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-rw-r--r--sys/rpc/auth.h4
-rw-r--r--sys/rpc/authunix_prot.c93
-rw-r--r--sys/rpc/svc_auth_unix.c94
3 files changed, 106 insertions, 85 deletions
diff --git a/sys/rpc/auth.h b/sys/rpc/auth.h
index 33c33ffd594d..648fb99a3a27 100644
--- a/sys/rpc/auth.h
+++ b/sys/rpc/auth.h
@@ -354,6 +354,10 @@ __END_DECLS
#define RPCSEC_GSS 6 /* RPCSEC_GSS */
#define AUTH_TLS 7 /* Initiate RPC-over-TLS */
+/* RFC 5531's prescribed limits for variable-lenth arrays. */
+#define AUTH_SYS_MAX_HOSTNAME 255
+#define AUTH_SYS_MAX_GROUPS 16 /* Supplementary groups. */
+
/*
* Pseudo auth flavors for RPCSEC_GSS.
*/
diff --git a/sys/rpc/authunix_prot.c b/sys/rpc/authunix_prot.c
index b107d5541c50..ff4c12c3f52e 100644
--- a/sys/rpc/authunix_prot.c
+++ b/sys/rpc/authunix_prot.c
@@ -30,7 +30,6 @@
* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
-#include <sys/cdefs.h>
/*
* authunix_prot.c
* XDR for UNIX style authentication parameters for RPC
@@ -40,8 +39,7 @@
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/jail.h>
-#include <sys/kernel.h>
-#include <sys/systm.h>
+#include <sys/libkern.h>
#include <sys/ucred.h>
#include <rpc/types.h>
@@ -50,9 +48,6 @@
#include <rpc/rpc_com.h>
-/* gids compose part of a credential; there may not be more than 16 of them */
-#define NGRPS 16
-
/*
* XDR for unix authentication parameters.
*/
@@ -60,25 +55,23 @@ bool_t
xdr_authunix_parms(XDR *xdrs, uint32_t *time, struct xucred *cred)
{
uint32_t namelen;
- uint32_t ngroups, i;
+ uint32_t supp_ngroups, i;
uint32_t junk;
char hostbuf[MAXHOSTNAMELEN];
+ if (xdrs->x_op == XDR_FREE)
+ /* This function does not allocate auxiliary memory. */
+ return (TRUE);
+
if (xdrs->x_op == XDR_ENCODE) {
- /*
- * Restrict name length to 255 according to RFC 1057.
- */
getcredhostname(NULL, hostbuf, sizeof(hostbuf));
namelen = strlen(hostbuf);
- if (namelen > 255)
- namelen = 255;
- } else {
+ if (namelen > AUTH_SYS_MAX_HOSTNAME)
+ namelen = AUTH_SYS_MAX_HOSTNAME;
+ } else
namelen = 0;
- }
- junk = 0;
- if (!xdr_uint32_t(xdrs, time)
- || !xdr_uint32_t(xdrs, &namelen))
+ if (!xdr_uint32_t(xdrs, time) || !xdr_uint32_t(xdrs, &namelen))
return (FALSE);
/*
@@ -88,43 +81,65 @@ xdr_authunix_parms(XDR *xdrs, uint32_t *time, struct xucred *cred)
if (!xdr_opaque(xdrs, hostbuf, namelen))
return (FALSE);
} else {
+ if (namelen > AUTH_SYS_MAX_HOSTNAME)
+ return (FALSE);
xdr_setpos(xdrs, xdr_getpos(xdrs) + RNDUP(namelen));
}
if (!xdr_uint32_t(xdrs, &cred->cr_uid))
return (FALSE);
+
+ /*
+ * Safety check: The protocol needs at least one group (access to
+ * 'cr_gid', decrementation of 'cr_ngroups' below).
+ */
+ if (xdrs->x_op == XDR_ENCODE && cred->cr_ngroups == 0)
+ return (FALSE);
if (!xdr_uint32_t(xdrs, &cred->cr_gid))
return (FALSE);
if (xdrs->x_op == XDR_ENCODE) {
/*
- * Note that this is a `struct xucred`, which maintains its
- * historical layout of preserving the egid in cr_ngroups and
- * cr_groups[0] == egid.
