| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|---|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The MAC framework provides a lot of useful functionality that can be
configured per-jail without requiring the use of labels. Having another
entry point that we invoke just for general prison cleanup rather than
freeing the label is useful to allow a module that can otherwise work
off of a series of MAC entry points + sysctls for configuration to free
its per-jail configuration without having to bring in osd(9).
One such example in the wild is HardenedBSD's secadm, but some of my
own personal use had wanted it as well- it was simply overlooked in the
final version because my first policy made more sense with labels. On
that note, it's expected that prison_cleanup and prison_destroy_label
will effectively be mutually exclusive -- the former only used when
a label isn't needed, the latter when it is.
Note that prison_cleanup isn't perfectly symmetrical w.r.t.
prison_created: the latter takes a label as well, because it's called
later in jail setup and a better point for propagation than when the
label is created.
As discussed with olce@, we may want to later revisit the notion that
struct labels get passed around explicitly along with the referenced
object and consider stripping them from all entry points in favor of
an object -> label accessor or something.
__FreeBSD_version bumped to force a rebuild of MAC policies.
Reviewed by: olce
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D54833
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
We'll still add an old-fashioned jail param to configure jail MAC
labels, but for testing it's really easy to grab a jaildesc and use
that.
Reviewed by: jamie, olce
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D53956
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This adds the following hooks:
- mpo_prison_check_attach: check for subject capability to attach to
a given jail
- mpo_prison_check_create: check for subject capability to create a
jail with the given option set
- mpo_prison_check_get: check for subject capability to fetch the
given parameters for a jail
- mpo_prison_check_set: check for subject capability to set the
given parameters for a jail
- mpo_prison_check_remove: check for subject capability to remove the
jail
check_get wouldn't typically be a privileged operation, but is included
to give MAC policies a wider range of capabilities at a relatively low
cost. We also add two more for the purpose of label propagation:
- mpo_prison_created: surface the creation of a jail so that one can
do propagation to, e.g., the root vnode or any mounts
- mpo_prison_attached: attach an existing process to the jail so that
one can propagate the jail label to the process, as appropriate.
It is unclear if this is preferred vs. having separate associate entry
points for each type of object we might associate. That would split
these up like so:
- prison_created -> prison_associate_vnode
- prison_attached -> prison_associate_proc
Some sample policy ideas that should be feasible to implement with this
set of hooks, in case it's inspiring:
- mac_bomb: policy that allows a poudriere user to construct jails
without root privilege, given a restricted set of jail parameters.
Slap a warning label on it.
- mac_capsule: policy that realizes the capsule idea that I pitched[0]
on -jail@ to create jails that are effectively immutable once
sealed, using these hooks and a label.
Perhaps a silly idea, but a downstream could consider a scenario where
it can implement special jail enumeration using a MAC policy and a
cooperating application that specifies non-parameter options to filter
the results.
[0] https://lists.freebsd.org/archives/freebsd-jail/2025-September/000550.html
Reviewed by: olce (slightly earlier version)
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D53954
|
|
|
Reviewed by: olce
Differential Revision: https://reviews.freebsd.org/D53953
|
