diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c | 584 |
1 files changed, 584 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..474ea7bf5b66 --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/t1_enc.c @@ -0,0 +1,584 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include <stdio.h> +#include "ssl_local.h" +#include "record/record_local.h" +#include "internal/ktls.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h" +#include <openssl/comp.h> +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/kdf.h> +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/obj_mac.h> +#include <openssl/core_names.h> +#include <openssl/trace.h> + +/* seed1 through seed5 are concatenated */ +static int tls1_PRF(SSL_CONNECTION *s, + const void *seed1, size_t seed1_len, + const void *seed2, size_t seed2_len, + const void *seed3, size_t seed3_len, + const void *seed4, size_t seed4_len, + const void *seed5, size_t seed5_len, + const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen, + unsigned char *out, size_t olen, int fatal) +{ + const EVP_MD *md = ssl_prf_md(s); + EVP_KDF *kdf; + EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx = NULL; + OSSL_PARAM params[8], *p = params; + const char *mdname; + + if (md == NULL) { + /* Should never happen */ + if (fatal) + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + else + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->libctx, + OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_PRF, + SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s)->propq); + if (kdf == NULL) + goto err; + kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf); + EVP_KDF_free(kdf); + if (kctx == NULL) + goto err; + mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, + (char *)mdname, 0); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET, + (unsigned char *)sec, + (size_t)slen); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED, + (void *)seed1, (size_t)seed1_len); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED, + (void *)seed2, (size_t)seed2_len); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED, + (void *)seed3, (size_t)seed3_len); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED, + (void *)seed4, (size_t)seed4_len); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED, + (void *)seed5, (size_t)seed5_len); + *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + if (EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, olen, params)) { + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); + return 1; + } + + err: + if (fatal) + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + else + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); + return 0; +} + +static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *km, + size_t num) +{ + int ret; + + /* Calls SSLfatal() as required */ + ret = tls1_PRF(s, + TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, + TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3.server_random, + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, + NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key, + s->session->master_key_length, km, num, 1); + + return ret; +} + +static int tls_iv_length_within_key_block(const EVP_CIPHER *c) +{ + /* If GCM/CCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */ + if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) + return EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; + else if (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) + return EVP_CCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; + else + return EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(c); +} + +int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int which) +{ + unsigned char *p, *mac_secret; + unsigned char *key, *iv; + const EVP_CIPHER *c; + const SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; + const EVP_MD *m; + int mac_type; + size_t mac_secret_size; + size_t n, i, j, k, cl; + int iivlen; + /* + * Taglen is only relevant for CCM ciphersuites. Other ciphersuites + * ignore this value so we can default it to 0. + */ + size_t taglen = 0; + int direction; + + c = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc; + m = s->s3.tmp.new_hash; + mac_type = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP + comp = s->s3.tmp.new_compression; +#endif + + p = s->s3.tmp.key_block; + i = mac_secret_size = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size; + + cl = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c); + j = cl; + iivlen = tls_iv_length_within_key_block(c); + if (iivlen < 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + k = iivlen; + if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || + (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { + mac_secret = &(p[0]); + n = i + i; + key = &(p[n]); + n += j + j; + iv = &(p[n]); + n += k + k; + } else { + n = i; + mac_secret = &(p[n]); + n += i + j; + key = &(p[n]); + n += j + k; + iv = &(p[n]); + n += k; + } + + if (n > s->s3.tmp.key_block_length) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + switch (EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(c)) { + case EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE: + taglen = EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; + break; + case EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE: + if ((s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc + & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) != 0) + taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN; + else + taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; + break; + default: + if (EVP_CIPHER_is_a(c, "CHACHA20-POLY1305")) { + taglen = EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN; + } else { + /* MAC secret size corresponds to the MAC output size */ + taglen = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size; + } + break; + } + + if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) { + if (s->ext.use_etm) + s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ; + else + s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ; + + if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) + s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; + else + s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; + + if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_TLSTREE) + s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE; + else + s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_TLSTREE; + + direction = OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ; + } else { + if (s->ext.use_etm) + s->s3.flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE; + else + s->s3.flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE; + + if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) + s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; + else + s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; + + if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_TLSTREE) + s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE; + else + s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_TLSTREE; + + direction = OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE; + } + + if (SSL_CONNECTION_IS_DTLS(s)) + dtls1_increment_epoch(s, which); + + if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version, direction, + OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION, + NULL, 0, key, cl, iv, (size_t)k, mac_secret, + mac_secret_size, c, taglen, mac_type, + m, comp, NULL)) { + /* SSLfatal already called */ + goto err; + } + + OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) { + BIO_printf(trc_out, "which = %04X, key:\n", which); + BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, key, EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c), 4); + BIO_printf(trc_out, "iv:\n"); + BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, iv, k, 4); + } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS); + + return 1; + err: + return 0; +} + +int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL_CONNECTION *s) +{ + unsigned char *p; + const EVP_CIPHER *c; + const EVP_MD *hash; + SSL_COMP *comp; + int mac_type = NID_undef; + size_t num, mac_secret_size = 0; + int ret = 0; + int ivlen; + + if (s->s3.tmp.key_block_length != 0) + return 1; + + if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), s->session, &c, &hash, + &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp, + s->ext.use_etm)) { + /* Error is already recorded */ + SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + ssl_evp_cipher_free(s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc); + s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc = c; + ssl_evp_md_free(s->s3.tmp.new_hash); + s->s3.tmp.new_hash = hash; + s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; + s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; + ivlen = tls_iv_length_within_key_block(c); + if (ivlen < 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + num = mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(c) + ivlen; + num *= 2; + + ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); + + if ((p = OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_CRYPTO_LIB); + goto err; + } + + s->s3.tmp.key_block_length = num; + s->s3.tmp.key_block = p; + + OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) { + BIO_printf(trc_out, "key block length: %zu\n", num); + BIO_printf(trc_out, "client random\n"); + BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4); + BIO_printf(trc_out, "server random\n"); + BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4); + BIO_printf(trc_out, "master key\n"); + BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, + s->session->master_key, + s->session->master_key_length, 4); + } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS); + + if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p, num)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) { + BIO_printf(trc_out, "key