diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c | 2932 |
1 files changed, 2932 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1e11d077f9e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c @@ -0,0 +1,2932 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include <limits.h> +#include <string.h> +#include <stdio.h> +#include "../ssl_local.h" +#include "statem_local.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h" +#include <openssl/buffer.h> +#include <openssl/objects.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/rsa.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> +#include <openssl/trace.h> +#include <openssl/encoder.h> + +/* + * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types. + */ +typedef struct x509err2alert_st { + int x509err; + int alert; +} X509ERR2ALERT; + +/* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ +const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { + 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, + 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, + 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c +}; + +int ossl_statem_set_mutator(SSL *s, + ossl_statem_mutate_handshake_cb mutate_handshake_cb, + ossl_statem_finish_mutate_handshake_cb finish_mutate_handshake_cb, + void *mutatearg) +{ + SSL_CONNECTION *sc = SSL_CONNECTION_FROM_SSL(s); + + if (sc == NULL) + return 0; + + sc->statem.mutate_handshake_cb = mutate_handshake_cb; + sc->statem.mutatearg = mutatearg; + sc->statem.finish_mutate_handshake_cb = finish_mutate_handshake_cb; + + return 1; +} + +/* + * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or + * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) + */ +int ssl3_do_write(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint8_t type) +{ + int ret; + size_t written = 0; + SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); + SSL *ussl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s); + + /* + * If we're running the test suite then we may need to mutate the message + * we've been asked to write. Does not happen in normal operation. + */ + if (s->statem.mutate_handshake_cb != NULL + && !s->statem.write_in_progress + && type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE + && s->init_num >= SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { + unsigned char *msg; + size_t msglen; + + if (!s->statem.mutate_handshake_cb((unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->init_num, + &msg, &msglen, + s->statem.mutatearg)) + return -1; + if (msglen < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + || !BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, msglen)) + return -1; + memcpy(s->init_buf->data, msg, msglen); + s->init_num = msglen; + s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + s->statem.finish_mutate_handshake_cb(s->statem.mutatearg); + s->statem.write_in_progress = 1; + } + + ret = ssl3_write_bytes(ssl, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], + s->init_num, &written); + if (ret <= 0) + return -1; + if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) + /* + * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll + * ignore the result anyway + * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added + */ + if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) + || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET + && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE + && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, + (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], + written)) + return -1; + if (written == s->init_num) { + s->statem.write_in_progress = 0; + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, + (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), ussl, + s->msg_callback_arg); + return 1; + } + s->init_off += written; + s->init_num -= written; + return 0; +} + +int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) +{ + size_t msglen; + + if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) + || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) + || msglen > INT_MAX) + return 0; + s->init_num = (int)msglen; + s->init_off = 0; + + return 1; +} + +int tls_setup_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s) +{ + int ver_min, ver_max, ok; + SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); + SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); + + if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + /* Reset any extension flags */ + memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); + + if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE); + return 0; + } + + /* Sanity check that we have MD5-SHA1 if we need it */ + if (sctx->ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX] == NULL) { + int negotiated_minversion; + int md5sha1_needed_maxversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) + ? DTLS1_VERSION : TLS1_1_VERSION; + + /* We don't have MD5-SHA1 - do we need it? */ + if (ssl_version_cmp(s, ver_max, md5sha1_needed_maxversion) <= 0) { + SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_DIGEST_ALGORITHM, + "The max supported SSL/TLS version needs the" + " MD5-SHA1 digest but it is not available" + " in the loaded providers. Use (D)TLSv1.2 or" + " above, or load different providers"); + return 0; + } + + ok = 1; + + /* Don't allow TLSv1.1 or below to be negotiated */ + negotiated_minversion = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) ? + DTLS1_2_VERSION : TLS1_2_VERSION; + if (ssl_version_cmp(s, ver_min, negotiated_minversion) < 0) + ok = SSL_set_min_proto_version(ssl, negotiated_minversion); + if (!ok) { + /* Shouldn't happen */ + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + + ok = 0; + if (s->server) { + STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); + int i; + + /* + * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers + * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the + * ClientHello. + */ + for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { + const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); + int cipher_minprotover = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) + ? c->min_dtls : c->min_tls; + int cipher_maxprotover = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) + ? c->max_dtls : c->max_tls; + + if (ssl_version_cmp(s, ver_max, cipher_minprotover) >= 0 + && ssl_version_cmp(s, ver_max, cipher_maxprotover) <= 0) { + ok = 1; + break; + } + } + if (!ok) { + SSLfatal_data(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, + SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE, + "No ciphers enabled for max supported " + "SSL/TLS version"); + return 0; + } + if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { + /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ + ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept); + } else { + /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ + ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); + + s->s3.tmp.cert_request = 0; + } + } else { + if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect); + else + ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, + &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); + + /* mark client_random uninitialized */ + memset(s->s3.client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3.client_random)); + s->hit = 0; + + s->s3.tmp.cert_req = 0; + + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) + s->statem.use_timer = 1; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: + * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator + */ +#define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 +#define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) + +static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, + void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) +{ + /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const char servercontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x73\x65\x72" + "\x76\x65\x72\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79"; + /* ASCII: "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const char clientcontext[] = "\x54\x4c\x53\x20\x31\x2e\x33\x2c\x20\x63\x6c\x69" + "\x65\x6e\x74\x20\x43\x65\x72\x74\x69\x66\x69\x63\x61\x74\x65\x56\x65\x72\x69\x66\x79"; + + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { + size_t hashlen; + + /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ + memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); + /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ + if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY + || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) + strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); + else + strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); + + /* + * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake + * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because + * that includes the CertVerify itself. + */ + if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY + || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { + memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, + s->cert_verify_hash_len); + hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; + } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + *hdata = tls13tbs; + *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; + } else { + size_t retlen; + long retlen_l; + + retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, hdata); + if (retlen_l <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + *hdatalen = retlen; + } + + return 1; +} + +CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; + void *hdata; + unsigned char *sig = NULL; + unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3.tmp.sigalg; + SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); + + if (lu == NULL || s->s3.tmp.cert == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + pkey = s->s3.tmp.cert->privatekey; + + if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(sctx, lu, &md)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (mctx == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + + /* Get the data to be signed */ + if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (EVP_DigestSignInit_ex(mctx, &pctx, + md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md), + sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey, + NULL) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + + if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 + || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, + RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { + /* + * Here we use EVP_DigestSignUpdate followed by EVP_DigestSignFinal + * in order to add the EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET call between them. + */ + if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 + || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, + (int)s->session->master_key_length, + s->session->master_key) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) { + + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); + if (sig == NULL + || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + } else { + /* + * Here we *must* use EVP_DigestSign() because Ed25519/Ed448 does not + * support streaming via EVP_DigestSignUpdate/EVP_DigestSignFinal + */ + if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, NULL, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); + if (sig == NULL + || EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + { + int pktype = lu->sig; + + if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) + BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); + } +#endif + + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + OPENSSL_free(sig); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); + return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; + err: + OPENSSL_free(sig); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); + return CON_FUNC_ERROR; +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + const unsigned char *data; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; +#endif + MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + int j; + unsigned int len; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL; + size_t hdatalen = 0; + void *hdata; + unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; + SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); + + if (mctx == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + + pkey = tls_get_peer_pkey(s); + if (pkey == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL, sctx) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); + goto err; + } + + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { + unsigned int sigalg; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); + goto err; + } + if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_R_LEGACY_SIGALG_DISALLOWED_OR_UNSUPPORTED); + goto err; + } + + if (!tls1_lookup_md(sctx, s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) + OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", + md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md)); + + /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ + /* + * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without + * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) + */ +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) + && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 + && (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 + || EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) + || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 + && EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { + len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); + } else +#endif + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + OSSL_TRACE1(TLS, "Using client verify alg %s\n", + md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_get0_name(md)); + + if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit_ex(mctx, &pctx, + md == NULL ? NULL : EVP_MD_get0_name(md), + sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, pkey, + NULL) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + { + int pktype = EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey); + if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 + || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { + if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) + goto err; + BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); + data = gost_data; + } + } +#endif + + if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 + || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, + RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + } + if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { + if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 + || EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, + (int)s->session->master_key_length, + s->session->master_key) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto err; + } + } else { + j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); +#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION + /* Ignore bad signatures when fuzzing */ + if (SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s)) + j = 1; +#endif + if (j <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); + goto err; + } + } + + /* + * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client + * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the + * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest + * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We + * want to make sure that SSL_get1_peer_certificate() will return the actual + * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback. + */ + if (!s->server && SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 1) + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + else + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; + err: + BIO_free(s->s3.handshake_buffer); + s->s3.handshake_buffer = NULL; + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST + OPENSSL_free(gost_data); +#endif + return ret; +} + +CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + size_t finish_md_len; + const char *sender; + size_t slen; + SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); + + /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ + if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; + + /* + * If we attempted to write early data or we're in middlebox compat mode + * then we deferred changing the handshake write keys to the last possible + * moment. If we didn't already do this when we sent the client certificate + * then we need to do it now. + */ + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) + && !s->server + && !SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s) + && (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE + || (s->options & SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT) != 0) + && s->s3.tmp.cert_req == 0 + && (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {; + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return CON_FUNC_ERROR; + } + + if (s->server) { + sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; + slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; + } else { + sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; + slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; + } + + finish_md_len = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, + sender, slen, + s->s3.tmp.finish_md); + if (finish_md_len == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return CON_FUNC_ERROR; + } + + s->s3.tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; + + if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return CON_FUNC_ERROR; + } + + /* + * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for + * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. + */ + if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) + && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->session->master_key, + s->session->master_key_length)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return CON_FUNC_ERROR; + } + + /* + * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks + */ + if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return CON_FUNC_ERROR; + } + if (!s->server) { + memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, + finish_md_len); + s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; + } else { + memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.finish_md, + finish_md_len); + s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; + } + + return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; +} + +CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return CON_FUNC_ERROR; + } + + s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; + return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + unsigned int updatetype; + + /* + * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must + * be on a record boundary. + */ + if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + /* + * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we + * didn't recognise. + */ + if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED + && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + /* + * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need + * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should + * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). + */ + if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) + s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; + + if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; +} + +/* + * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen + * to far. + */ +int ssl3_take_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s) +{ + const char *sender; + size_t slen; + SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); + + if (!s->server) { + sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; + slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; + } else { + sender = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; + slen = ssl->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; + } + + s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len = + ssl->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, + s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md); + + if (s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s, + PACKET *pkt) +{ + size_t remain; + + remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); + /* + * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have + * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, + * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes + */ + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER + && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) + || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER + && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } else { + if (remain != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } + + /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ + if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 1; + if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + /* + * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of + * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no + * SCTP is used + */ + BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)), + BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); +#endif + } + + return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; +} + +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + size_t md_len; + SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); + int was_first = SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s); + int ok; + + + /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ + if (s->server) { + /* + * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We + * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This is ignored if less than + * TLSv1.3 + */ + if (s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts != NULL) + s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.rrl, 0); + if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) + && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } + + /* + * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the + * message must be on a record boundary. + */ + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) + && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ + if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3.change_cipher_spec) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + s->s3.change_cipher_spec = 0; + + md_len = s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md_len; + + if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + ok = CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, + md_len); +#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION + if (ok != 0) { + if ((PACKET_data(pkt)[0] ^ s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md[0]) != 0xFF) { + ok = 0; + } + } +#endif + if (ok != 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + /* + * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks + */ + if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + if (s->server) { + memcpy(s->s3.previous_client_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, + md_len); + s->s3.previous_client_finished_len = md_len; + } else { + memcpy(s->s3.previous_server_finished, s->s3.tmp.peer_finish_md, + md_len); + s->s3.previous_server_finished_len = md_len; + } + + /* + * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing + * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) + */ + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (s->server) { + if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && + !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } else { + /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */ + size_t dummy; + if (!ssl->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, + s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, + &dummy)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + if (!tls13_store_server_finished_hash(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + + /* + * For non-QUIC we set up the client's app data read keys now, so + * that we can go straight into reading 0.5RTT data from the server. + * For QUIC we don't do that, and instead defer setting up the keys + * until after we have set up the write keys in order to ensure that + * write keys are always set up before read keys (so that if we read + * a message we have the correct keys in place to ack it) + */ + if (!SSL_IS_QUIC_HANDSHAKE(s) + && !ssl->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, + SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + } + } + } + + if (was_first + && !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s) + && s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake != NULL) + s->rlayer.rrlmethod->set_first_handshake(s->rlayer.rrl, 0); + + return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; +} + +CON_FUNC_RETURN tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt) +{ + if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return CON_FUNC_ERROR; + } + + return CON_FUNC_SUCCESS; +} + +/* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ +static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, + X509 *x, int chain, int for_comp) +{ + int len; + unsigned char *outbytes; + int context = SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE; + + if (for_comp) + context |= SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_COMPRESSION; + + len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); + if (len < 0) { + if (!for_comp) + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); + return 0; + } + if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) + || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { + if (!for_comp) + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if ((SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) || for_comp) + && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, context, x, chain)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ +static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk, int for_comp) +{ + int i, chain_count; + X509 *x; + STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; + STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; + X509_STORE *chain_store; + SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); + + if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) + return 1; + + x = cpk->x509; + + /* + * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. + */ + if (cpk->chain != NULL) + extra_certs = cpk->chain; + else + extra_certs = sctx->extra_certs; + + if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) + chain_store = NULL; + else if (s->cert->chain_store) + chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; + else + chain_store = sctx->cert_store; + + if (chain_store != NULL) { + X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new_ex(sctx->libctx, + sctx->propq); + + if (xs_ctx == NULL) { + if (!for_comp) + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB); + return 0; + } + if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + if (!for_comp) + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_X509_LIB); + return 0; + } + /* + * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we + * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately + * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying + * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can + */ + (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); + /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ + ERR_clear_error(); + chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); + i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); + if (i != 1) { +#if 0 + /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); +#endif + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + if (!for_comp) + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i); + return 0; + } + chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); + for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); + + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i, for_comp)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + return 0; + } + } + X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); + } else { + i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); + if (i != 1) { + if (!for_comp) + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, i); + return 0; + } + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0, for_comp)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { + x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); + if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1, for_comp)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } + } + return 1; +} + +EVP_PKEY* tls_get_peer_pkey(const SSL_CONNECTION *sc) +{ + if (sc->session->peer_rpk != NULL) + return sc->session->peer_rpk; + if (sc->session->peer != NULL) + return X509_get0_pubkey(sc->session->peer); + return NULL; +} + +int tls_process_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, PACKET *pkt, EVP_PKEY **peer_rpk) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + int ret = 0; + RAW_EXTENSION *rawexts = NULL; + PACKET extensions; + PACKET context; + unsigned long cert_len = 0, spki_len = 0; + const unsigned char *spki, *spkistart; + SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(sc); + + /*- + * ---------------------------- + * TLS 1.3 Certificate message: + * ---------------------------- + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc8446#section-4.4.2 + * + * enum { + * X509(0), + * RawPublicKey(2), + * (255) + * } CertificateType; + * + * struct { + * select (certificate_type) { + * case RawPublicKey: + * // From RFC 7250 ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo + * opaque ASN1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>; + * + * case X509: + * opaque cert_data<1..2^24-1>; + * }; + * Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; + * } CertificateEntry; + * + * struct { + * opaque certificate_request_context<0..2^8-1>; + * CertificateEntry certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; + * } Certificate; + * + * The client MUST send a Certificate message if and only if the server + * has requested client authentication via a CertificateRequest message + * (Section 4.3.2). If the server requests client authentication but no + * suitable certificate is available, the client MUST send a Certificate + * message containing no certificates (i.e., with the "certificate_list" + * field having length 0). + * + * ---------------------------- + * TLS 1.2 Certificate message: + * ---------------------------- + * https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7250#section-3 + * + * opaque ASN.1Cert<1..2^24-1>; + * + * struct { + * select(certificate_type){ + * + * // certificate type defined in this document. + * case RawPublicKey: + * opaque ASN.1_subjectPublicKeyInfo<1..2^24-1>; + * + * // X.509 certificate defined in RFC 5246 + * case X.509: + * ASN.1Cert certificate_list<0..2^24-1>; + * + * // Additional certificate type based on + * // "TLS Certificate Types" subregistry + * }; + * } Certificate; + * + * ------------- + * Consequently: + * ------------- + * After the (TLS 1.3 only) context octet string (1 byte length + data) the + * Certificate message has a 3-byte length that is zero in the client to + * server message when the client has no RPK to send. In that case, there + * are no (TLS 1.3 only) per-certificate extensions either, because the + * [CertificateEntry] list is empty. + * + * In the server to client direction, or when the client had an RPK to send, + * the TLS 1.3 message just prepends the length of the RPK+extensions, + * while TLS <= 1.2 sends just the RPK (octet-string). + * + * The context must be zero-length in the server to client direction, and + * must match the value recorded in the certificate request in the client + * to server direction. + */ + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &context)) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); + goto err; + } + if (sc->server) { + if (sc->pha_context == NULL) { + if (PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); + goto err; + } + } else { + if (!PACKET_equal(&context, sc->pha_context, sc->pha_context_len)) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); + goto err; + } + } + } else { + if (PACKET_remaining(&context) != 0) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_INVALID_CONTEXT); + goto err; + } + } + } + + if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &cert_len) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != cert_len) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + /* + * The list length may be zero when there is no RPK. In the case of TLS + * 1.2 this is actually the RPK length, which cannot be zero as specified, + * but that breaks the ability of the client to decline client auth. We + * overload the 0 RPK length to mean "no RPK". This interpretation is + * also used some other (reference?) implementations, but is not supported + * by the verbatim RFC7250 text. + */ + if (cert_len == 0) + return 1; + + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { + /* + * With TLS 1.3, a non-empty explicit-length RPK octet-string followed + * by a possibly empty extension block. + */ + if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &spki_len)) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + if (spki_len == 0) { + /* empty RPK */ + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_EMPTY_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY); + goto err; + } + } else { + spki_len = cert_len; + } + + if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &spki, spki_len)) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + spkistart = spki; + if ((pkey = d2i_PUBKEY_ex(NULL, &spki, spki_len, sctx->libctx, sctx->propq)) == NULL + || spki != (spkistart + spki_len)) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, + SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS); + goto err; + } + + /* Process the Extensions block */ + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != (cert_len - 3 - spki_len)) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &extensions) + || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + if (!tls_collect_extensions(sc, &extensions, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, + &rawexts, NULL, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal already called */ + goto err; + } + /* chain index is always zero and fin always 1 for RPK */ + if (!tls_parse_all_extensions(sc, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, + rawexts, NULL, 0, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal already called */ + goto err; + } + } + ret = 1; + if (peer_rpk != NULL) { + *peer_rpk = pkey; + pkey = NULL; + } + + err: + OPENSSL_free(rawexts); + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + return ret; +} + +unsigned long tls_output_rpk(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) +{ + int pdata_len = 0; + unsigned char *pdata = NULL; + X509_PUBKEY *xpk = NULL; + unsigned long ret = 0; + X509 *x509 = NULL; + + if (cpk != NULL && cpk->x509 != NULL) { + x509 = cpk->x509; + /* Get the RPK from the certificate */ + xpk = X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cpk->x509); + if (xpk == NULL) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + pdata_len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(xpk, &pdata); + } else if (cpk != NULL && cpk->privatekey != NULL) { + /* Get the RPK from the private key */ + pdata_len = i2d_PUBKEY(cpk->privatekey, &pdata); + } else { + /* The server RPK is not optional */ + if (sc->server) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + /* The client can send a zero length certificate list */ + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, pdata, pdata_len)) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + return 1; + } + + if (pdata_len <= 0) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* + * TLSv1.2 is _just_ the raw public key + * TLSv1.3 includes extensions, so there's a length wrapper + */ + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u24(pkt, pdata, pdata_len)) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(sc)) { + /* + * Only send extensions relevant to raw public keys. Until such + * extensions are defined, this will be an empty set of extensions. + * |x509| may be NULL, which raw public-key extensions need to handle. + */ + if (!tls_construct_extensions(sc, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, + x509, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + } + + ret = 1; + err: + OPENSSL_free(pdata); + return ret; +} + +unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL_CONNECTION *s, WPACKET *pkt, + CERT_PKEY *cpk, int for_comp) +{ + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { + if (!for_comp) + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk, for_comp)) + return 0; + + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + if (!for_comp) + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* + * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result + * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is + * freed up as well. + */ +WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL_CONNECTION *s, ossl_unused WORK_STATE wst, + int clearbufs, int stop) +{ + void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; + int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand; + SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s); + SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); + + if (clearbufs) { + if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP + /* + * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS + * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions + * MUST NOT be used. + * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used. + */ + || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s))) +#endif + ) { + /* + * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf + * in case there are any unexpected retransmits + */ + BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); + s->init_buf = NULL; + } + + if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return WORK_ERROR; + } + s->init_num = 0; + } + + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server + && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) + s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; + + /* + * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3 + * post handshake exchange + */ + if (cleanuphand) { + /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ + s->renegotiate = 0; + s->new_session = 0; + s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; + s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; + + ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); + + if (s->server) { + /* + * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the + * NewSessionTicket + */ + if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); + + /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ + ssl_tsan_counter(sctx, &sctx->stats.sess_accept_good); + s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; + } else { + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { + /* + * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once, + * so we remove this one from the cache. + */ + if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode + & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0) + SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); + } else { + /* + * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the + * NewSessionTicket + */ + ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); + } + if (s->hit) + ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, + &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit); + + s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; + ssl_tsan_counter(s->session_ctx, + &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); + } + + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { + /* done with handshaking */ + s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; + s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; + s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; + dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); + } + } + + if (s->info_callback != NULL) + cb = s->info_callback; + else if (sctx->info_callback != NULL) + cb = sctx->info_callback; + + /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */ + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); + + if (cb != NULL) { + if (cleanuphand + || !