diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'sys/geom/eli/g_eli_integrity.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | sys/geom/eli/g_eli_integrity.c | 587 |
1 files changed, 587 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/sys/geom/eli/g_eli_integrity.c b/sys/geom/eli/g_eli_integrity.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..2c16c6bf81c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/sys/geom/eli/g_eli_integrity.c @@ -0,0 +1,587 @@ +/*- + * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause + * + * Copyright (c) 2005-2011 Pawel Jakub Dawidek <pawel@dawidek.net> + * All rights reserved. + * + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions + * are met: + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright + * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the + * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. + * + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHORS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE + * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF + * SUCH DAMAGE. + */ + +#include <sys/param.h> +#include <sys/systm.h> +#include <sys/kernel.h> +#include <sys/linker.h> +#include <sys/module.h> +#include <sys/lock.h> +#include <sys/mutex.h> +#include <sys/bio.h> +#include <sys/sysctl.h> +#include <sys/kthread.h> +#include <sys/proc.h> +#include <sys/sched.h> +#include <sys/smp.h> +#include <sys/vnode.h> + +#include <vm/uma.h> + +#include <geom/geom.h> +#include <geom/geom_dbg.h> +#include <geom/eli/g_eli.h> +#include <geom/eli/pkcs5v2.h> + +/* + * The data layout description when integrity verification is configured. + * + * One of the most important assumption here is that authenticated data and its + * HMAC has to be stored in the same place (namely in the same sector) to make + * it work reliable. + * The problem is that file systems work only with sectors that are multiple of + * 512 bytes and a power of two number. + * My idea to implement it is as follows. + * Let's store HMAC in sector. This is a must. This leaves us 480 bytes for + * data. We can't use that directly (ie. we can't create provider with 480 bytes + * sector size). We need another sector from where we take only 32 bytes of data + * and we store HMAC of this data as well. This takes two sectors from the + * original provider at the input and leaves us one sector of authenticated data + * at the output. Not very efficient, but you got the idea. + * Now, let's assume, we want to create provider with 4096 bytes sector. + * To output 4096 bytes of authenticated data we need 8x480 plus 1x256, so we + * need nine 512-bytes sectors at the input to get one 4096-bytes sector at the + * output. That's better. With 4096 bytes sector we can use 89% of size of the + * original provider. I find it as an acceptable cost. + * The reliability comes from the fact, that every HMAC stored inside the sector + * is calculated only for the data in the same sector, so its impossible to + * write new data and leave old HMAC or vice versa. + * + * And here is the picture: + * + * da0: +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+-----+ + * |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |480b| |32b |256b | + * |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data| |HMAC|Data | + * +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+----+ +----+-----+ + * |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |512 bytes| |288 bytes | + * +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ +---------+ |224 unused| + * +----------+ + * da0.eli: +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ + * |480b|480b|480b|480b|480b|480b|480b|480b|256b| + * +----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+----+ + * | 4096 bytes | + * +--------------------------------------------+ + * + * PS. You can use any sector size with geli(8). My example is using 4kB, + * because it's most efficient. For 8kB sectors you need 2 extra sectors, + * so the cost is the same as for 4kB sectors. + */ + +/* + * Code paths: + * BIO_READ: + * g_eli_start -> g_eli_auth_read -> g_io_request -> g_eli_read_done -> g_eli_auth_run -> g_eli_auth_read_done -> g_io_deliver + * BIO_WRITE: + * g_eli_start -> g_eli_auth_run -> g_eli_auth_write_done -> g_io_request -> g_eli_write_done -> g_io_deliver + */ + +/* + * Here we generate key for HMAC. Every sector has its own HMAC key, so it is + * not possible to copy sectors. + * We cannot depend on fact, that every sector has its own IV, because different + * IV doesn't change HMAC, when we use encrypt-then-authenticate method. + */ +static void +g_eli_auth_keygen(struct g_eli_softc *sc, off_t offset, u_char *key) +{ + SHA256_CTX ctx; + + /* Copy precalculated SHA256 context. */ + bcopy(&sc->sc_akeyctx, &ctx, sizeof(ctx)); + SHA256_Update(&ctx, (uint8_t *)&offset, sizeof(offset)); + SHA256_Final(key, &ctx); +} + +/* + * The function is called after we read and decrypt data. + * + * g_eli_start -> g_eli_auth_read -> g_io_request -> g_eli_read_done -> g_eli_auth_run -> G_ELI_AUTH_READ_DONE -> g_io_deliver + */ +static int +g_eli_auth_read_done(struct cryptop *crp) +{ + struct g_eli_softc *sc; + struct bio *bp; + + if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { + if (g_eli_crypto_rerun(crp) == 0) + return (0); + } + bp = (struct bio *)crp->crp_opaque; + bp->bio_inbed++; + sc = bp->bio_to->geom->softc; + if (crp->crp_etype == 0) { + bp->bio_completed += crp->crp_payload_length; + G_ELI_DEBUG(3, "Crypto READ request done (%d/%d) (add=%d completed=%jd).", + bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children, crp->crp_payload_length, (intmax_t)bp->bio_completed); + } else { + u_int nsec, decr_secsize, encr_secsize, rel_sec; + int *errorp; + + /* Sectorsize of decrypted provider eg. 4096. */ + decr_secsize = bp->bio_to->sectorsize; + /* The real sectorsize of encrypted provider, eg. 512. */ + encr_secsize = + LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer)->provider->sectorsize; + /* Number of sectors from decrypted provider, eg. 2. */ + nsec = bp->bio_length / decr_secsize; + /* Number of sectors from encrypted provider, eg. 18. */ + nsec = (nsec * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector) / encr_secsize; + /* Which relative sector this request decrypted. */ + rel_sec = ((crp->crp_buf.cb_buf + crp->crp_payload_start) - + (char *)bp->bio_driver2) / encr_secsize; + + errorp = (int *)((char *)bp->bio_driver2 + encr_secsize * nsec + + sizeof(int) * rel_sec); + *errorp = crp->crp_etype; + G_ELI_DEBUG(1, + "Crypto READ request failed (%d/%d) error=%d.", + bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children, crp->crp_etype); + if (bp->bio_error == 0 || bp->bio_error == EINTEGRITY) + bp->bio_error = crp->crp_etype == EBADMSG ? + EINTEGRITY : crp->crp_etype; + } + if (crp->crp_cipher_key != NULL) + g_eli_key_drop(sc, __DECONST(void *, crp->crp_cipher_key)); + crypto_freereq(crp); + /* + * Do we have all sectors already? + */ + if (bp->bio_inbed < bp->bio_children) + return (0); + + if (bp->bio_error == 0) { + u_int i, lsec, nsec, data_secsize, decr_secsize, encr_secsize; + u_char *srcdata, *dstdata; + + /* Sectorsize of decrypted provider eg. 4096. */ + decr_secsize = bp->bio_to->sectorsize; + /* The real sectorsize of encrypted provider, eg. 512. */ + encr_secsize = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer)->provider->sectorsize; + /* Number of data bytes in one encrypted sector, eg. 480. */ + data_secsize = sc->sc_data_per_sector; + /* Number of sectors from decrypted provider, eg. 2. */ + nsec = bp->bio_length / decr_secsize; + /* Number of sectors from encrypted provider, eg. 18. */ + nsec = (nsec * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector) / encr_secsize; + /* Last sector number in every big sector, eg. 9. */ + lsec = sc->sc_bytes_per_sector / encr_secsize; + + srcdata = bp->bio_driver2; + dstdata = bp->bio_data; + + for (i = 1; i <= nsec; i++) { + data_secsize = sc->sc_data_per_sector; + if ((i % lsec) == 0) + data_secsize = decr_secsize % data_secsize; + bcopy(srcdata + sc->sc_alen, dstdata, data_secsize); + srcdata += encr_secsize; + dstdata += data_secsize; + } + } else if (bp->bio_error == EINTEGRITY) { + u_int i, lsec, nsec, data_secsize, decr_secsize, encr_secsize; + int *errorp; + off_t coroff, corsize, dstoff; + + /* Sectorsize of decrypted provider eg. 4096. */ + decr_secsize = bp->bio_to->sectorsize; + /* The real sectorsize of encrypted provider, eg. 512. */ + encr_secsize = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer)->provider->sectorsize; + /* Number of data bytes in one encrypted sector, eg. 480. */ + data_secsize = sc->sc_data_per_sector; + /* Number of sectors from decrypted provider, eg. 2. */ + nsec = bp->bio_length / decr_secsize; + /* Number of sectors from encrypted provider, eg. 18. */ + nsec = (nsec * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector) / encr_secsize; + /* Last sector number in every big sector, eg. 9. */ + lsec = sc->sc_bytes_per_sector / encr_secsize; + + errorp = (int *)((char *)bp->bio_driver2 + encr_secsize * nsec); + coroff = -1; + corsize = 0; + dstoff = bp->bio_offset; + + for (i = 1; i <= nsec; i++) { + data_secsize = sc->sc_data_per_sector; + if ((i % lsec) == 0) + data_secsize = decr_secsize % data_secsize; + if (errorp[i - 1] == EBADMSG) { + /* + * Corruption detected, remember the offset if + * this is the first corrupted sector and + * increase size. + */ + if (coroff == -1) + coroff = dstoff; + corsize += data_secsize; + } else { + /* + * No corruption, good. + * Report previous corruption if there was one. + */ + if (coroff != -1) { + G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "%s: Failed to authenticate %jd " + "bytes of data at offset %jd.", + sc->sc_name, (intmax_t)corsize, + (intmax_t)coroff); + coroff = -1; + corsize = 0; + } + } + dstoff += data_secsize; + } + /* Report previous corruption if there was one. */ + if (coroff != -1) { + G_ELI_DEBUG(0, "%s: Failed to authenticate %jd " + "bytes of data at offset %jd.", + sc->sc_name, (intmax_t)corsize, (intmax_t)coroff); + } + } + g_eli_free_data(bp); + if (bp->bio_error != 0) { + if (bp->bio_error != EINTEGRITY) { + G_ELI_LOGREQ(0, bp, + "Crypto READ request failed (error=%d).", + bp->bio_error); + } + bp->bio_completed = 0; + } + /* + * Read is finished, send it up. + */ + g_io_deliver(bp, bp->bio_error); + atomic_subtract_int(&sc->sc_inflight, 1); + return (0); +} + +/* + * The function is called after data encryption. + * + * g_eli_start -> g_eli_auth_run -> G_ELI_AUTH_WRITE_DONE -> g_io_request -> g_eli_write_done -> g_io_deliver + */ +static int +g_eli_auth_write_done(struct cryptop *crp) +{ + struct g_eli_softc *sc; + struct g_consumer *cp; + struct bio *bp, *cbp, *cbp2; + u_int nsec; + + if (crp->crp_etype == EAGAIN) { + if (g_eli_crypto_rerun(crp) == 0) + return (0); + } + bp = (struct bio *)crp->crp_opaque; + bp->bio_inbed++; + if (crp->crp_etype == 0) { + G_ELI_DEBUG(3, "Crypto WRITE request done (%d/%d).", + bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children); + } else { + G_ELI_DEBUG(1, "Crypto WRITE request failed (%d/%d) error=%d.", + bp->bio_inbed, bp->bio_children, crp->crp_etype); + if (bp->bio_error == 0) + bp->bio_error = crp->crp_etype; + } + sc = bp->bio_to->geom->softc; + if (crp->crp_cipher_key != NULL) + g_eli_key_drop(sc, __DECONST(void *, crp->crp_cipher_key)); + crypto_freereq(crp); + /* + * All sectors are already encrypted? + */ + if (bp->bio_inbed < bp->bio_children) + return (0); + if (bp->bio_error != 0) { + G_ELI_LOGREQ(0, bp, "Crypto WRITE request failed (error=%d).", + bp->bio_error); + g_eli_free_data(bp); + cbp = bp->bio_driver1; + bp->bio_driver1 = NULL; + g_destroy_bio(cbp); + g_io_deliver(bp, bp->bio_error); + atomic_subtract_int(&sc->sc_inflight, 1); + return (0); + } + cp = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer); + cbp = bp->bio_driver1; + bp->bio_driver1 = NULL; + cbp->bio_to = cp->provider; + cbp->bio_done = g_eli_write_done; + + /* Number of sectors from decrypted provider, eg. 1. */ + nsec = bp->bio_length / bp->bio_to->sectorsize; + /* Number of sectors from encrypted provider, eg. 9. */ + nsec = (nsec * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector) / cp->provider->sectorsize; + + cbp->bio_length = cp->provider->sectorsize * nsec; + cbp->bio_offset = (bp->bio_offset / bp->bio_to->sectorsize) * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector; + cbp->bio_data = bp->bio_driver2; + + /* + * We write more than what is requested, so we have to be ready to write + * more than maxphys. + */ + cbp2 = NULL; + if (cbp->bio_length > maxphys) { + cbp2 = g_duplicate_bio(bp); + cbp2->bio_length = cbp->bio_length - maxphys; + cbp2->bio_data = cbp->bio_data + maxphys; + cbp2->bio_offset = cbp->bio_offset + maxphys; + cbp2->bio_to = cp->provider; + cbp2->bio_done = g_eli_write_done; + cbp->bio_length = maxphys; + } + /* + * Send encrypted data to the provider. + */ + G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, cbp, "Sending request."); + bp->bio_inbed = 0; + bp->bio_children = (cbp2 != NULL ? 2 : 1); + g_io_request(cbp, cp); + if (cbp2 != NULL) { + G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, cbp2, "Sending request."); + g_io_request(cbp2, cp); + } + return (0); +} + +void +g_eli_auth_read(struct g_eli_softc *sc, struct bio *bp) +{ + struct g_consumer *cp; + struct bio *cbp, *cbp2; + size_t size; + off_t nsec; + + G_ELI_SETWORKER(bp->bio_pflags, 0); + + cp = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer); + cbp = bp->bio_driver1; + bp->bio_driver1 = NULL; + cbp->bio_to = cp->provider; + cbp->bio_done = g_eli_read_done; + + /* Number of sectors from decrypted provider, eg. 1. */ + nsec = bp->bio_length / bp->bio_to->sectorsize; + /* Number of sectors from encrypted provider, eg. 9. */ + nsec = (nsec * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector) / cp->provider->sectorsize; + + cbp->bio_length = cp->provider->sectorsize * nsec; + size = cbp->bio_length; + size += sizeof(int) * nsec; + size += G_ELI_AUTH_SECKEYLEN * nsec; + cbp->bio_offset = (bp->bio_offset / bp->bio_to->sectorsize) * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector; + if (!g_eli_alloc_data(bp, size)) { + G_ELI_LOGREQ(0, bp, "Crypto auth read request failed (ENOMEM)"); + g_destroy_bio(cbp); + bp->bio_error = ENOMEM; + g_io_deliver(bp, bp->bio_error); + atomic_subtract_int(&sc->sc_inflight, 1); + return; + } + cbp->bio_data = bp->bio_driver2; + + /* Clear the error array. */ + memset((char *)bp->bio_driver2 + cbp->bio_length, 0, + sizeof(int) * nsec); + + /* + * We read more than what is requested, so we have to be ready to read + * more than maxphys. + */ + cbp2 = NULL; + if (cbp->bio_length > maxphys) { + cbp2 = g_duplicate_bio(bp); + cbp2->bio_length = cbp->bio_length - maxphys; + cbp2->bio_data = cbp->bio_data + maxphys; + cbp2->bio_offset = cbp->bio_offset + maxphys; + cbp2->bio_to = cp->provider; + cbp2->bio_done = g_eli_read_done; + cbp->bio_length = maxphys; + } + /* + * Read encrypted data from provider. + */ + G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, cbp, "Sending request."); + g_io_request(cbp, cp); + if (cbp2 != NULL) { + G_ELI_LOGREQ(2, cbp2, "Sending request."); + g_io_request(cbp2, cp); + } +} + +/* + * This is the main function responsible for cryptography (ie. communication + * with crypto(9) subsystem). + * + * BIO_READ: + * g_eli_start -> g_eli_auth_read -> g_io_request -> g_eli_read_done -> G_ELI_AUTH_RUN -> g_eli_auth_read_done -> g_io_deliver + * BIO_WRITE: + * g_eli_start -> G_ELI_AUTH_RUN -> g_eli_auth_write_done -> g_io_request -> g_eli_write_done -> g_io_deliver + */ +void +g_eli_auth_run(struct g_eli_worker *wr, struct bio *bp) +{ + struct g_eli_softc *sc; + struct cryptopq crpq; + struct cryptop *crp; + u_int i, lsec, nsec, data_secsize, decr_secsize, encr_secsize; + off_t dstoff; + u_char *p, *data, *authkey, *plaindata; + int error __diagused; + bool batch; + + G_ELI_LOGREQ(3, bp, "%s", __func__); + + G_ELI_SETWORKER(bp->bio_pflags, wr->w_number); + sc = wr->w_softc; + /* Sectorsize of decrypted