block\n"); + BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, p, num, 4); + } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS); + + ret = 1; + err: + return ret; +} + +size_t tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const char *str, + size_t slen, unsigned char *out) +{ + size_t hashlen; + unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + size_t finished_size = TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH; + + if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kGOST18) + finished_size = 32; + + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + if (!tls1_PRF(s, str, slen, hash, hashlen, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, + s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, + out, finished_size, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen); + return finished_size; +} + +int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *out, + unsigned char *p, size_t len, + size_t *secret_size) +{ + if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) { + unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; + size_t hashlen; + /* + * Digest cached records keeping record buffer (if present): this won't + * affect client auth because we're freezing the buffer at the same + * point (after client key exchange and before certificate verify) + */ + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1) + || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) { + BIO_printf(trc_out, "Handshake hashes:\n"); + BIO_dump(trc_out, (char *)hash, hashlen); + } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS); + if (!tls1_PRF(s, + TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, + TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, + hash, hashlen, + NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, p, len, out, + SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + OPENSSL_cleanse(hash, hashlen); + } else { + if (!tls1_PRF(s, + TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, + TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, + s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, + NULL, 0, + s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, + NULL, 0, p, len, out, + SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + } + + OSSL_TRACE_BEGIN(TLS) { + BIO_printf(trc_out, "Premaster Secret:\n"); + BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, p, len, 4); + BIO_printf(trc_out, "Client Random:\n"); + BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4); + BIO_printf(trc_out, "Server Random:\n"); + BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, 4); + BIO_printf(trc_out, "Master Secret:\n"); + BIO_dump_indent(trc_out, + s->session->master_key, + SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE, 4); + } OSSL_TRACE_END(TLS); + + *secret_size = SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE; + return 1; +} + +int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *out, + size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *context, + size_t contextlen, int use_context) +{ + unsigned char *val = NULL; + size_t vallen = 0, currentvalpos; + int rv = 0; + + /* + * RFC 5705 embeds context length as uint16; reject longer context + * before proceeding. + */ + if (contextlen > 0xffff) { + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT); + return 0; + } + + /* + * construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather + * than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the + * concatenation of values does not create a prohibited label. + */ + vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2; + if (use_context) { + vallen += 2 + contextlen; + } + + val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen); + if (val == NULL) + goto ret; + currentvalpos = 0; + memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen); + currentvalpos += llen; + memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3.client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3.server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); + currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; + + if (use_context) { + val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff; + currentvalpos++; + val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff; + currentvalpos++; + if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) { + memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen); + } + } + + /* + * disallow prohibited labels note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited + * label len) = 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and + * the comparisons won't have buffer overflow + */ + if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, + TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) + goto err1; + if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, + TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) + goto err1; + if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, + TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) + goto err1; + if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, + TLS_MD_EXTENDED_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) + goto err1; + if (memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, + TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) + goto err1; + + rv = tls1_PRF(s, + val, vallen, + NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, + NULL, 0, + s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, + out, olen, 0); + + goto ret; + err1: + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); + ret: + OPENSSL_clear_free(val, vallen); + return rv; +} + +int tls1_alert_code(int code) +{ + switch (code) { + case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: + return SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY; + case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: + return SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE; + case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: + return SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC; + case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: + return TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED; + case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: + return TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW; + case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: + return SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE; + case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: + return SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: + return -1; + case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: + return SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE; + case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: + return SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE; + case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: + return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED; + case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: + return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED; + case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: + return SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN; + case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: + return SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: + return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA; + case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: + return TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED; + case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: + return TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: + return TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; + case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: + return TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION; + case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: + return TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; + case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: + return TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY; + case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: + return TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; + case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: + return TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED; + case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: + return TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION; + case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: + return TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; + case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: + return TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE; + case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: + return TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; + case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: + return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; + case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: + return TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE; + case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: + return TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; + case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK: + return TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; + case SSL_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL: + return TLS1_AD_NO_APPLICATION_PROTOCOL; + case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED: + return SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + case TLS13_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION: + return SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; + default: + return -1; + } +} |