (identity >= (unsigned int)s->ext.tick_identity) {
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the
+ * ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we
+ * sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket.
+ */
+ if (identity == 0 && (s->psksession == NULL || s->ext.tick_identity == 2)) {
+ s->hit = 1;
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession);
+ s->psksession = NULL;
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ if (s->psksession == NULL) {
+ /* Should never happen */
+ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret
+ * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the
+ * early_secret across that we generated earlier.
+ */
+ if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY
+ && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING)
+ || s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0
+ || s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0)
+ memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
+
+ SSL_SESSION_free(s->session);
+ s->session = s->psksession;
+ s->psksession = NULL;
+ s->hit = 1;
+ /* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */
+ if (identity != 0)
+ s->ext.early_data_ok = 0;
+#endif
+
+ return 1;
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_client_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
+ if (sc->client_cert_type == NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_client_cert_type)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, sc->client_cert_type, sc->client_cert_type_len)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+int tls_parse_stoc_client_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ unsigned int type;
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1) {
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)) {
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* We did not send/ask for this */
+ if (!ossl_assert(sc->ext.client_cert_type_ctos == OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD)) {
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* We don't have this enabled */
+ if (sc->client_cert_type == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Given back a value we didn't configure */
+ if (memchr(sc->client_cert_type, type, sc->client_cert_type_len) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_VALUE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sc->ext.client_cert_type = type;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_NONE;
+ if (sc->server_cert_type == NULL)
+ return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
+
+ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_cert_type)
+ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)
+ || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, sc->server_cert_type, sc->server_cert_type_len)
+ || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) {
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
+ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL;
+ }
+ sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos = OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD;
+ return EXT_RETURN_SENT;
+}
+
+int tls_parse_stoc_server_cert_type(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt,
+ unsigned int context,
+ X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
+{
+ unsigned int type;
+
+ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1) {
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &type)) {
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* We did not send/ask for this */
+ if (!ossl_assert(sc->ext.server_cert_type_ctos == OSSL_CERT_TYPE_CTOS_GOOD)) {
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* We don't have this enabled */
+ if (sc->server_cert_type == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* Given back a value we didn't configure */
+ if (memchr(sc->server_cert_type, type, sc->server_cert_type_len) == NULL) {
+ SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_VALUE);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ sc->ext.server_cert_type = type;
+ return 1;
+}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-10-24 00:16:57 +0000