+ * Note that this is a 'struct xucred', which still has the
+ * historical layout where the effective GID is in cr_groups[0]
+ * and is accounted in 'cr_ngroups'. We substract 1 to obtain
+ * the number of "supplementary" groups, passed in the AUTH_SYS
+ * credentials variable-length array called gids[] in RFC 5531.
*/
- ngroups = cred->cr_ngroups - 1;
- if (ngroups > NGRPS)
- ngroups = NGRPS;
+ MPASS(cred->cr_ngroups <= XU_NGROUPS);
+ supp_ngroups = cred->cr_ngroups - 1;
+ if (supp_ngroups > AUTH_SYS_MAX_GROUPS)
+ /* With current values, this should never execute. */
+ supp_ngroups = AUTH_SYS_MAX_GROUPS;
}
- if (!xdr_uint32_t(xdrs, &ngroups))
+ if (!xdr_uint32_t(xdrs, &supp_ngroups))
return (FALSE);
- for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) {
- if (i < ngroups_max) {
- if (!xdr_uint32_t(xdrs, &cred->cr_groups[i + 1]))
- return (FALSE);
- } else {
- if (!xdr_uint32_t(xdrs, &junk))
- return (FALSE);
- }
- }
- if (xdrs->x_op == XDR_DECODE) {
- if (ngroups > ngroups_max)
- cred->cr_ngroups = ngroups_max + 1;
- else
- cred->cr_ngroups = ngroups + 1;
- }
+ /*
+ * Because we cannot store more than XU_NGROUPS in total (16 at time of
+ * this writing), for now we choose to be strict with respect to RFC
+ * 5531's maximum number of supplementary groups (AUTH_SYS_MAX_GROUPS).
+ * That would also be an accidental DoS prevention measure if the
+ * request handling code didn't try to reassemble it in full without any
+ * size limits. Although AUTH_SYS_MAX_GROUPS and XU_NGROUPS are equal,
+ * since the latter includes the "effective" GID, we cannot store the
+ * last group of a message with exactly AUTH_SYS_MAX_GROUPS
+ * supplementary groups. We accept such messages so as not to violate
+ * the protocol, silently dropping the last group on the floor.
+ */
+
+ if (xdrs->x_op != XDR_ENCODE && supp_ngroups > AUTH_SYS_MAX_GROUPS)
+ return (FALSE);
+
+ junk = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < supp_ngroups; ++i)
+ if (!xdr_uint32_t(xdrs, i < XU_NGROUPS - 1 ?
+ &cred->cr_sgroups[i] : &junk))
+ return (FALSE);
+
+ if (xdrs->x_op != XDR_ENCODE)
+ cred->cr_ngroups = MIN(supp_ngroups + 1, XU_NGROUPS);
return (TRUE);
}
diff --git a/sys/rpc/svc_auth_unix.c b/sys/rpc/svc_auth_unix.c
index 963f4f272964..aa0fc585865f 100644
--- a/sys/rpc/svc_auth_unix.c
+++ b/sys/rpc/svc_auth_unix.c
@@ -41,18 +41,12 @@
*/
#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/lock.h>
-#include <sys/mutex.h>
-#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/ucred.h>
#include <rpc/rpc.h>
#include <rpc/rpc_com.h>
-#define MAX_MACHINE_NAME 255
-#define NGRPS 16
-
/*
* Unix longhand authenticator
*/
@@ -62,11 +56,8 @@ _svcauth_unix(struct svc_req *rqst, struct rpc_msg *msg)
enum auth_stat stat;
XDR xdrs;
int32_t *buf;
- uint32_t time;
struct xucred *xcr;
- u_int auth_len;
- size_t str_len, gid_len;
- u_int i;
+ uint32_t auth_len, time;
xcr = rqst->rq_clntcred;
auth_len = (u_int)msg->rm_call.cb_cred.oa_length;
@@ -74,51 +65,58 @@ _svcauth_unix(struct svc_req *rqst, struct rpc_msg *msg)
XDR_DECODE);
buf = XDR_INLINE(&xdrs, auth_len);
if (buf != NULL) {
+ /* 'time', 'str_len', UID, GID and 'supp_ngroups'. */
+ const uint32_t min_len = 5 * BYTES_PER_XDR_UNIT;
+ uint32_t str_len, supp_ngroups;
+
+ if (auth_len < min_len)
+ goto badcred;
time = IXDR_GET_UINT32(buf);
- str_len = (size_t)IXDR_GET_UINT32(buf);
- if (str_len > MAX_MACHINE_NAME) {
- stat = AUTH_BADCRED;
- goto done;
- }
+ str_len = IXDR_GET_UINT32(buf);
+ if (str_len > AUTH_SYS_MAX_HOSTNAME)
+ goto badcred;
str_len = RNDUP(str_len);
+ /*
+ * Recheck message length now that we know the value of
+ * 'str_len' (and that it won't cause an overflow in additions
+ * below) to protect access to the credentials part.