provider eg. 4096. */ + decr_secsize = bp->bio_to->sectorsize; + /* The real sectorsize of encrypted provider, eg. 512. */ + encr_secsize = LIST_FIRST(&sc->sc_geom->consumer)->provider->sectorsize; + /* Number of data bytes in one encrypted sector, eg. 480. */ + data_secsize = sc->sc_data_per_sector; + /* Number of sectors from decrypted provider, eg. 2. */ + nsec = bp->bio_length / decr_secsize; + /* Number of sectors from encrypted provider, eg. 18. */ + nsec = (nsec * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector) / encr_secsize; + /* Last sector number in every big sector, eg. 9. */ + lsec = sc->sc_bytes_per_sector / encr_secsize; + /* Destination offset, used for IV generation. */ + dstoff = (bp->bio_offset / bp->bio_to->sectorsize) * sc->sc_bytes_per_sector; + + plaindata = bp->bio_data; + if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_READ) { + data = bp->bio_driver2; + p = data + encr_secsize * nsec; + p += sizeof(int) * nsec; + } else { + size_t size; + + size = encr_secsize * nsec; + size += G_ELI_AUTH_SECKEYLEN * nsec; + size += sizeof(uintptr_t); /* Space for alignment. */ + if (!g_eli_alloc_data(bp, size)) { + G_ELI_LOGREQ(0, bp, "Crypto request failed (ENOMEM)"); + if (bp->bio_driver1 != NULL) { + g_destroy_bio(bp->bio_driver1); + bp->bio_driver1 = NULL; + } + bp->bio_error = ENOMEM; + g_io_deliver(bp, bp->bio_error); + if (sc != NULL) + atomic_subtract_int(&sc->sc_inflight, 1); + return; + } + data = bp->bio_driver2; + p = data + encr_secsize * nsec; + } + bp->bio_inbed = 0; + bp->bio_children = nsec; + +#if defined(__mips_n64) || defined(__mips_o64) + p = (char *)roundup((uintptr_t)p, sizeof(uintptr_t)); +#endif + + TAILQ_INIT(&crpq); + batch = atomic_load_int(&g_eli_batch) != 0; + + for (i = 1; i <= nsec; i++, dstoff += encr_secsize) { + crp = crypto_getreq(wr->w_sid, M_WAITOK); + authkey = (u_char *)p; p += G_ELI_AUTH_SECKEYLEN; + + data_secsize = sc->sc_data_per_sector; + if ((i % lsec) == 0) { + data_secsize = decr_secsize % data_secsize; + /* + * Last encrypted sector of each decrypted sector is + * only partially filled. + */ + if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_WRITE) + memset(data + sc->sc_alen + data_secsize, 0, + encr_secsize - sc->sc_alen - data_secsize); + } else if (data_secsize + sc->sc_alen != encr_secsize) { + /* + * If the HMAC size is not a multiple of 128 bits, the + * per-sector data size is rounded down to ensure that + * encryption can be performed without requiring any + * padding. In this case, each sector contains unused + * bytes. + */ + if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_WRITE) + memset(data + sc->sc_alen + data_secsize, 0, + encr_secsize - sc->sc_alen - data_secsize); + } + + if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_WRITE) { + bcopy(plaindata, data + sc->sc_alen, data_secsize); + plaindata += data_secsize; + } + + crypto_use_buf(crp, data, sc->sc_alen + data_secsize); + crp->crp_opaque = (void *)bp; + data += encr_secsize; + crp->crp_flags = CRYPTO_F_CBIFSYNC; + if (bp->bio_cmd == BIO_WRITE) { + crp->crp_callback = g_eli_auth_write_done; + crp->crp_op = CRYPTO_OP_ENCRYPT | + CRYPTO_OP_COMPUTE_DIGEST; + } else { + crp->crp_callback = g_eli_auth_read_done; + crp->crp_op = CRYPTO_OP_DECRYPT | + CRYPTO_OP_VERIFY_DIGEST; + } + + crp->crp_digest_start = 0; + crp->crp_payload_start = sc->sc_alen; + crp->crp_payload_length = data_secsize; + if ((sc->sc_flags & G_ELI_FLAG_FIRST_KEY) == 0) { + crp->crp_cipher_key = g_eli_key_hold(sc, dstoff, + encr_secsize); + } + if (g_eli_ivlen(sc->sc_ealgo) != 0) { + crp->crp_flags |= CRYPTO_F_IV_SEPARATE; + g_eli_crypto_ivgen(sc, dstoff, crp->crp_iv, + sizeof(crp->crp_iv)); + } + + g_eli_auth_keygen(sc, dstoff, authkey); + crp->crp_auth_key = authkey; + + if (batch) { + TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&crpq, crp, crp_next); + } else { + error = crypto_dispatch(crp); + KASSERT(error == 0, + ("crypto_dispatch() failed (error=%d)", error)); + } + } + + if (batch) + crypto_dispatch_batch(&crpq, 0); +} |