diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/openssl/ssl/tls13_enc.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | crypto/openssl/ssl/tls13_enc.c | 947 |
1 files changed, 947 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/openssl/ssl/tls13_enc.c b/crypto/openssl/ssl/tls13_enc.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0aa97648c4ed --- /dev/null +++ b/crypto/openssl/ssl/tls13_enc.c @@ -0,0 +1,947 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2016-2025 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include <stdlib.h> +#include "ssl_local.h" +#include "internal/ktls.h" +#include "record/record_local.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include "internal/ssl_unwrap.h" +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/kdf.h> +#include <openssl/core_names.h> + +#define TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN 249 + +/* ASCII: "tls13 ", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ +static const unsigned char label_prefix[] = "\x74\x6C\x73\x31\x33\x20"; + +/* + * Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and |data| of length + * |datalen| (e.g. typically a hash of the handshake messages), derive a new + * secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in the location pointed to be |out|. + * The |data| value may be zero length. Any errors will be treated as fatal if + * |fatal| is set. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure. + * If |raise_error| is set, ERR_raise is called on failure. + */ +int tls13_hkdf_expand_ex(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq, + const EVP_MD *md, + const unsigned char *secret, + const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, + unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int raise_error) +{ + EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF, propq); + EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx; + OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params; + int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY; + const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md); + int ret; + size_t hashlen; + + kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf); + EVP_KDF_free(kdf); + if (kctx == NULL) + return 0; + + if (labellen > TLS13_MAX_LABEL_LEN) { + if (raise_error) + /* + * Probably we have been called from SSL_export_keying_material(), + * or SSL_export_keying_material_early(). + */ + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); + + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); + return 0; + } + + if ((ret = EVP_MD_get_size(md)) <= 0) { + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); + if (raise_error) + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + hashlen = (size_t)ret; + + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, + (char *)mdname, 0); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, + (unsigned char *)secret, hashlen); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PREFIX, + (unsigned char *)label_prefix, + sizeof(label_prefix) - 1); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_LABEL, + (unsigned char *)label, labellen); + if (data != NULL) + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DATA, + (unsigned char *)data, + datalen); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + ret = EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, outlen, params) <= 0; + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); + + if (ret != 0) { + if (raise_error) + ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_SSL, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + } + + return ret == 0; +} + +int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md, + const unsigned char *secret, + const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen, + const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, + unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal) +{ + int ret; + SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); + + ret = tls13_hkdf_expand_ex(sctx->libctx, sctx->propq, md, + secret, label, labellen, data, datalen, + out, outlen, !fatal); + if (ret == 0 && fatal) + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Given a |secret| generate a |key| of length |keylen| bytes. Returns 1 on + * success 0 on failure. + */ +int tls13_derive_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md, + const unsigned char *secret, + unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) +{ + /* ASCII: "key", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char keylabel[] = "\x6B\x65\x79"; + + return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, keylabel, sizeof(keylabel) - 1, + NULL, 0, key, keylen, 1); +} + +/* + * Given a |secret| generate an |iv| of length |ivlen| bytes. Returns 1 on + * success 0 on failure. + */ +int tls13_derive_iv(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md, + const unsigned char *secret, + unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen) +{ + /* ASCII: "iv", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char ivlabel[] = "\x69\x76"; + + return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, ivlabel, sizeof(ivlabel) - 1, + NULL, 0, iv, ivlen, 1); +} + +int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md, + const unsigned char *secret, + unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen) +{ + /* ASCII: "finished", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char finishedlabel[] = "\x66\x69\x6E\x69\x73\x68\x65\x64"; + + return tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, secret, finishedlabel, + sizeof(finishedlabel) - 1, NULL, 0, fin, finlen, 1); +} + +/* + * Given the previous secret |prevsecret| and a new input secret |insecret| of + * length |insecretlen|, generate a new secret and store it in the location + * pointed to by |outsecret|. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure. + */ +int tls13_generate_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md, + const unsigned char *prevsecret, + const unsigned char *insecret, + size_t insecretlen, + unsigned char *outsecret) +{ + size_t mdlen; + int mdleni; + int ret; + EVP_KDF *kdf; + EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx; + OSSL_PARAM params[7], *p = params; + int mode = EVP_PKEY_HKDEF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY; + const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md); + /* ASCII: "derived", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const char derived_secret_label[] = "\x64\x65\x72\x69\x76\x65\x64"; + SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); + + kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(sctx->libctx, OSSL_KDF_NAME_TLS1_3_KDF, sctx->propq); + kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf); + EVP_KDF_free(kdf); + if (kctx == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + mdleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md); + /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ + if (!ossl_assert(mdleni > 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); + return 0; + } + mdlen = (size_t)mdleni; + + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, &mode); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, + (char *)mdname, 0); + if (insecret != NULL) + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, + (unsigned char *)insecret, + insecretlen); + if (prevsecret != NULL) + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, + (unsigned char *)prevsecret, mdlen); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PREFIX, + (unsigned char *)label_prefix, + sizeof(label_prefix) - 1); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_LABEL, + (unsigned char *)derived_secret_label, + sizeof(derived_secret_label) - 1); + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + ret = EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, outsecret, mdlen, params) <= 0; + + if (ret != 0) + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); + return ret == 0; +} + +/* + * Given an input secret |insecret| of length |insecretlen| generate the + * handshake secret. This requires the early secret to already have been + * generated. Returns 1 on success 0 on failure. + */ +int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, + const unsigned char *insecret, + size_t insecretlen) +{ + /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */ + return tls13_generate_secret(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), s->early_secret, + insecret, insecretlen, + (unsigned char *)&s->handshake_secret); +} + +/* + * Given the handshake secret |prev| of length |prevlen| generate the master + * secret and store its length in |*secret_size|. Returns 1 on success 0 on + * failure. + */ +int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *out, + unsigned char *prev, size_t prevlen, + size_t *secret_size) +{ + const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); + int md_size; + + md_size = EVP_MD_get_size(md); + if (md_size <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + *secret_size = (size_t)md_size; + /* Calls SSLfatal() if required */ + return tls13_generate_secret(s, md, prev, NULL, 0, out); +} + +/* + * Generates the mac for the Finished message. Returns the length of the MAC or + * 0 on error. + */ +size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const char *str, size_t slen, + unsigned char *out) +{ + const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); + const char *mdname = EVP_MD_get0_name(md); + unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char finsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char *key = NULL; + size_t len = 0, hashlen; + OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params; + SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); + + if (md == NULL) + return 0; + + /* Safe to cast away const here since we're not "getting" any data */ + if (sctx->propq != NULL) + *p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_ALG_PARAM_PROPERTIES, + (char *)sctx->propq, + 0); + *p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, sizeof(hash), &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + if (str == SSL_CONNECTION_GET_SSL(s)->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label) { + key = s->server_finished_secret; + } else if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { + key = s->client_finished_secret; + } else { + if (!tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, md, + s->client_app_traffic_secret, + finsecret, hashlen)) + goto err; + key = finsecret; + } + + if (!EVP_Q_mac(sctx->libctx, "HMAC", sctx->propq, mdname, + params, key, hashlen, hash, hashlen, + /* outsize as per sizeof(peer_finish_md) */ + out, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2, &len)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + err: + OPENSSL_cleanse(finsecret, sizeof(finsecret)); + return len; +} + +/* + * There isn't really a key block in TLSv1.3, but we still need this function + * for initialising the cipher and hash. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. + */ +int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL_CONNECTION *s) +{ + const EVP_CIPHER *c; + const EVP_MD *hash; + int mac_type = NID_undef; + size_t mac_secret_size = 0; + + s->session->cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher; + if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), s->session, &c, &hash, + &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, NULL, 0)) { + /* Error is already recorded */ + SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + + ssl_evp_cipher_free(s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc); + s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc = c; + ssl_evp_md_free(s->s3.tmp.new_hash); + s->s3.tmp.new_hash = hash; + s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; + s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; + + return 1; +} + +static int derive_secret_key_and_iv(SSL_CONNECTION *s, const EVP_MD *md, + const EVP_CIPHER *ciph, + int mac_type, + const EVP_MD *mac_md, + const unsigned char *insecret, + const unsigned char *hash, + const unsigned char *label, + size_t labellen, unsigned char *secret, + unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen, + unsigned char **iv, size_t *ivlen, + size_t *taglen) +{ + int hashleni = EVP_MD_get_size(md); + size_t hashlen; + int mode, mac_mdleni; + + /* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */ + if (!ossl_assert(hashleni > 0)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + return 0; + } + hashlen = (size_t)hashleni; + + if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret, label, labellen, hash, hashlen, + secret, hashlen, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + /* if ciph is NULL cipher, then use new_hash to calculate keylen */ + if (EVP_CIPHER_is_a(ciph, "NULL") + && mac_md != NULL + && mac_type == NID_hmac) { + mac_mdleni = EVP_MD_get_size(mac_md); + + if (mac_mdleni <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + *ivlen = *taglen = (size_t)mac_mdleni; + *keylen = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_secret_size; + } else { + + *keylen = EVP_CIPHER_get_key_length(ciph); + + mode = EVP_CIPHER_get_mode(ciph); + if (mode == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { + uint32_t algenc; + + *ivlen = EVP_CCM_TLS_IV_LEN; + if (s->s3.tmp.new_cipher != NULL) { + algenc = s->s3.tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc; + } else if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { + /* We've not selected a cipher yet - we must be doing early data */ + algenc = s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc; + } else if (s->psksession != NULL && s->psksession->cipher != NULL) { + /* We must be doing early data with out-of-band PSK */ + algenc = s->psksession->cipher->algorithm_enc; + } else { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + return 0; + } + if (algenc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) + *taglen = EVP_CCM8_TLS_TAG_LEN; + else + *taglen = EVP_CCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; + } else { + int iivlen; + + if (mode == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { + *taglen = EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; + } else { + /* CHACHA20P-POLY1305 */ + *taglen = EVP_CHACHAPOLY_TLS_TAG_LEN; + } + iivlen = EVP_CIPHER_get_iv_length(ciph); + if (iivlen < 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + return 0; + } + *ivlen = iivlen; + } + } + + if (*ivlen > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) { + *iv = OPENSSL_malloc(*ivlen); + if (*iv == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + return 0; + } + } + + if (!tls13_derive_key(s, md, secret, key, *keylen) + || !tls13_derive_iv(s, md, secret, *iv, *ivlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +static int tls13_store_hash(SSL_CONNECTION *s, unsigned char *hash, size_t len) +{ + size_t hashlen; + + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1) + || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hash, len, &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */; + return 0; + } + + return 1; +} + +int tls13_store_handshake_traffic_hash(SSL_CONNECTION *s) +{ + return tls13_store_hash(s, s->handshake_traffic_hash, + sizeof(s->handshake_traffic_hash)); +} + +int tls13_store_server_finished_hash(SSL_CONNECTION *s) +{ + return tls13_store_hash(s, s->server_finished_hash, + sizeof(s->server_finished_hash)); +} + +int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int which) +{ + /* ASCII: "c e traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char client_early_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x65\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63"; + /* ASCII: "c hs traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char client_handshake_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x68\x73\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63"; + /* ASCII: "c ap traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char client_application_traffic[] = "\x63\x20\x61\x70\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63"; + /* ASCII: "s hs traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char server_handshake_traffic[] = "\x73\x20\x68\x73\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63"; + /* ASCII: "s ap traffic", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char server_application_traffic[] = "\x73\x20\x61\x70\x20\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63"; + /* ASCII: "exp master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char exporter_master_secret[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72"; + /* ASCII: "res master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char resumption_master_secret[] = "\x72\x65\x73\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72"; + /* ASCII: "e exp master", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[] = "\x65\x20\x65\x78\x70\x20\x6D\x61\x73\x74\x65\x72"; + unsigned char iv_intern[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + unsigned char *iv = iv_intern; + unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; + unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char hashval[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char *hash = hashval; + unsigned char *insecret; + unsigned char *finsecret = NULL; + const char *log_label = NULL; + int finsecretlen = 0; + const unsigned char *label; + size_t labellen, hashlen = 0; + int ret = 0; + const EVP_MD *md = NULL, *mac_md = NULL; + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; + int mac_pkey_type = NID_undef; + SSL_CTX *sctx = SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s); + size_t keylen, ivlen = EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH, taglen; + int level; + int direction = (which & SSL3_CC_READ) != 0 ? OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ + : OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE; + + if (((which & SSL3_CC_CLIENT) && (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) + || ((which & SSL3_CC_SERVER) && (which & SSL3_CC_READ))) { + if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0) { + EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx = NULL; + long handlen; + void *hdata; + unsigned int hashlenui; + const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session); + + insecret = s->early_secret; + label = client_early_traffic; + labellen = sizeof(client_early_traffic) - 1; + log_label = CLIENT_EARLY_LABEL; + + handlen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3.handshake_buffer, &hdata); + if (handlen <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_HANDSHAKE_LENGTH); + goto err; + } + + if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING + && s->max_early_data > 0 + && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) { + /* + * If we are attempting to send early data, and we've decided to + * actually do it but max_early_data in s->session is 0 then we + * must be using an external PSK. + */ + if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL + && s->max_early_data == + s->psksession->ext.max_early_data)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession); + } + if (sslcipher == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_R_BAD_PSK); + goto err; + } + + /* + * This ups the ref count on cipher so we better make sure we free + * it again + */ + if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_cipher(sctx, sslcipher, &cipher)) { + /* Error is already recorded */ + SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (((EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) == 0) + && (!ssl_cipher_get_evp_md_mac(sctx, sslcipher, &mac_md, + &mac_pkey_type, NULL))) { + SSLfatal_alert(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + /* + * We need to calculate the handshake digest using the digest from + * the session. We haven't yet selected our ciphersuite so we can't + * use ssl_handshake_md(). + */ + mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + if (mdctx == NULL) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); + goto err; + } + + md = ssl_md(sctx, sslcipher->algorithm2); + if (md == NULL || !EVP_DigestInit_ex(mdctx, md, NULL) + || !EVP_DigestUpdate(mdctx, hdata, handlen) + || !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mdctx, hashval, &hashlenui)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx); + goto err; + } + hashlen = hashlenui; + EVP_MD_CTX_free(mdctx); + + if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, insecret, + early_exporter_master_secret, + sizeof(early_exporter_master_secret) - 1, + hashval, hashlen, + s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen, + 1)) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + + if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL, + s->early_exporter_master_secret, hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } else if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) { + insecret = s->handshake_secret; + finsecret = s->client_finished_secret; + finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s)); + if (finsecretlen <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + label = client_handshake_traffic; + labellen = sizeof(client_handshake_traffic) - 1; + log_label = CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL; + /* + * The handshake hash used for the server read/client write handshake + * traffic secret is the same as the hash for the server + * write/client read handshake traffic secret. However, if we + * processed early data then we delay changing the server + * read/client write cipher state until later, and the handshake + * hashes have moved on. Therefore we use the value saved earlier + * when we did the server write/client read change cipher state. + */ + hash = s->handshake_traffic_hash; + } else { + insecret = s->master_secret; + label = client_application_traffic; + labellen = sizeof(client_application_traffic) - 1; + log_label = CLIENT_APPLICATION_LABEL; + /* + * For this we only use the handshake hashes up until the server + * Finished hash. We do not include the client's Finished, which is + * what ssl_handshake_hash() would give us. Instead we use the + * previously saved value. + */ + hash = s->server_finished_hash; + } + } else { + /* Early data never applies to client-read/server-write */ + if (which & SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) { + insecret = s->handshake_secret; + finsecret = s->server_finished_secret; + finsecretlen = EVP_MD_get_size(ssl_handshake_md(s)); + if (finsecretlen <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + goto err; + } + label = server_handshake_traffic; + labellen = sizeof(server_handshake_traffic) - 1; + log_label = SERVER_HANDSHAKE_LABEL; + } else { + insecret = s->master_secret; + label = server_application_traffic; + labellen = sizeof(server_application_traffic) - 1; + log_label = SERVER_APPLICATION_LABEL; + hash = s->server_finished_hash; + } + } + + if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) == 0) { + md = ssl_handshake_md(s); + cipher = s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc; + mac_md = s->s3.tmp.new_hash; + mac_pkey_type = s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; + if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1) + || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashval, sizeof(hashval), &hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */; + goto err; + } + } + + if (label == client_application_traffic) { + /* + * We also create the resumption master secret, but this time use the + * hash for the whole handshake including the Client Finished + */ + if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret, + resumption_master_secret, + sizeof(resumption_master_secret) - 1, + hashval, hashlen, s->resumption_master_secret, + hashlen, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } + + /* check whether cipher is known */ + if (!ossl_assert(cipher != NULL)) + goto err; + + if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, md, cipher, mac_pkey_type, mac_md, + insecret, hash, label, labellen, secret, key, + &keylen, &iv, &ivlen, &taglen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + if (label == server_application_traffic) { + memcpy(s->server_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen); + /* Now we create the exporter master secret */ + if (!tls13_hkdf_expand(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), insecret, + exporter_master_secret, + sizeof(exporter_master_secret) - 1, + hash, hashlen, s->exporter_master_secret, + hashlen, 1)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + if (!ssl_log_secret(s, EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->exporter_master_secret, + hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + } else if (label == client_application_traffic) + memcpy(s->client_app_traffic_secret, secret, hashlen); + + if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + if (finsecret != NULL + && !tls13_derive_finishedkey(s, ssl_handshake_md(s), secret, + finsecret, (size_t)finsecretlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + if ((which & SSL3_CC_WRITE) != 0) { + if (!s->server && label == client_early_traffic) + s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.wrl, 1); + else + s->rlayer.wrlmethod->set_plain_alerts(s->rlayer.wrl, 0); + } + + level = (which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0 + ? OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_EARLY + : ((which &SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE) != 0 + ? OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_HANDSHAKE + : OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION); + + if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version, + direction, + level, secret, hashlen, key, keylen, iv, + ivlen, NULL, 0, cipher, taglen, + mac_pkey_type, mac_md, NULL, md)) { + /* SSLfatal already called */ + goto err; + } + + ret = 1; + err: + if ((which & SSL3_CC_EARLY) != 0) { + /* We up-refed this so now we need to down ref */ + if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) == 0) + ssl_evp_md_free(mac_md); + ssl_evp_cipher_free(cipher); + } + OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key)); + OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret)); + if (iv != iv_intern) + OPENSSL_free(iv); + return ret; +} + +int tls13_update_key(SSL_CONNECTION *s, int sending) +{ + /* ASCII: "traffic upd", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char application_traffic[] = "\x74\x72\x61\x66\x66\x69\x63\x20\x75\x70\x64"; + const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); + size_t hashlen; + unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; + unsigned char *insecret; + unsigned char secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + char *log_label; + size_t