+ */
+ if (auth_len < min_len + str_len)
+ goto badcred;
buf += str_len / sizeof (int32_t);
xcr->cr_uid = IXDR_GET_UINT32(buf);
xcr->cr_gid = IXDR_GET_UINT32(buf);
- gid_len = (size_t)IXDR_GET_UINT32(buf);
- if (gid_len > NGRPS) {
- stat = AUTH_BADCRED;
- goto done;
- }
- for (i = 0; i < gid_len; i++) {
- /*
- * Note that this is a `struct xucred`, which maintains
- * its historical layout of preserving the egid in
- * cr_ngroups and cr_groups[0] == egid.
- */
- if (i + 1 < XU_NGROUPS)
- xcr->cr_groups[i + 1] = IXDR_GET_INT32(buf);
- else
- buf++;
- }
- if (gid_len + 1 > XU_NGROUPS)
- xcr->cr_ngroups = XU_NGROUPS;
- else
- xcr->cr_ngroups = gid_len + 1;
+ supp_ngroups = IXDR_GET_UINT32(buf);
+ /*
+ * See the herald comment before a similar test at the end of
+ * xdr_authunix_parms() for why we strictly respect RFC 5531 and
+ * why we may have to drop the last supplementary group when
+ * there are AUTH_SYS_MAX_GROUPS of them.
+ */
+ if (supp_ngroups > AUTH_SYS_MAX_GROUPS)
+ goto badcred;
+ /*
+ * Final message length check, as we now know how much we will
+ * read in total.
+ */
+ if (auth_len < min_len + str_len +
+ supp_ngroups * BYTES_PER_XDR_UNIT)
+ goto badcred;
/*
- * five is the smallest unix credentials structure -
- * timestamp, hostname len (0), uid, gid, and gids len (0).
+ * Note that 'xcr' is a 'struct xucred', which still has the
+ * historical layout where the effective GID is in cr_groups[0]
+ * and is accounted in 'cr_ngroups'.
*/
- if ((5 + gid_len) * BYTES_PER_XDR_UNIT + str_len > auth_len) {
- (void) printf("bad auth_len gid %ld str %ld auth %u\n",
- (long)gid_len, (long)str_len, auth_len);
- stat = AUTH_BADCRED;
- goto done;
+ for (uint32_t i = 0; i < supp_ngroups; ++i) {
+ if (i < XU_NGROUPS - 1)
+ xcr->cr_sgroups[i] = IXDR_GET_INT32(buf);
+ else
+ buf++;
}
- } else if (! xdr_authunix_parms(&xdrs, &time, xcr)) {
- stat = AUTH_BADCRED;
- goto done;
- }
+ xcr->cr_ngroups = MIN(supp_ngroups + 1, XU_NGROUPS);
+ } else if (!xdr_authunix_parms(&xdrs, &time, xcr))
+ goto badcred;
rqst->rq_verf = _null_auth;
stat = AUTH_OK;
@@ -126,6 +124,10 @@ done:
XDR_DESTROY(&xdrs);
return (stat);
+
+badcred:
+ stat = AUTH_BADCRED;
+ goto done;
}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.25.1) at 2025-10-18 13:51:01 +0000