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) + || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + cb(ssl, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); + } + + if (!stop) { + /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */ + ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); + return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; + } + + return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; +} + +int tls_get_message_header(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *mt) +{ + /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ + int skip_message, i; + uint8_t recvd_type; + unsigned char *p; + size_t l, readbytes; + SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); + SSL *ussl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s); + + p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; + + do { + while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { + i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, + &p[s->init_num], + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, + 0, &readbytes); + if (i <= 0) { + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + return 0; + } + if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + /* + * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur + * in the middle of a handshake message. + */ + if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); + return 0; + } + if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE + && (s->s3.flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { + /* + * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is + * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. + * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do + * not return success until we see the second ClientHello + * with a valid cookie. + */ + return 0; + } + s->s3.tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; + s->init_num = readbytes - 1; + s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; + s->s3.tmp.message_size = readbytes; + return 1; + } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, + SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); + return 0; + } + s->init_num += readbytes; + } + + skip_message = 0; + if (!s->server) + if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK + && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) + /* + * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- + * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if + * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' + * MAC. + */ + if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { + s->init_num = 0; + skip_message = 1; + + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, + p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ussl, + s->msg_callback_arg); + } + } while (skip_message); + /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ + + *mt = *p; + s->s3.tmp.message_type = *(p++); + + if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { + /* + * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible + * ClientHello + * + * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read + * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read + */ + l = s->rlayer.tlsrecs[0].length + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; + + s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; + s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + } else { + n2l3(p, l); + /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ + if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); + return 0; + } + s->s3.tmp.message_size = l; + + s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; + s->init_num = 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls_get_message_body(SSL_CONNECTION *s, size_t *len) +{ + size_t n, readbytes; + unsigned char *p; + int i; + SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); + SSL *ussl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_USER_SSL(s); + + if (s->s3.tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { + /* We've already read everything in */ + *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; + return 1; + } + + p = s->init_msg; + n = s->s3.tmp.message_size - s->init_num; + while (n > 0) { + i = ssl->method->ssl_read_bytes(ssl, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, + &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); + if (i <= 0) { + s->rwstate = SSL_READING; + *len = 0; + return 0; + } + s->init_num += readbytes; + n -= readbytes; + } + + /* + * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for + * Finished verification. + */ + if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + *len = 0; + return 0; + } + + /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ + if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->init_num)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + *len = 0; + return 0; + } + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, + (size_t)s->init_num, ussl, s->msg_callback_arg); + } else { + /* + * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of + * processing the message + * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished + * message. + */ +#define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) + /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ + if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s) + || (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET + && s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { + if (s->s3.tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO + || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + || memcmp(hrrrandom, + s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + *len = 0; + return 0; + } + } + } + if (s->msg_callback) + s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, + (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, ussl, + s->msg_callback_arg); + } + + *len = s->init_num; + return 1; +} + +static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = { + {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, + {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, + {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, + + /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */ + {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN} +}; + +int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err) +{ + const X509ERR2ALERT *tp; + + for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp) + if (tp->x509err == x509err) + break; + return tp->alert; +} + +int ssl_allow_compression(SSL_CONNECTION *s) +{ + if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) + return 0; + return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); +} + +/* + * SSL/TLS/DTLS version comparison + * + * Returns + * 0 if versiona is equal to versionb + * 1 if versiona is greater than versionb + * -1 if versiona is less than versionb + */ +int ssl_version_cmp(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int versiona, int versionb) +{ + int dtls = SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s); + + if (versiona == versionb) + return 0; + if (!dtls) + return versiona < versionb ? -1 : 1; + return DTLS_VERSION_LT(versiona, versionb) ? -1 : 1; +} + +typedef struct { + int version; + const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); + const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); +} version_info; + +#if TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != TLS1_3_VERSION +# error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. +#endif + +/* Must be in order high to low */ +static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 + {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, +#else + {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 + {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, +#else + {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 + {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, +#else + {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 + {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, +#else + {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 + {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, +#else + {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, +#endif + {0, NULL, NULL}, +}; + +#if DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL != DTLS1_2_VERSION +# error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. +#endif + +/* Must be in order high to low */ +static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 + {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, +#else + {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, +#endif +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 + {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, + {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, +#else + {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, + {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, +#endif + {0, NULL, NULL}, +}; + +/* + * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. + * + * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method + * @method: the intended method. + * + * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. + */ +static int ssl_method_error(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) +{ + int version = method->version; + + if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && + ssl_version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || + ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) + return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; + + if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && + ssl_version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) + return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; + + if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) + return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) + return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable + * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has + * a servername callback configure. Otherwise returns 0. + */ +static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL_CONNECTION *s) +{ + size_t i; + int curve; + SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); + + if (!ossl_assert(sctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL)) + return 0; + + /* + * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername + * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok + */ + if (sctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL + || s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL) + return 1; + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK + if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) + return 1; +#endif + + if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) + return 1; + + /* All provider-based sig algs are required to support at least TLS1.3 */ + for (i = 0; i < s->ssl_pkey_num; i++) { + /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */ + switch (i) { + case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: + case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: + case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: + case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: + continue; + default: + break; + } + if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i)) + continue; + if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC) + return 1; + /* + * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is + * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this + * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446. + */ + curve = ssl_get_EC_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); + if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve)) + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +/* + * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by + * `SSL *` instance + * + * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method + * @version: Protocol version to test against + * + * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 + */ +int ssl_version_supported(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version, + const SSL_METHOD **meth) +{ + const version_info *vent; + const version_info *table; + + switch (SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->version) { + default: + /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ + return ssl_version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; + case TLS_ANY_VERSION: + table = tls_version_table; + break; + case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: + table = dtls_version_table; + break; + } + + for (vent = table; + vent->version != 0 && ssl_version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; + ++vent) { + const SSL_METHOD *(*thismeth)(void) = s->server ? vent->smeth + : vent->cmeth; + + if (thismeth != NULL + && ssl_version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 + && ssl_method_error(s, thismeth()) == 0 + && (!s->server + || version != TLS1_3_VERSION + || is_tls13_capable(s))) { + if (meth != NULL) + *meth = thismeth(); + return 1; + } + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version + * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest + * supported protocol version. + * + * @s server SSL handle. + * + * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. + */ +int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s) +{ + const version_info *vent; + const version_info *table; + SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); + + /* + * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version + * (according to ssl->defltmethod, as version negotiation may have changed + * s->method). + */ + if (s->version == ssl->defltmeth->version) + return 1; + + /* + * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its + * highest protocol version). + */ + if (ssl->defltmeth->version == TLS_method()->version) + table = tls_version_table; + else if (ssl->defltmeth->version == DTLS_method()->version) + table = dtls_version_table; + else { + /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ + return 0; + } + + for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { + if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) + return s->version == vent->version; + } + return 0; +} + +/* + * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS + * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This + * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is + * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. + * + * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. + * @version: the intended limit. + * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. + * + * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. + */ +int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) +{ + int valid_tls; + int valid_dtls; + + if (version == 0) { + *bound = version; + return 1; + } + + valid_tls = version >= SSL3_VERSION && version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL; + valid_dtls = + /* We support client side pre-standardisation version of DTLS */ + (version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) + || (DTLS_VERSION_LE(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL) + && DTLS_VERSION_GE(version, DTLS1_VERSION)); + + if (!valid_tls && !valid_dtls) + return 0; + + /*- + * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. + * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. + * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. + * + * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not + * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user + * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's + * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the + * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. + * + * We ignore attempts to set bounds on version-inflexible methods, + * returning success. + */ + switch (method_version) { + default: + break; + + case TLS_ANY_VERSION: + if (valid_tls) + *bound = version; + break; + + case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: + if (valid_dtls) + *bound = version; + break; + } + return 1; +} + +static void check_for_downgrade(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) +{ + if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION + && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) { + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; + } else if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) + && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION + /* + * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2 + * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still + * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and + * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is + * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not. + */ + && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) { + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; + } else { + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; + } +} + +/* + * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the + * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and + * the version specific method. + * + * @s: server SSL handle. + * + * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. + */ +int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, + DOWNGRADE *dgrd) +{ + /*- + * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: + * + * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, + * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION_INTERNAL. + * + * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the + * handle version. + */ + SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); + int server_version = ssl->method->version; + int client_version = hello->legacy_version; + const version_info *vent; + const version_info *table; + int disabled = 0; + RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; + + s->client_version = client_version; + + switch (server_version) { + default: + if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_TLS13(s)) { + if (ssl_version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) + return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; + *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; + /* + * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't + * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope + * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol + * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return + * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) + */ + return 0; + } + /* + * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after + * a HelloRetryRequest + */ + /* fall thru */ + case TLS_ANY_VERSION: + table = tls_version_table; + break; + case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: + table = dtls_version_table; + break; + } + + suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; + + /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ + if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) + return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + + if (suppversions->present && !SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { + unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; + unsigned int best_vers = 0; + const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; + PACKET versionslist; + + suppversions->parsed = 1; + + if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { + /* Trailing or invalid data? */ + return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + /* + * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION. + * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3: + * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with + * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to + * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert." + * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower. + * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1. + */ + if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION) + return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION; + + while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { + if (ssl_version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) + continue; + if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method)) + best_vers = candidate_vers; + } + if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { + /* Trailing data? */ + return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; + } + + if (best_vers > 0) { + if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { + /* + * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we + * negotiated TLSv1.3 + */ + if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) + return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + return 0; + } + check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); + s->version = best_vers; + ssl->method = best_method; + if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, best_vers)) + return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + return 0; + } + return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; + } + + /* + * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest + * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 + */ + if (ssl_version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) + client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; + + /* + * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in + * the ClientHello. + */ + for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { + const SSL_METHOD *method; + + if (vent->smeth == NULL || + ssl_version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) + continue; + method = vent->smeth(); + if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { + check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); + s->version = vent->version; + ssl->method = method; + if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) + return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; + + return 0; + } + disabled = 1; + } + return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; +} + +/* + * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the + * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and + * the version specific method. + * + * @s: client SSL handle. + * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. + * @extensions: The extensions received + * + * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. + */ +int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int version, + RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) +{ + const version_info *vent; + const version_info *table; + int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv; + SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); + + origv = s->version; + s->version = version; + + /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ + if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, + SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO + | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, + NULL, 0)) { + s->version = origv; + return 0; + } + + if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE + && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); + return 0; + } + + switch (ssl->method->version) { + default: + if (s->version != ssl->method->version) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); + return 0; + } + /* + * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't + * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope + * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol + * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return + * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) + */ + if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + return 1; + case TLS_ANY_VERSION: + table = tls_version_table; + break; + case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: + table = dtls_version_table; + break; + } + + ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max); + if (ret != 0) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, ret); + return 0; + } + if (ssl_version_cmp(s, s->version, ver_min) < 0 + || ssl_version_cmp(s, s->version, ver_max) > 0) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); + return 0; + } + + if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0) + real_max = ver_max; + + /* Check for downgrades */ + /* TODO(DTLSv1.3): Update this code for DTLSv1.3 */ + if (!SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s) && real_max > s->version) { + /* Signal applies to all versions */ + if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, + s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + - sizeof(tls11downgrade), + sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + return 0; + } + /* Only when accepting TLS1.3 */ + if (real_max == TLS1_3_VERSION + && memcmp(tls12downgrade, + s->s3.server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + - sizeof(tls12downgrade), + sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, + SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); + return 0; + } + } + + for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { + if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version) + continue; + + ssl->method = vent->cmeth(); + if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, s->version)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + return 1; + } + + s->version = origv; + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); + return 0; +} + +/* + * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version + * @s: The SSL connection + * @min_version: The minimum supported version + * @max_version: The maximum supported version + * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole + * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled + * protocol. + * + * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the + * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx + * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B + * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, + * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. + * + * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, + * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol + * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. + * + * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure + * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. + */ +int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL_CONNECTION *s, int *min_version, + int *max_version, int *real_max) +{ + int version, tmp_real_max; + int hole; + const SSL_METHOD *method; + const version_info *table; + const version_info *vent; + const SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); + + switch (ssl->method->version) { + default: + /* + * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't + * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope + * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol + * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return + * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) + */ + *min_version = *max_version = s->version; + /* + * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version + * flexible method. + */ + if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL)) + return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; + return 0; + case TLS_ANY_VERSION: + table = tls_version_table; + break; + case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: + table = dtls_version_table; + break; + } + + /* + * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols + * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version + * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method + * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". + * + * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above + * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above + * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. + * + * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes + * the selected version. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. + * + * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, we support a contiguous + * range of at least two methods. If we hit a disabled method, + * then hole becomes true again, but nothing else changes yet, + * because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. + * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes + * selected, as we start from scratch. + */ + *min_version = version = 0; + hole = 1; + if (real_max != NULL) + *real_max = 0; + tmp_real_max = 0; + for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { + /* + * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the + * "version capability" vector. + */ + if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { + hole = 1; + tmp_real_max = 0; + continue; + } + method = vent->cmeth(); + + if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0) + tmp_real_max = vent->version; + + if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { + hole = 1; + } else if (!hole) { + *min_version = method->version; + } else { + if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0) + *real_max = tmp_real_max; + version = method->version; + *min_version = version; + hole = 0; + } + } + + *max_version = version; + + /* Fail if everything is disabled */ + if (version == 0) + return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; + + return 0; +} + +/* + * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for + * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. + * + * @s: client SSL handle. + * + * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. + */ +int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL_CONNECTION *s) +{ + int ver_min, ver_max, ret; + + /* + * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent + * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated. + */ + if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) + return 0; + + ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL); + + if (ret != 0) + return ret; + + s->version = ver_max; + + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) { + if (ver_max == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { + /* + * Even though this is technically before version negotiation, + * because we have asked for DTLS1_BAD_VER we will never negotiate + * anything else, and this has impacts on the record layer for when + * we read the ServerHello. So we need to tell the record layer + * about this immediately. + */ + if (!ssl_set_record_protocol_version(s, ver_max)) + return 0; + } + } else if (ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) { + /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ + ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; + } + + s->client_version = ver_max; + return 0; +} + +/* + * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is + * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be + * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is + * 1) or 0 otherwise. If provided a pointer it will also return the position + * where the group was found. + */ +int check_in_list(SSL_CONNECTION *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, + size_t num_groups, int checkallow, size_t *pos) +{ + size_t i; + + if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) + return 0; + + for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { + uint16_t group = groups[i]; + + if (group_id == group + && (!checkallow + || tls_group_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { + if (pos != NULL) + *pos = i; + return 1; + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ +int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL_CONNECTION *s, + const unsigned char *hashval, + size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, + size_t hrrlen) +{ + unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; + + memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); + + if (hashval == NULL) { + hashval = hashvaltmp; + hashlen = 0; + /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) + || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), + &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } + + /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ + if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ + msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; + msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; + if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) + || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + /* + * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted + * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after + * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. + */ + if (hrr != NULL + && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) + || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, + s->s3.tmp.message_size + + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) +{ + return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); +} + +int parse_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, PACKET *pkt) +{ + STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); + X509_NAME *xn = NULL; + PACKET cadns; + + if (ca_sk == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); + goto err; + } + /* get the CA RDNs */ + if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { + const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; + unsigned int name_len; + + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) + || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + namestart = namebytes; + if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); + goto err; + } + + if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); + goto err; + } + xn = NULL; + } + + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); + s->s3.tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; + + return 1; + + err: + sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); + X509_NAME_free(xn); + return 0; +} + +const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s) +{ + const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL; + SSL *ssl = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s); + + if (s->server) { + ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(ssl); + if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0) + ca_sk = NULL; + } + + if (ca_sk == NULL) + ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(ssl); + + return ca_sk; +} + +int construct_ca_names(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, + WPACKET *pkt) +{ + /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ + if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + if ((ca_sk != NULL) && !(s->options & SSL_OP_DISABLE_TLSEXT_CA_NAMES)) { + int i; + + for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { + unsigned char *namebytes; + X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); + int namelen; + + if (name == NULL + || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 + || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, + &namebytes) + || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + } + } + + if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +/* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ +size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char **ptbs, + const void *param, size_t paramlen) +{ + size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; + unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); + + if (tbs == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); + return 0; + } + memcpy(tbs, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + + memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); + + *ptbs = tbs; + return tbslen; +} + +/* + * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, + * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once + */ +int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s) +{ + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + + s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, + s->s3.handshake_dgst)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst); + s->pha_dgst = NULL; + return 0; + } + } + return 1; +} + +/* + * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest + * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request + */ +int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL_CONNECTION *s) +{ + if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3.handshake_dgst, + s->pha_dgst)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + return 1; +} + +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP_ALG +MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls13_process_compressed_certificate(SSL_CONNECTION *sc, + PACKET *pkt, + PACKET *tmppkt, + BUF_MEM *buf) +{ + MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; + int comp_alg; + COMP_METHOD *method = NULL; + COMP_CTX *comp = NULL; + size_t expected_length; + size_t comp_length; + int i; + int found = 0; + + if (buf == NULL) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int*)&comp_alg)) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + /* If we have a prefs list, make sure the algorithm is in it */ + if (sc->cert_comp_prefs[0] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none) { + for (i = 0; sc->cert_comp_prefs[i] != TLSEXT_comp_cert_none; i++) { + if (sc->cert_comp_prefs[i] == comp_alg) { + found = 1; + break; + } + } + if (!found) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto err; + } + } + if (!ossl_comp_has_alg(comp_alg)) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto err; + } + switch (comp_alg) { + case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zlib: + method = COMP_zlib_oneshot(); + break; + case TLSEXT_comp_cert_brotli: + method = COMP_brotli_oneshot(); + break; + case TLSEXT_comp_cert_zstd: + method = COMP_zstd_oneshot(); + break; + default: + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); + goto err; + } + + if ((comp = COMP_CTX_new(method)) == NULL + || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &expected_length) + || !PACKET_get_net_3_len(pkt, &comp_length)) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); + goto err; + } + + if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != comp_length || comp_length == 0) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); + goto err; + } + + if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, expected_length) + || !PACKET_buf_init(tmppkt, (unsigned char *)buf->data, expected_length) + || COMP_expand_block(comp, (unsigned char *)buf->data, expected_length, + (unsigned char*)PACKET_data(pkt), comp_length) != (int)expected_length) { + SSLfatal(sc, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); + goto err; + } + ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; + err: + COMP_CTX_free(comp); + return ret; +} +#endif |