keylen, ivlen, taglen; + int ret = 0, l; + int direction = sending ? OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_WRITE + : OSSL_RECORD_DIRECTION_READ; + unsigned char iv_intern[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; + unsigned char *iv = iv_intern; + + if ((l = EVP_MD_get_size(md)) <= 0) { + SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + return 0; + } + hashlen = (size_t)l; + + if (s->server == sending) + insecret = s->server_app_traffic_secret; + else + insecret = s->client_app_traffic_secret; + + if (!derive_secret_key_and_iv(s, md, + s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc, + s->s3.tmp.new_mac_pkey_type, s->s3.tmp.new_hash, + insecret, NULL, + application_traffic, + sizeof(application_traffic) - 1, secret, key, + &keylen, &iv, &ivlen, &taglen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + + memcpy(insecret, secret, hashlen); + + if (!ssl_set_new_record_layer(s, s->version, + direction, + OSSL_RECORD_PROTECTION_LEVEL_APPLICATION, + insecret, hashlen, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, NULL, 0, + s->s3.tmp.new_sym_enc, taglen, NID_undef, NULL, + NULL, md)) { + /* SSLfatal already called */ + goto err; + } + + /* Call Key log on successful traffic secret update */ + log_label = s->server == sending ? SERVER_APPLICATION_N_LABEL : CLIENT_APPLICATION_N_LABEL; + if (!ssl_log_secret(s, log_label, secret, hashlen)) { + /* SSLfatal() already called */ + goto err; + } + ret = 1; + err: + OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key)); + OPENSSL_cleanse(secret, sizeof(secret)); + if (iv != iv_intern) + OPENSSL_free(iv); + return ret; +} + +int tls13_alert_code(int code) +{ + /* There are 2 additional alerts in TLSv1.3 compared to TLSv1.2 */ + if (code == SSL_AD_MISSING_EXTENSION || code == SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REQUIRED) + return code; + + return tls1_alert_code(code); +} + +int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL_CONNECTION *s, + unsigned char *out, size_t olen, + const char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *context, + size_t contextlen, int use_context) +{ + unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + /* ASCII: "exporter", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x6F\x72\x74\x65\x72"; + unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + const EVP_MD *md = ssl_handshake_md(s); + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + unsigned int hashsize, datalen; + int ret = 0; + + if (ctx == NULL || md == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_allowed(s)) + goto err; + + if (!use_context) + contextlen = 0; + + if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0 + || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->exporter_master_secret, + (const unsigned char *)label, llen, + data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0) + || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel, + sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize, + out, olen, 0)) + goto err; + + ret = 1; + err: + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); + return ret; +} + +int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL_CONNECTION *s, + unsigned char *out, size_t olen, + const char *label, size_t llen, + const unsigned char *context, + size_t contextlen) +{ + /* ASCII: "exporter", in hex for EBCDIC compatibility */ + static const unsigned char exporterlabel[] = "\x65\x78\x70\x6F\x72\x74\x65\x72"; + unsigned char exportsecret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], data[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + const EVP_MD *md; + EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); + unsigned int hashsize, datalen; + int ret = 0; + const SSL_CIPHER *sslcipher; + + if (ctx == NULL || !ossl_statem_export_early_allowed(s)) + goto err; + + if (!s->server && s->max_early_data > 0 + && s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) + sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->psksession); + else + sslcipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(s->session); + + md = ssl_md(SSL_CONNECTION_GET_CTX(s), sslcipher->algorithm2); + + /* + * Calculate the hash value and store it in |data|. The reason why + * the empty string is used is that the definition of TLS-Exporter + * is like so: + * + * TLS-Exporter(label, context_value, key_length) = + * HKDF-Expand-Label(Derive-Secret(Secret, label, ""), + * "exporter", Hash(context_value), key_length) + * + * Derive-Secret(Secret, Label, Messages) = + * HKDF-Expand-Label(Secret, Label, + * Transcript-Hash(Messages), Hash.length) + * + * Here Transcript-Hash is the cipher suite hash algorithm. + */ + if (md == NULL + || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, context, contextlen) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, hash, &hashsize) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 + || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, data, &datalen) <= 0 + || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, s->early_exporter_master_secret, + (const unsigned char *)label, llen, + data, datalen, exportsecret, hashsize, 0) + || !tls13_hkdf_expand(s, md, exportsecret, exporterlabel, + sizeof(exporterlabel) - 1, hash, hashsize, + out, olen, 0)) + goto err; + + ret = 1; + err: + EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); + return ret; +} |